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Overview 
From 2002 to 2012, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation provided $50 million 
to the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago), to implement the New 
Communities Program (NCP). NCP supported community organizations in 14 neighborhood 
areas to convene local partners to define a “quality-of-life plan” for each neighborhood. It then 
provided grants to carry out these plans, which addressed a variety of local challenges, includ-
ing unemployment, struggling schools, and gang violence.  
MacArthur’s investment was informed by research that residents have better outcomes when 
they live in neighborhoods where individuals and organizations come together to respond to 
local challenges. For its part, LISC Chicago wanted to help local agencies learn to work 
together to resolve long-standing antagonisms when they existed and to facilitate implementa-
tion of diverse community improvement projects. This report describes the challenges that NCP 
faced, the extent to which it achieved its goals, and the implications for similar initiatives. As a 
model for recent federal policy, the NCP experience is particularly important to consider.  
Key Findings 
• Nearly 850 varied improvement projects — many with multiple components — and over 
$900 million in total funding (grants and loans) were reported among the 14 neighborhood 
areas over 10 years. MacArthur’s investment was always intended to leverage additional 
resources. NCP succeeded in connecting many groups to citywide and national funders and 
also resulted in partnerships across neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with multi-issue, high-
capacity lead agencies and strong local partners tended to leverage the most additional 
funds.  
• NCP helped to improve collaborative partnerships among local agencies. In neighborhoods 
where trust and cooperation were better established among community groups at the begin-
ning of NCP, interorganizational relationships deepened over the course of the initiative. 
But where there were histories of antagonism among community partners, relationships im-
proved during the periods of planning and early implementation, although it proved difficult 
to sustain both trust and collaboration over time. 
• It was rare for interorganizational relationships to promote collaborative, coordinated 
programming across the many projects supported by NCP, and it was rare for NCP net-
works to add value to the implementation of small, individual projects. In some significant 
cases, however, when guided by a high-capacity lead agency, these organizational partner-
ships could tap into new funding streams and promote strong collaborations. 
Building on the NCP experience, MacArthur and LISC have launched a next-generation 
initiative, “Testing the Model” (TTM). Like the original NCP model, TTM attempts to deliver 
resources to neighborhoods, but these investments are explicitly aimed at achieving longer-term 
change by concentrating efforts on a single issue or domain. Future work will report on the 
implementation of TTM and how neighborhoods are changing in these targeted domains. 
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Preface 
Economic shocks like the Great Recession and natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy have had 
deep consequences for affected communities. But some neighborhoods struggle more with 
these negative events than others. That is, some places see neighbors and local organizations 
coming together to coordinate action to respond to problems, whereas collective action in other 
neighborhoods is rare, fragmented, or disjointed. Research suggests that neighborhoods with the 
ability to come together can respond better to shocks — be it a heat wave or gang violence — 
and can also support better outcomes for residents than their counterparts without this capacity. 
This research presents an important question for policymakers: Which policies and programs 
best support “resilience” and permit neighborhoods to respond to shocks of all sorts?  
One of the largest investments in the country to promote the ability of local organiza-
tions to work together — to solve problems and take advantage of opportunities — was made 
by the MacArthur Foundation, to the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC 
Chicago) and its New Communities Program (NCP). With an investment of $50 million over 10 
years, NCP supported community organizations in 14 neighborhoods to convene local partners 
to define a “quality-of-life plan” for each neighborhood. It then provided grants to carry out 
these plans, which addressed a variety of local challenges, including unemployment, struggling 
schools, and gang violence. LISC Chicago acted as a “managing intermediary,” attracting 
additional resources to NCP neighborhoods; holding lead agencies accountable for making 
progress on plans; and brokering relationships within neighborhoods and between neighbor-
hoods and city agencies, funders, and other powerful agencies. The 10-year period in which 
NCP operated was marked first by a period of housing inflation and then by the bursting of the 
housing bubble and the onset of the Great Recession. In other words, NCP was designed to 
support community resilience, and the recession, in fact, posed this test. 
How funders, communities, and local practitioners responded to the volatility of a dec-
ade is of critical interest to the field. In many ways a template for the Obama administration’s 
Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, which emphasizes the coordination of comprehensive 
investments, NCP’s challenges and successes provide a detailed sense of what it takes to 
implement this influential model for community improvement. 
 
Gordon L. Berlin 
President, MDRC 
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Executive Summary 
The New Communities Program: Goals and Structure 
In many low-income communities, gang violence, housing disinvestment, and limited economic 
mobility may magnify the effects of poverty for residents, making it even harder for children to 
succeed in school, grow up healthy, and achieve economic success. But in their ability to meet 
these challenges, not all low-income neighborhoods are alike. A growing body of evidence 
suggests that when neighbors and local organizations can come together to respond to problems, 
residents in these places have better educational and health outcomes than their counterparts in 
lower-capacity neighborhoods.1 With this goal in mind, beginning in 2002, the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation supported the New Communities Program (NCP) in 
Chicago, providing $50 million over 10 years to help promote the ability of local organizations 
to band together, respond to challenges, and implement new solutions to improve communities.  
Developed by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) as 
a way of promoting comprehensive community development among local groups, NCP is one 
of the largest single-city efforts to help develop local capacity, partnerships, and resources. (Box 
ES.1 defines the key terms associated with these efforts.) Although NCP continues in Chicago, 
this report is focused on the first 10 years of MacArthur’s support for the program. This fourth 
and final report on the first 10 years of NCP describes the guiding principles behind the initia-
tive, the extent to which it achieved its goals, the challenges it faced, and the implications of 
these challenges and successes for similar initiatives. As a flagship example of a significant 
comprehensive community initiative (CCI) — and one that has served as a model for recent 
federal policy — the NCP experience offers important lessons for the next generation of place-
based CCIs.  
From the outset, NCP had three important goals: 
1. Building the capacity of individual community organizations to function 
as neighborhood-wide conveners or “intermediaries.” NCP operated un-
der the theory that neighborhoods that came together to identify problems, 
propose solutions, and implement locally developed plans would be more re-
silient than others. As such, this intermediary, convening approach to com-
                                                     
1See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the 
Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Robert J. Sampson, Great American City: 
Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); and Katherine 
S. Newman and Rebekah Peeples Massengill, “The Texture of Hardship: Qualitative Sociology of Poverty, 
1995-2005” (Annual Review of Sociology 32: 423-446 [2006]). 
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Box ES.1 
Key Terms for the NCP Evaluation 
Comprehensive community initiative (CCI): A program (such as NCP) distinguished by 
a comprehensive approach to community improvement. Some CCIs, like NCP, promote 
projects in varied domains of neighborhood work, while others use multiple approaches to 
target a single goal. 
Community development corporation (CDC): A not-for-profit organization, usually 
serving a geographic location such as a neighborhood or a town. While CDCs can be 
involved in a variety of activities, they are often associated with building and renovating 
affordable housing and commercial real estate for low-income people through “bricks-
and-mortar” development. NCP was designed in part to help CDCs enter into more varied 
areas of work. 
Intermediary: An organization that supports relationships among groups, promotes their 
capacity, and helps steer investments to them. NCP relies heavily on intermediaries, with a 
“managing intermediary” in the form of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of 
Chicago (LISC Chicago) taking a direct role in day-to-day operations of the initiative and 
14 “local intermediaries” or “neighborhood intermediaries” (also known as “lead agen-
cies,” described next) overseeing the program’s local implementation. 
Lead agency: One of 14 organizations chosen by LISC and the MacArthur Foundation to 
manage NCP planning and plan implementation. Also referred to as “local intermediaries” 
or “neighborhood intermediaries,” lead agencies were generally provided with two staff 
members, who first direct a community planning process and then help manage the plan’s 
implementation. In contrast to other initiatives, NCP initially took the approach of desig-
nating a single lead agency to manage the initiative in each Chicago neighborhood. Lead 
agencies included CDCs, community organizing groups, and agencies newly formed to 
manage NCP. 
Leverage: Additional funding from other sources that may follow an initial grant. Al-
though it was a substantial investment for the MacArthur Foundation, NCP was designed 
to create opportunities for LISC, lead agencies, and partners to identify and obtain more 
funding. 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC): LISC is a national community develop-
ment intermediary (see above) founded in 1979 by Ford Foundation, initially to help 
promote the capacity of CDCs and support the financing of affordable housing. It has over 
30 offices in urban areas around the country, and its Chicago office manages the NCP 
initiative. 
NCP “platform”: The idea that local relationships, capacity, and investments sparked 
through NCP can serve as a basis for future investments in the neighborhood. “Platform 
projects” were larger investments centered on education, broadband technology, and youth 
development that emerged over the course of the initiative in NCP areas.  
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munity development was seen to be more successful than various “go it 
alone” efforts that characterized previous community development efforts, 
which often led to fragmentation and disorganization.  
2. Building stronger partnerships and coordinating program implementa-
tion among neighborhood organizations, based on mutual trust. Trust-
building was considered to be a goal in itself and was also a step toward cre-
ating more strategic partnerships that connected isolated community im-
provement efforts to each other, thereby improving their targeting and coor-
dination. NCP also hoped to help strengthen ties between neighborhood 
groups and powerful agencies outside the neighborhood. 
3. Leveraging external resources for varied improvement projects of quali-
ty and scale. NCP stemmed from LISC’s belief that community develop-
ment corporations (CDCs) had focused too exclusively on building afforda-
ble housing and not on the variety of interconnected problems that befall 
neighborhoods. Accordingly, NCP attempted to help neighborhoods address 
different types of local challenges, including unemployment, struggling 
schools, and gang violence. While MacArthur’s investment was substantial, 
it was spread over many different neighborhoods over a long period time, so 
grants were always intended to leverage additional resources by convincing 
other public and private funders that NCP neighborhoods represented good 
investments.  
To enact these goals, NCP selected a local “lead agency” in each neighborhood area 
and paid for two full-time staff, technical support for planning, and an opportunity to participate 
in learning from peers and subject-area experts. Lead agencies varied in size and historic 
capacity. LISC Chicago acted as a “managing intermediary,” attracting additional resources to 
NCP neighborhoods; holding lead agencies accountable for making progress on plans; and 
brokering relationships within neighborhoods and between neighborhoods and city agencies, 
funders, and other powerful agencies.  
During the planning phase of NCP, each lead agency convened other community or-
ganizations to define its own “quality-of-life plan” for its neighborhood. The plan provided a 
template for varied projects to be accomplished over the course of several years. Projects 
spanned large public investments that did not currently exist (such as a new transportation stop 
on a commuter rail line) to small private ones that were already planned (such as murals and 
tree plantings). These plans were meant to be very inclusive of all groups’ ideas and existing 
efforts, thereby building trust among local organizations. The plans did not, however, set 
standards for the implementation of individual projects or dictate how groups would interact 
ES-4 
with each other in the future. During the implementation phase of NCP, LISC Chicago awarded  
loans from its own National Loan Pool and grants using MacArthur Foundation funding and 
other sources to support these projects. Over time, LISC was able to attract significant external 
resources into larger “platform projects” (Box ES.1) in youth development, middle school 
improvement, and access to technology, among other areas. These projects became an increas-
ing emphasis of NCP implementation. 
NCP Neighborhoods and the Great Recession  
NCP operates in 14 Chicago areas, encompassing primarily African-American, primarily Latino 
and immigrant areas, and more racially and ethnically mixed locations. (See Figure ES.1.) It is 
important to note that the 10 years of NCP implementation included both a housing boom and 
the period known as “the Great Recession.” That is, in 2006, during the height of NCP imple-
mentation, the housing market collapsed, bursting the speculative bubble that had been growing 
since the turn of the century and helping launch one of the worst financial crises in decades.  
The most profound effect of the recession was seen in housing and lending indicators. 
Completed foreclosures exhibited a dramatic upswing, going from an annual average decline 
of 28.4 percent in the period 2003-2005 to an annual average increase of 24.5 percent in the 
years 2006-2009. Across Chicago, the volume of housing lending declined, with lower-income 
neighborhoods being particularly hard hit. Commercial lending declined overall, and job growth 
and employment also suffered. Although neighborhoods experienced stresses associated with 
the recession differently, the tumultuous period of NCP implementation put its underlying 
theory — working together, neighborhood organizations can respond effectively to shocks and 
take advantage of opportunities — to the test.  
Key Findings 
1. Building capacity: Lead agencies varied substantially as to whether they 
developed the convening or “intermediary” skills of the NCP model.  
NCP rests on the premise that community improvement may best be achieved by mobilizing 
many local groups to take ownership of the program, supported by outside partners. But 
histories of conflict or fragmentation among local agencies can derail this collaboration. NCP 
charged a single agency in each neighborhood with coordinating and steering work by other 
groups over which it had no direct authority, asking it to overcome differences among them and 
to sustain engagement over a long period of time. These tasks are challenging by definition, 
especially because most organizations are skilled in providing services — not in acting as 
neighborhood-wide conveners and leaders.  
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The New Communities Program 
 
Figure ES.1 
 
The NCP Neighborhoods 
 
 
NOTE: The map displays the Chicago municipal area within Cook County divided into the 80 neighbor-
hoods defined for the NCP analysis. The 14 NCP neighborhoods are labeled and shaded. 
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• Lead agencies that began NCP with a track record of bringing local 
groups together enhanced these skills over the course of the initiative.  
Within NCP, about one-quarter of lead agencies started NCP with a significant track 
record of convening other neighborhood organizations. However, these agencies uniformly 
improved those skills through NCP — a notable accomplishment, given the agencies’ strong 
starting places. Some were community organizing groups that had brought local organizations 
and individuals together for some time. But other larger, generally high-capacity groups also 
improved their ability to act as conveners. For example, a large CDC in northwest Chicago 
which had been seen as an important partner in local collaborations (but not necessarily a leader 
of them) learned to staff and facilitate multiple task forces over the 10-year course of NCP and 
also learned to teach other groups how to accomplish this convening work. 
• Small-to-midsize CDCs that formed in the 1980s as well as new organi-
zations that formed for the purpose of implementing NCP found it diffi-
cult to learn how to spark and sustain productive partnerships among 
neighborhood organizations over time.  
About one-quarter of NCP lead agencies were smaller CDCs that focused on building 
affordable housing, and all but one these groups found it difficult to make the transition to 
NCP’s model of facilitating action by others. In many ways, it is not surprising that organiza-
tions that were “built” primarily to do something different from NCP found its model more 
challenging to implement. However, about another third of lead agencies were founded express-
ly for the purposes of implementing NCP, and these groups also faced difficult trade-offs 
between consolidating themselves as independent organizations that provided services and 
acting as conveners or intermediaries. Challenges that both types of agencies faced were 
compounded by the fact that they operated in neighborhoods where there were fewer partners to 
convene or where trust was low among organizations.  
2. Forming relationships: NCP helped to improve collaborative partnerships 
among local agencies that started from a stronger foundation of trusting 
relationships.  
NCP attempted to build relationships among community organizations and to connect these 
groups to actors outside the neighborhood, under the theory that neighborhoods with closer 
connections are better able to respond to crises and take advantage of opportunities.  
• In neighborhoods where trust and cooperation were better established 
among community groups at the beginning of NCP, interorganizational 
relationships deepened over the course of the initiative. 
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In about a third of NCP neighborhoods, organizations had good working relationships 
before NCP. For example, in Humboldt Park, relations were already strong in the eastern, 
Puerto Rican part of the neighborhood, but trust continued to deepen among service, youth, and 
cultural organizations, resulting in new types of collaborations and new opportunities for 
funding outside NCP. Trust also deepened between the western, African-American side of the 
neighborhood and its eastern, Puerto Rican sections, with the result that new resources were 
delivered to that underserved portion of the neighborhood. Across the initiative, LISC Chicago 
helped broker relationships among lead agencies and between these groups, outside funders, 
and city government.  
• NCP helped connect many lead agencies to citywide and national fun-
ders, and it resulted in partnerships across neighborhoods.  
Participation in NCP over time helped enhance lead agencies’ connections to each other 
from around the city, building community among them and resulting in programs being spread 
from group to group in connection with youth programming and teacher recruitment efforts. 
• Where there were greater histories of antagonism among community 
partners at the beginning of the initiative, NCP improved relationships 
during the planning period and through early implementation, but both 
trust and collaboration were often difficult to sustain. 
Although neighborhoods with histories of antagonism among community groups had 
planning “task forces” to explore different issues at the beginning of the initiative, they tended not 
to sustain active participation over the course of NCP. For example, in North Lawndale — a 
historically disinvested area on the West Side of Chicago — planning and early implementation 
helped form some partnerships, but these were difficult to sustain after the planning period ended.  
• It was rare for relationships to promote collaborative, coordinated pro-
gramming across individual projects, but when guided by a high-
capacity organization, innovative partnerships did develop.  
Across the many projects supported by NCP, it was rare for NCP networks to add value 
to the implementation of individual projects in concrete ways; in other words, while groups may 
have had greater awareness of each others’ projects, this tended not to change the ways that 
smaller initiatives were implemented in relationship to each other. (Individual “platform” 
initiatives did, however, attempt to change practice, for example, in the ways that agencies 
approached workforce development.) In some significant cases, however, when guided by a 
high-capacity lead agency, these new relationships enabled agencies to tap into new funding 
streams and promote strong collaborations. For example, the lead agency in Chicago Lawn, the 
Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP), helped bring together churches, schools, and other 
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community organizations whose work was not related to housing but who quickly became 
more convinced that foreclosures represented a community crisis that threatened their own 
efforts in the neighborhood, and so they worked to address that crisis. In general, even though 
NCP emphasized relationships in areas outside of housing development, housing and foreclo-
sure prevention was an area in which NCP networks could be especially instrumental. 
3. Implementation and leverage: The lead agencies and their partners 
implemented varied improvement projects, which reported substantial 
leverage of additional resources from sources other than the MacArthur 
Foundation. 
Comprehensive community development programs such as NCP proceed under the belief that 
neighborhood improvement is best achieved through a multipronged effort, instead of a sole 
focus on physical, “bricks-and-mortar” improvement to housing alone. Through 2008, early 
implementation demonstrated the completion of projects in social services and education under 
the auspices of NCP,2 but the Great Recession altered the flow of resources to neighborhoods, 
making it more difficult to attract loans for affordable housing construction and reducing 
state funding, even as it provided other resources through federal stimulus programs. 
• Nearly 850 projects — many with multiple components — and over 
$900 million in total funding (grants and loans) were reported among 
the 14 neighborhood areas. Work continued to be comprehensive, and 
there was no “flagging” of implementation efforts during the later years 
of the initiative. 
The Great Recession moved project activity away from real estate development, with 
the result that more leverage came in foundation or federally supported initiatives than from 
loans or grants associated with housing construction. These significant investments demon-
strate that the NCP platform remained a vehicle for substantial improvement efforts. For 
example, in the later years of NCP, “The Green Exchange” initiative in Logan Square provid-
ed job training and employment for low-income workers in the community, and it was reported 
to have leveraged more than $6 million in additional funding. (See Figure ES.2.)  
• NCP lead agencies and their partners were able to direct resources with-
in neighborhoods, often to promote work along commercial corridors or 
to subareas that they saw as being underserved. 
                                                     
2David Greenberg, Nandita Verma, Keri-Nicole Dillman, and Robert Chaskin, Creating a Platform for 
Sustained Neighborhood Improvement: Interim Findings from Chicago’s New Communities Program (New 
York: MDRC, 2010). 
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MDRC mapped the locations of implemented projects in three neighborhoods and 
whether these projects were located in areas with more reported crime, foreclosures, and 
housing investment within the community. In all three neighborhoods, there was evidence that 
lead agencies and their partners consciously targeted activities, generally along local 
commercial corridors. For example, in Chicago Lawn, the 63rd Street Streetscape program 
beautified and improved a central commercial corridor and was reported to have brought in 
$600,000 in private donations from the Islamic community in Chicago Lawn and surrounding 
neighborhoods, as well as over $1 million in additional financial resources. Despite the fact that 
NCP planning might have produced projects that were spread thinly throughout the whole 
neighborhood, lead agencies were, in fact, able to channel implementation efforts within 
communities. (However, these activities were not always coordinated with each other, as 
described above.)  
• Neighborhoods with multi-issue, high-capacity lead agencies and strong 
local partners tended to leverage the most additional funds.  
The New Communities Program
Figure ES.2
NCP Funding, by Domain and Time Period
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago.
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, non-LISC 
investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support.
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For example, in Logan Square, the Logan Square Neighborhood Association is a well-
established community organizing group that had established planning task forces in multiple 
areas. NCP helped it bring affordable housing developers into deeper partnership with the lead 
agency, and when construction of local apartments faced opposition from those worried about 
additional affordable housing in the neighborhood, organizers mobilized networks to request 
their support for a zoning change that would allow for the construction.  
4. Managing the initiative: LISC Chicago played a critical role in attracting 
additional investments to NCP and lead agencies, but it was challenged 
to help lead agencies implement strongly coordinated local initiatives. 
The interim report on NCP found that LISC Chicago was able to manage grants flexibly and to 
mediate community conflict successfully.3 Community organizations valued the flexibility and 
speed with which LISC Chicago provided seed grants and its technical assistance during 
planning. Given the challenges of sustaining action over a long period of time, it is worth 
considering how LISC’s management of the initiative evolved over the course of imple-
mentation. 
• During the budgetary crises associated with the Great Recession, LISC 
Chicago was able to attract significant additional funding to make up 
for service cuts and the absence of construction loans, based on the 
comprehensive approach that NCP promoted.  
Local groups were often directly affected by budgetary crises, and they valued NCP 
and the resources that LISC Chicago was able to attract, as an alternative source of revenue 
during a difficult time. In some cases, LISC’s support was critical to keeping agencies viable 
during the downturn. The fact that NCP operated in multiple domains and that it provided a 
framework for local collaboration was very important to attracting these additional resources, as 
it allowed LISC Chicago to solicit funding for large, cross-neighborhood initiatives related to 
income and credit building, education, broadband, and youth development. 
• LISC Chicago provided a structured approach to creating neighbor-
hood plans, but, later in the initiative, NCP had few formal mechanisms 
for encouraging quality or coordination among smaller and larger 
stand-alone projects. 
The broad quality-of-life plans initially developed through NCP did not require projects 
to be concretely connected to each other. Indeed, one purpose of the NCP small grants was to 
                                                     
3Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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provide flexibility and autonomy without onerous requirements on participants. Lead agencies 
and LISC Chicago were also reluctant to direct other groups’ efforts, given a need to maintain 
relationships and a desire not to undercut community control of interventions. In part due to 
these factors, lead agencies took different approaches to implementation, and about half did not 
attempt to foster or maintain collaborations over time that could result in greater coordination. 
As described above, among individual platform projects, additional planning, engagement, and 
quality mechanisms were implemented, but there was variation in how well these efforts were 
connected with other community-based initiatives associated with NCP. 
NCP Evolves  
In 2012, MacArthur’s investment in the New Communities Program entered a new phase, 
with a shift toward LISC Chicago’s “Testing the Model” (TTM) pilot project. Over the course 
of NCP, the foundation became increasingly interested in establishing specific community 
change targets as part of its next phase of investment in Chicago neighborhoods, as it believed 
that establishing these outcomes could be a way to establish greater coordination of invest-
ments within NCP neighborhoods. In response, LISC Chicago developed TTM as a pilot 
program meant to test whether relationships that formed over the course of NCP could be 
harnessed in a focused attempt to change neighborhood trajectories in health, housing, 
education, and safety. In this way, TTM represents a way to align LISC’s traditional interest 
in capacity-building and the MacArthur Foundation’s traditional interest in demonstrating 
measurable community change.  
TTM represents an effort to deploy NCP’s platform of interorganizational relationships 
and partnerships toward a more outcomes- and data-oriented approach to comprehensive 
community development. It asks lead agencies and their community partners to identify a single 
issue area or domain in which they will concentrate and coordinate efforts and around which 
they will target multistrategy, multipartner approaches to enacting quantifiable, community-
wide goals. Like the original NCP model, TTM attempts to improve capacity, further develop 
relationships, and deliver resources to neighborhoods, but near-term capacity-building is less an 
end in itself than a means to achieve longer-term community change goals. The agencies and 
neighborhoods selected for TTM included some of the strongest performers among NCP, where 
the deepest relationships were built and where agencies had best learned to act as conveners and 
intermediaries. In March 2012, the MacArthur Foundation awarded a three-year, $8 million 
grant in support of TTM. Currently, five TTM sites from the original 14 NCP neighborhoods 
are implementing plans that were developed with the help of community partners and issue 
experts. Areas of intervention that were selected by local groups include education, safety, 
housing, and public health. Future reports will study the implementation of TTM and how 
neighborhoods are changing in these targeted domains.  
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Lessons for the Field 
The NCP experience is particularly relevant for communities launching initiatives that rely 
heavily on partnerships among neighborhood organizations or that emphasize coordinated and 
comprehensive action. NCP research provides some important lessons for future comprehensive 
community development initiatives and for an emerging set of federal and place-based initia-
tives that have modeled themselves in some ways on it, such as the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s Choice Neighborhoods program for redeveloping 
distressed public housing projects via comprehensive strategies; the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Promise Neighborhoods initiative to promote place-based planning and imple-
mentation of comprehensive services to help “a continuum of cradle-through-college-and-
career solutions”; and LISC’s national Building Sustainable Communities (BSC) program, 
which is, in many ways, an explicit replication of NCP, now operating in 110 target neighbor-
hoods in 25 cities across the country. Such initiatives faced several formative decisions that are 
illuminated by the NCP experience.  
• Defining comprehensiveness. Designers of future initiatives should define 
“comprehensiveness” as a framework for varied but coordinated strategies 
that work together to achieve common goals.  
Led in many ways by LISC Chicago, comprehensiveness has become a significant 
guiding principle for community development across the nation. Within NCP, “comprehensive-
ness” was defined primarily as the promotion of a broad and inclusive range of neighborhood 
improvement projects. This approach was successful in promoting community engagement in 
the quality-of-life planning process. It later allowed LISC Chicago and lead agencies to attract 
grants in broadband, education, and foreclosure prevention that helped them offset the funding 
gaps caused by the recession. But there are pitfalls to this model of comprehensiveness, 
including the risk of spreading limited resources too thinly among many different types of 
projects. In NCP, it did not ensure high-quality implementation across a broad range of work or 
promote coordination among varied projects growing from the early implementation of quality-
of-life plans. Its breadth also made it difficult if not impossible to establish quantifiable com-
munity change goals and to measure community-level outcomes. (However, within large, 
multisite initiatives such as income and credit building, middle school education, broadband 
adoption, and youth sports programming, programmatic goals were established as a way of 
monitoring implementation).4 These challenges suggest that program designers may be better 
                                                     
4For evaluations of these initiatives and accounts of how they developed, see Caroline Tolbert, Karen 
Mossberger, and Chris Anderson, “Measuring Change in Internet Use and Broadband Adoption: Comparing 
BTOP Smart Communities and Other Chicago Neighborhoods” (Springfield: Partnership for a Better Illinois, 
2013); and Caroline Goldstein, “New Communities Program Data Brief, 2003-2011,” Updated Draft (Chicago: 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago, December 1, 2011). 
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served by defining comprehensiveness as the coordinated mobilization of a varied range of 
complementary efforts and strategies to achieve more limited and well-defined common goals. 
This is the approach now being pursued in TTM. 
• Deciding where to invest. Initiative managers should be aware of the neigh-
borhood conditions and features of local partner organizations and should 
plan accordingly.  
All community initiatives — even large federal efforts like Choice Neighborhoods and 
Promise Neighborhoods — face difficult choices as to where they will invest limited resources, 
since there are many neighborhoods in the United States with high levels of need. The neigh-
borhoods that were best able to implement NCP — best able to convene others, build strong 
relationships that allowed for more coordinated efforts, and leverage additional resources from 
funders other than MacArthur — tended to be neighborhoods with many potential implement-
ing partners and generally good relationships among them. They also tended to be neighbor-
hoods where NCP was led by organizations with a proven track record of achievement and 
growth over time, experience with convening and coordinating, a history of working in more 
than one issue area, and a community organizing background. NCP proved most difficult to 
implement where all or most of these conditions were absent, suggesting that implementers 
should expect that greater resources and more creative strategies will be required in such 
contexts. (LISC made significant investments in these more challenged environments, and it 
saw some notable successes, in such neighborhoods as Quad Communities on the South Side.)  
• Planning ahead for implementation. The planning process should en-
courage relationship-building by including an array of existing groups and 
projects. But it also should establish how individual projects will be coordi-
nated and should identify new implementation collaborations where possible. 
Public and interagency planning processes are central to the White House’s Neighbor-
hood Revitalization Initiative (NRI) strategy. Accordingly, decisions about how to structure 
these processes are particularly important. NCP was remarkably effective in building relations 
among community organizations through a very inclusive 18-month period of collective 
planning and visioning. LISC Chicago supported this inclusive approach to promote community 
priorities, acting as a “partner” to lead agencies rather than as an ordinary funder, and lead 
agencies valued this more relational approach to NCP management. At the same time, LISC did 
not generally set guidance for project coordination or for greater collaborative impact during 
implementation of varied projects established in quality-of-life plans (although it provided 
greater guidance on larger, multisite, platform projects.). Attention to these issues during 
planning may, therefore, be important for similar initiatives, such as Choice Neighborhoods and 
Promise Neighborhoods. While they are challenging efforts, both TTM and the inclusion of 
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accountability goals in platform projects have been important ways to establish new quality, 
targeting, and coordination goals. Funders in foundations or government should be aware that 
the amount of resources provided to local implementers — often significant for a funder but 
modest relative to the community’s or project’s needs, and divided among multiple parties — 
should be taken into account while setting these expectations.  
• Sustaining local governance. Initiative managers should support local con-
vening and accountability mechanisms during implementation.  
NCP, like many community initiatives, sought to build strong relationships among local 
groups and between these groups, government, and funders — what initiative managers came to 
call “the NCP platform” (Box ES.1). One early choice by NCP designers to promote this goal 
was making a single lead agency responsible for coordinating a collective planning process and 
managing the implementation of quality-of-life plans. In contrast to earlier initiatives that 
struggled with collective governance structures, this choice proved to be an effective way of 
balancing efficiency of implementation with collective ownership. However, neighborhoods 
that did not continue to convene local groups through implementation found it more difficult to 
sustain relationships and coordinate projects over time. Thus, managers may need to set 
stronger expectations and provide stronger supports toward sustaining such governance 
structures and charging them with periodic re-planning and joint decision-making about 
important implementation projects, while remaining flexible as to the specific form this local 
governance takes.  
 
1 
Chapter 1 
Building the NCP Platform 
Why Neighborhood Matters 
In the United States, low-income households often live in neighborhoods apart.1 The toll of 
poverty on life prospects may be compounded in these places, as researchers have documented 
“neighborhood effects” that exacerbate the consequences of being poor.2 For example, studies 
have estimated that the stress caused by living in a very low-income neighborhood decreases 
educational performance by about two grade levels.3 Concentrated poverty — on the rise 
through the first decade of the century and likely compounded by the Great Recession (2006-
2009) — makes considerations of place and its effects on residents especially important.4 
Foreclosures and abandonment brought about by financial and economic crises have been 
especially apparent in historically disinvested neighborhoods, where owners weathered housing 
speculation only to be unable to pay back loans on properties that were difficult to resell or 
refinance. As tax revenues in the Great Recession dried up in the wake of the financial and 
economic collapse, states experienced the largest budget shortfalls ever recorded, totaling nearly 
$600 billion5 and affecting programs that support the neighborhoods of greatest need by 
creating further shortfalls. 
Urban problems in these communities can be addressed through separate means, includ-
ing educational reform, affordable housing initiatives, and social service interventions. But 
because neighborhood “matters,” these problems are often interconnected, and improvement in 
one area can be held up by problems in another. For example, it may be hard to encourage 
families to stay and invest in their homes if they believe that local schools do not serve their 
children well. In turn, efforts to improve schools may be held up by gang violence, which itself 
may be connected to a lack of youth development services. Although it may not be feasible to 
tackle every problem, the goal of comprehensive community development has emerged as an 
important component of neighborhood improvement. Such development declares that complex, 
interrelated, problems require coordinated, intensive responses that are driven by local needs 
and so are better able to respond with locally driven solutions.6 
                                                     
1Massey and Denton (1993). 
2Sampson (2012). 
3Newman and Massengill (2006). 
4Kneebone, Nadeau, and Berube (2011). 
5Oliff, Mai, and Palacios (2012). 
6Kubisch et al. (2002). 
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Not every neighborhood has the ability to carry out this approach to community im-
provement efforts. In fact, research on neighborhood effects suggests that not all low-income 
neighborhoods are the same; rather, neighborhoods possess varied strengths, especially in the 
ability of individuals and community organizations to come together to solve the problems that 
they face. These varied capacities have been associated with differences in measurable commu-
nity indicators, such as crime.7 In other words, while neighborhood-based networks and 
institutions can exacerbate poverty’s effects, they can also be deployed to mitigate them. 
Moving to solve problems together may require a different set of capacities on the part of local 
organizations and the funders who support them, a set of relationships that support the imple-
mentation of coordinated programs, and resources that can allow groups to act in multiple areas 
at once. 
The New Communities Program 
In scale and in the duration of its commitment, perhaps the preeminent single-city initiative that 
promotes comprehensive community development is the New Communities Program (NCP), 
operated by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) and funded 
by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. A 10-year, $50 million initiative, NCP 
helps selected Chicago neighborhoods develop partnerships to address challenges in such areas 
as employment, education, housing, and safety in a comprehensive, coordinated fashion. 
Through engagement, collaborative planning, and implementation, NCP designers believed that 
community organizations, which too often work in isolation on narrow agendas, would come 
together to solve common problems and improve the quality of life in their communities — 
across a variety of outcomes. 
NCP’s specific genesis was in the efforts of leaders of community development in Chi-
cago, led by LISC Chicago. In 1997, the Futures Committee — a gathering of civic and neigh-
borhood leaders convened by LISC Chicago and MacArthur — began to rethink the goals and 
methods of community development. At the time, there was a sense that neighborhoods needed 
more than subsidized housing to reconnect to the mainstream and that community development 
organizations needed to be more than builders and landlords. Around the same moment, the 
MacArthur Foundation was interested in forming a stronger framework for guiding its communi-
ty investments within Chicago. Its board was interested in the foundation’s expanding its work to 
many more neighborhoods, especially those with high rates of poverty. MacArthur had worked 
with LISC Chicago in the past to build the capacity of the community development field, and the 
foundation sought to partner with it again in the effort to expand. LISC Chicago engaged thinkers 
on comprehensive community development initiatives — including the creator of the Compre-
                                                     
7Sampson (2012). 
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hensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP) in the South Bronx, New York City — and 
developed a pilot initiative modeled after it, known as the New Communities Initiative (NCI). 
NCP built on NCI and greatly expanded it, moving to 14 neighborhood areas, each served by a 
lead agency.8 Table 1.1 briefly describes all 14 neighborhoods. 
The NCP approach, as it emerged, involved several design choices or features that came 
from past insights about community initiatives. Each of these distinctive features of NCP is 
explored in this report. 
• Challenges of local coordination and capacity. To respond to these chal-
lenges, NCP emphasizes the development of an “intermediary approach” to 
neighborhood improvement. An intermediary is an organization that attempts 
to promote relationships among organizations, builds the capacity of these 
groups, and steers strategic investments to them. Both planning and coordi-
nation of efforts occur through a single local intermediary — referred to as 
the “lead agency” — that works extensively to build consensus among other 
community organizations, to strengthen existing relationships, and to form 
new ones. 
• Challenges of implementation. To promote implementation, NCP relies on 
a strategy that delegates tasks among many hands. In contrast to its pilot pre-
decessor, NCI, a feature of NCP as it expanded to additional areas is that it 
offers much more explicit encouragement to lead agencies that other organi-
zations carry out the plan that was created collectively. That is, while pro-
grams such as CCRP in the South Bronx focused on community development 
corporations (CDCs) and chose to diversify their activities, NCP acknowl-
edges that a CDC does not, in itself, need to take on projects that it may not 
be suited to implement directly.9 NCP promotes implementation in other 
ways, as in attempts to promote early-action projects to bridge the gap be-
tween planning and implementation. 
• Conflict between funders and implementers. To avoid such conflicts, 
LISC Chicago is the manager of grants and the direct contact with local or-
ganizations, while the MacArthur Foundation is the primary funder. This re-
lationship was not without conflict, sometimes centering on the question of 
                                                     
8NCP is often described as serving 16 Chicago communities. However, these communities are located in 
14 areas for the purposes of the initiative’s planning and implementation. Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, this 
report refers to these areas as NCP’s 14 neighborhoods. 
9Although NCP does not work only with CDCs, LISC has traditionally worked with these organizations. 
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whether NCP’s efforts should be expected to transform neighborhoods — a 
complicated issue for research and evaluation. 
   
Community Area Served,            
Lead Agencya 
 (Year Founded)
Auburn Gresham: Greater 
Auburn Gresham Development  
Corporation (2001)
CDC Commercial 
development, 
affordable housing
Implementer No 98%h African-
American
25,336 Limited, few groups, 
holes in existing services
Chicago Southwest: Greater 
Southwest Community 
Development Corporation 
(1974) / Southwest Organizing 
Project (1988)
CDC/ community 
organizing
Commercial 
development/ multi-
issue
Implementer/
broker
Yes 59% African-
American, 35% 
Latino, 10% 
white, large 
Middle Eastern 
community
118,674 Strong, many groups, 
service-rich
East Garfield Park: Garfield 
Park Conservatory Alliance 
(1998)d
Education/ 
outreach
Nature, conservation Implementer No 98% African-
American
30,301 Limited, few groups, 
holes in existing services
Englewood: Teamwork 
Englewood (2003)
NCP 
implementation
Established for NCP Implementer No 98% African-
American
77,515 Limited, few groups, 
holes in existing services
Humboldt Park: Bickerdike 
Redevelopment Corporation 
(1968)
CDC with issue-
specific organizing 
history
Affordable housing Broker Yes 48% African-
American, 48% 
Latino
85,591 Strong, many groups, 
service-rich
(continued)
The New Communities Program
Table 1.1
The NCP Neighborhoods
Type of 
Organization Pre-NCP Focus
Primary 
Implementation 
Approach
Early 
Legitimacy as 
Convener
Demographic 
Makeupb Populationc
Strength and Number of 
Community Partners
4 
 Community Area Served,                      
Lead Agencya                                    
(Year Founded)
Type of 
Organization Pre-NCP Focus
Primary 
Implementation 
Approach
Early 
Legitimacy as 
Convener
Demographic 
Makeupb Populationc
Strength and Number of 
Community Partners
Little Village: Enlace (1998) Community 
outreach and 
education 
Violence prevention, 
youth
Implementer/
broker
Somewhat 83% Latino 77,324 Limited, few groups, 
some historic 
tensions/holes in existing 
services
Logan Square: Logan Square 
Neighborhood Association 
(1962)
Community 
organizing
Multi-issue: housing, 
health, education, 
jobs, immigration
Implementer/ 
broker
Yes 65% Latino 81,140 Strong, many groups, 
service-rich
North Lawndale: Lawndale 
Christian Development 
Corporation (1987)
CDC Housing development Implementer No 94% African-
American
4,799 Average
Pilsen: The Resurrection Project 
(1990)
CDC, with 
organizing history
Affordable housing, 
commercial 
development
Implementor/ 
broker
Somewhat 89% Latino 37,477 Strong, many groups, 
service-rich
Quad:e Quad Community 
Development Corporation 
(2003)
NCP 
implementation
Established for NCP Implementer No 89% African-
American
21,252 Average
South Chicago: Claretian 
Associatesf (1981)
CDC Affordable housing Broker Yes 68% African-
American, 27% 
Latino
11,406 Average
Washington Park: Washington 
Park Consortium (2003)g
NCP 
implementation
Established for NCP Broker No 97% African-
American
8,465 Limited, few groups, 
holes in existing services
West Haven: Near Westside 
Community Development 
Corporation (1987)
CDC Affordable housing, 
commercial 
development
Implementer Somewhat 53% African-
American, 10% 
Latino
8,802 Limited, few groups, 
holes in existing services
Woodlawn: The Network of 
Woodlawn 
NCP 
implementation
Established for NCP Broker Somewhat 95% African-
American
23,410 Average
(continued)
Table 1.1 (continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
SOURCES: 2008 lead-agency portfolio update, MDRC interviews, and NCP program documentation.
NOTES: aLead agency as of 2009. Unless otherwise noted, organizations were established prior to NCP.
bBased on 2000 Census, around baseline.
cFrom 2005-2009 American Community Survey, based on definition of NCP area, which differs in some cases from the city-designated community area.
dWhile the Garfield Park Conservatory Alliance is a long-established organization, NCP within it was a newer function and established itself as a 
separate nonprofit organization toward the end of the 10 years of NCP.
eQuad is not a community area. Its boundaries represent the 4th Aldermanic Ward of Chicago and include portions of Douglas, Grand Boulevard, North 
Kenwood, and Oakland.
fClaretian Associates was not the original agency selected to implement NCP but became the NCP lead after the original agency no longer wanted to 
participate.  
gThe Washington Park Consortium was founded after the original NCP lead agency was removed by LISC. 
hFigures in this table were rounded to the nearest whole number and may not add up to 100 percent.
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 Box 1.1 defines the key terms associated with these distinctive characteristics of NCP. 
The NCP model emerged as follows: A lead agency is provided with two full-time staff, 
technical support for planning and documentation, and an opportunity to participate in learning 
from peers and subject-area experts. During the planning phase of NCP, the lead agency con-
venes other local groups to define a quality-of-life plan. This plan provides a template for varied 
projects to be accomplished over the next several years, including social service initiatives, 
employment and economic development programs, community arts initiatives, and affordable 
housing development. These plans were meant to be inclusive of all groups’ ideas and existing 
efforts, thereby building trust among local organizations. The plans did not, however, set 
standards for the implementation of individual projects or their coordination, nor did they 
establish mechanisms for governance or continued engagement among groups.  
During the implementation phase of NCP, LISC Chicago made loans and modest “seed 
grants” with grant funds from the MacArthur Foundation and provided technical assistance to 
support these projects. Projects funded with seed grants are wide-ranging and include social 
service and education initiatives, community beautification projects, affordable housing devel-
opment, and jobs programs. Seed grants were, during the early years of the program, a major 
vehicle for stimulating action on immediately doable projects, but because the size of these 
grants did not always cover the total cost of a project, both the lead agencies and their partners 
were responsible for securing additional resources in cases where they are warranted.  
By coordinating multiple seed grants around comprehensive areas of improvements, in-
vestments were meant to “leverage” more than the seed grants themselves. Furthermore, by 
creating an environment in which local groups were able to collaborate well together, NCP 
designers believed that they might set the stage for other major community programs to emerge 
in neighborhoods. Designers refer to this as the “platform” function of NCP, in that it serves as 
the base by which other initiatives may be layered and may perform better than they would 
otherwise. LISC Chicago held the belief that the NCP platform would, over time, create 
conditions for positive neighborhood change, but no explicit mechanism to achieve these goals 
was built into NCP’s planning. Whether NCP promoted leverage, collaboration, and capacity or 
whether it explicitly promoted neighborhood-level change would become a source of tension in 
the late stages of NCP. 
Significance of the New Communities Program 
and NCP Research 
The New Communities Program (NCP) is an initiative that is informed by, and also attempts to 
address limitations in, two important strands of place-based interventions. This report speaks 
not only to these projects but also to recent federal strategies that have sought to learn from 
8 
 
  
Box 1.1 
Key Terms for the NCP Evaluation 
Comprehensive community initiative (CCI): A program (such as NCP) distinguished by a 
comprehensive approach to community improvement. Some CCIs, like NCP, promote projects 
in varied domains of neighborhood work, while others use multiple approaches to target a 
single goal. 
Community development corporation (CDC): A not-for-profit organization, usually serving 
a geographic location such as a neighborhood or a town. While CDCs can be involved in a 
variety of activities, they are often associated with building and renovating affordable housing 
and commercial real estate for low-income people through “bricks-and-mortar” development. 
NCP was designed in part to help CDCs enter into more varied areas of work. 
Intermediary: An organization that supports relationships among groups, promotes their 
capacity, and helps steer investments to them. NCP relies heavily on intermediaries, with a 
“managing intermediary” in the form of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago 
(LISC Chicago) taking a direct role in day-to-day operations of the initiative and 14 “local 
intermediaries” or “neighborhood intermediaries” (also known as “lead agencies,” described 
next) overseeing the program’s local implementation. 
Lead agency: One of 14 organizations chosen by LISC and the MacArthur Foundation to 
manage NCP planning and plan implementation. Also referred to as “local intermediaries” or 
“neighborhood intermediaries,” lead agencies were generally provided with two staff mem-
bers, who first direct a community planning process and then help manage the plan’s imple-
mentation. In contrast to other initiatives, NCP initially took the approach of designating a 
single lead agency to manage the initiative in each Chicago neighborhood. Lead agencies 
included CDCs, community organizing groups, and agencies newly formed to manage NCP. 
Leverage: Additional funding from other sources that may follow an initial grant. Although it 
was a substantial investment for the MacArthur Foundation, NCP was designed to create 
opportunities for LISC, lead agencies, and partners to identify and obtain more funding. 
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC): LISC is a national community development 
intermediary (see above) founded in 1979 by Ford Foundation, initially to help promote the 
capacity of CDCs and support the financing of affordable housing. It has over 30 offices in 
urban areas around the country, and its Chicago office manages the NCP initiative. 
NCP “platform”: The idea that local relationships, capacity, and investments sparked through 
NCP can serve as a basis for future investments in the neighborhood. “Platform projects” were 
larger investments centered on education, broadband technology, and youth development that 
emerged over the course of the initiative in NCP areas.  
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NCP — sometimes explicitly. That is, a number of Obama administration and national initia-
tives that have explicitly looked to comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) — and, more 
pointedly, to the NCP experience — as an attempt to realize the goals of comprehensive 
community development: systematic improvement in multiple domains, better coordination, 
and leveraging of important local resources. Within this portfolio, Choice Neighborhoods — the 
flagship public housing initiative of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) that targets low-income housing developments for redevelopment — has cited NCP as 
one of the sources of its focus on planning and comprehensive neighborhood revitalization. 
Choice adds an extensive emphasis not just on “bricks-and-mortar” change to neighborhoods 
but on social services and education. Promise Neighborhoods is the U.S. Department of 
Education’s program to promote place-based planning and implementation of comprehensive 
services to help “a continuum of cradle-through-college-and-career solutions,” focused on the 
school system. The White House’s Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative “recognizes that 
the interconnected challenges in high-poverty neighborhoods require interconnected solutions” 
and attempts to weave together these place-based programs. 
Within the community development field, NCP has also informed LISC’s Building Sus-
tainable Communities (BSC) program, which, in many ways, is an explicit replication of the 
NCP model. BSC launched its model of planning and collective implementation in 110 target 
neighborhoods in 25 cities across the country. Through BSC, NCP has essentially become the 
new template for LISC’s community development efforts across the nation.  
While these initiatives cite NCP’s aspirations, the opportunity of this stage of NCP re-
search is to provide a detailed, in-depth look at what it takes to realize the promises of compre-
hensive community development in practice. For example, while Choice Neighborhoods has 
stated ambitions to transform neighborhoods, the size of the direct implementation grants to 
localities has only been approximately $30 million, meaning that sites will have to develop 
ways of leveraging funds in order to realize neighborhood change goals. NCP research also 
provides a basis to examine some of the underlying assumptions about the value of the strategy 
in ways that may clarify program inputs and objectives. These underlying assumptions include: 
• The value of comprehensiveness. NCP (like other, more recent federal and 
national initiatives) is designed to attack neighborhood problems beyond 
housing. At the same time, it is worth noting that comprehensiveness often 
already occurs in neighborhoods, as organizations working in different areas 
go about their work. In addition, pushing individual organizations to focus on 
too many things may result in their not being accomplished at all or not being 
accomplished well. What has a shift in mind-set toward comprehensiveness 
across discrete issue areas actually provided local organizations and their 
partners, in terms of greater access to resources, implementation successes, 
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or new capacities? How does a comprehensive mind-set encourage organiza-
tions and systems to work more strategically or promote a vision of how dif-
ferent aspects of neighborhood change are connected? 
• The value of both colocating investments and coordinating among them. 
An important premise underlying Choice and other comprehensive commu-
nity development initiatives is that a saturation of investments may improve 
local outcomes, through colocated investments. But the level of investments 
provided through NCP and some other federal initiatives is relatively small 
compared with the scale of investments seen to “spill over” into other areas 
of neighborhood improvement.10 As a result, it is worth exploring how colo-
cated investments are leveraged or targeted in a way that improves on their 
ability to act in isolation. To what extent are programs like NCP able to 
achieve both colocation and coordination of investments?  
• Institution-building. NCP was designed to create durable structures for 
community improvement — as suggested by the metaphor of the NCP “plat-
form.” This means that these programs create viable funding mechanisms for 
supporting a range of community projects and a set of relationships that help 
identify and implement these programs. There may, however, be a trade-off 
between developing these institutions and creating flexible and adaptable 
mechanisms, especially when strategies promoted by programs like NCP 
need to respond in effective ways to changing contexts. How adaptable are 
initiatives like NCP to changing environments, such as the Great Recession? 
Earlier Findings from NCP Research 
As described in an interim report in 2010, NCP has been a well-run community initiative with 
generally strong planning and implementation.11 While the structure of NCP was deliberately 
meant to build on local strengths and existing partnerships — sometimes making it difficult to 
tell what value was “added” through NCP — NCP moved past many of its predecessor initia-
tives in being able to avoid conflict between funders and intermediaries and in being able to 
move past planning to implementation. Highlights of earlier findings include: 
• A common vision among implementers about the goal of the initiative. 
During early years of the program, NCP was seen by LISC Chicago and its 
implementers as building relationships and promoting the implementation of 
                                                     
10Galster (2009). 
11Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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community projects. This finding is significant because it describes an initia-
tive with a shared culture, which helped avoid tensions that community initi-
atives have sometimes experienced between funders and implementers. At 
the same time, the absence of clear goals surrounding community change 
would remain a point of tension between LISC Chicago and its major funder, 
MacArthur, with implications for designing the next phase of NCP, as de-
scribed below. 
• Planning that helped build relationships. In part based on this shared ethos 
of collaboration and relationship-building, planning was successful through-
out NCP and generally helped build trust among community organizations. 
Lead agencies engaged a broad range of stakeholders in their communities, 
helped build trust among groups who already knew one another, and contrib-
uted to the formation of new relationships among groups who had no history 
of working together. Organizations, not residents, became the focus of these 
relationship-building efforts.  
• A successful transition to implementation. Unlike many community initia-
tives, which faltered after the point of planning, NCP made a generally suc-
cessful transition to implementation. Through 2008, hundreds of projects 
were supported in the areas of education, workforce development, housing, 
and social services. NCP was developed to spark comprehensive community 
improvements, and analysis of program annual reports suggests that NCP 
did, in fact, create a successful system for identifying and supporting projects 
in multiple domains.  
• Collaborations that sometimes attracted substantial leverage. Relation-
ships formed through NCP sometimes brought substantial new resources to 
neighborhoods, especially when NCP helped create local collaboratives to 
apply for larger grants that small groups might not have been able to attract 
on their own. For example, in one community, NCP helped several neigh-
borhood organizations apply for relatively large public health grants. In some 
ways, these new collaborations for funding provide the strongest evidence of 
NCP’s “working” in its intended mode, because they represent ways that the 
initiative has added value to existing networks. 
• A managing intermediary that was trusted to promote progress and ac-
countability. LISC Chicago was able to manage grants flexibly, mediate 
community conflict successfully, and promote progress among NCP com-
munity partners. Community organizations valued the flexibility and speed 
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with which LISC Chicago provided seed grants and its technical assistance 
during planning and implementation. In some important instances, LISC 
Chicago stepped in to enforce accountability by replacing grantees or direct-
ing agencies to hire staff whose skills were more suited to the project. In oth-
er cases, it served as a mediator among community groups, where conflict 
might have derailed NCP processes. 
At the same time, the interim report notes some challenges experienced by the initiative. 
Some challenges stemmed from the structure of NCP, and some arose within the dynamics of 
local or citywide implementation.  
• A difficulty moving to implementation when there were fewer local 
partners to carry out work. Implementation tended to stall in cases where 
there were few local partners to carry out work. This finding is significant 
because it raises questions about the initiative’s ability to build new capacity 
to carry out work in areas that are not rich in organizations, and it suggests 
that such efforts can be a slow process. With some significant exceptions, 
historically disinvested neighborhoods attracted fewer projects than other 
neighborhoods, in large part because there were fewer organizations able to 
implement projects. 
• Challenges in moving relationships significantly from their starting 
place. While organizational relationships improved throughout NCP, the 
starting point of these relations mattered a great deal. Whether organizations 
started out skeptical or trusting of each other played a large role in the nature 
of the eventual collaboration. In addition, improvements in relationships 
mostly occurred within neighborhoods — that is, they were “horizontal” 
networks and not generally “vertical,” meaning that the initiative’s emphasis 
on local action and smaller projects had meant that it missed an opportunity 
to connect to broader, Chicago-wide efforts initiated by larger players, like 
the city government or the school system. 
Exploring “What Matters” in Local Organizational and 
Neighborhood Contexts 
Both the extended research period and the fact that NCP occurs in such varied neighborhoods 
within Chicago allows for more generalizable findings than previous community development 
evaluations. In the past, qualitative research on CDCs and CCIs have examined changes 
associated with programs on the organizational and community level, but — because of 
problems of comparison among neighborhoods, difficulties in assessing the quality of plans and 
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interventions, boundary-blurriness around the scope of intervention, and general difficulties in 
establishing a counterfactual — they have not been able to explore critical outcomes assump-
tions at the heart of the model.12 Because of these factors, research and evaluation of these 
initiatives raise issues of systematic comparability and generalizability. 
Situated in a single city, NCP holds political, intermediary, and programmatic contexts 
relatively constant, while providing variation in economic context, strategy and interorganiza-
tional context. While the initiative as a whole shared a set of common features, the variation 
across lead agencies and communities provides an opportunity to understand the factors that 
contribute to successful implementation of comprehensive community development initiatives 
like NCP. Several key characteristics influenced implementation among the 14 cases and are 
described throughout the report. These include (1) the relative maturity of the lead agency, (2) 
its starting orientation toward conducting comprehensive community development in collabora-
tive fashion, (3) its local legitimacy, (4) the number of local potential implementation partners it 
had, and (5) local histories of collaboration. 
• Lead agency history, size, and type. Lead agencies had a range of histories 
and encompassed different types of organizations. At one end of the spec-
trum were three large, established lead agencies: Greater Southwest Devel-
opment Corporation and the Southwest Organizing Project in Chicago 
Southwest, the Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation in Humboldt Park, 
and the Logan Square Neighborhood Association. For these organizations, 
NCP’s challenge was about the integration of NCP’s planning and imple-
mentation processes with previous ways in which they interacted with the 
community. At the other end of the spectrum were new lead agencies created 
for the purposes of NCP or that were so new as to be virtually untested: the 
Quad Communities Development Corporation in near-South Chicago, 
Teamwork Englewood, and the Greater Auburn-Gresham Development 
Corporation.13 Often, these newly created lead agencies were formed in asso-
ciation with or backing from local elected officials or other powerful organi-
zations. These groups were challenged to manage a broad, inclusive planning 
process while also building their own identity in a way that might be sustain-
able after NCP’s direct operating support ceased. 
• Lead agency experience with facilitating comprehensive community de-
velopment. A second important variable was the degree to which lead agen-
cies had an orientation toward, or experience with, comprehensive communi-
                                                     
12Baum (2001). 
13Another new lead agency was later created in Washington Park. 
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ty development, community convening, and coordinating or collaborating 
with other community organizations. Since this was a critical NCP capacity, 
lead agency starting places mattered significantly in this regard. Some agen-
cies were multi-issue organizations, and the other “new” organizations start-
ed out with a clean slate around which to work. Six of the original 14 lead 
agencies could be characterized as “traditional CDCs” with a predominant 
focus on bricks-and-mortar development work and a minimum of interorgan-
izational planning and collaboration. Strikingly, only three of these six organ-
izations survived more than a few years as NCP lead agencies. 
• Lead agency legitimacy. A third important starting point was how a lead 
agency was perceived in the community and its legitimacy as a convener. 
Legitimacy could have different dimensions; in some cases, it could be based 
on the lead agency’s leadership in helping form strong networks. In others, 
legitimacy derived more from an agency’s political clout or connections. 
Newly formed lead agencies faced daunting challenges with regard to build-
ing legitimacy in the early years of NCP. Sometimes these challenges of 
newness could be partially overcome by the group’s ties to elected officials 
or other powerful stakeholders within the neighborhood. For example, Quad 
Communities Development Corporation was, in essence, founded by the 4th 
Ward alderman, even though the organization was formally distinct from the 
alderman’s office. 
Just as lead agencies differed, so did the organizational landscapes in which NCP oper-
ated. As a comprehensive improvement initiative that relied on the work of many partners for 
strong implementation, these landscapes also proved to be significant. 
• Number of organizational partners. Given the reliance of NCP on “many 
hands” to perform community work, the number of potential partners could 
be a critical issue. In East Garfield Park, for example, the Garfield Park Con-
servatory Alliance was able to bring a wide array of resident stakeholders 
and other informal associations during the planning process. However, in a 
neighborhood with only a handful of formal organizations able to receive 
implementation grants, GPCA found it difficult to facilitate projects and of-
ten needed to partner with citywide organizations to implement projects for 
which it did not have the capacity. In contrast, Humboldt Park, on its eastern 
side, had many potential service partners through which grants could flow. 
• Local histories of collaboration. Conflict among organizations could result 
in more challenging environments for planning and implementation. In 
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neighborhoods where there were historic tensions among organizations, lead 
agencies had to facilitate the building of organizational ties and navigate his-
toric tensions among organizations. For example, in North Lawndale, the 
lead agency, Lawndale Christian Development Corporation, was initially 
viewed with skepticism by some existing organizations because of the per-
ception that LCDC was focusing on its own service area and not on the entire 
neighborhood. In contrast, places like Auburn Gresham, which did not have 
many organizations with which to partner, experienced fewer tensions due to 
more positive histories of collaboration among actors with implementation 
experience. 
Boxes 1.2 through 1.5 describe four lead agencies selected for in-depth research in this 
phase of the evaluation.  
  
Box 1.2 
Humboldt Park 
Humboldt Park is located on Chicago’s Near Northwest Side, surrounding a 207-acre park of 
the same name, with a population of 65,836 at the start of NCP. Roughly half the total popula-
tion are Latino, and African-Americans make up just under 40 percent. The eastern part of the 
neighborhood is the long-standing center of Chicago’s Puerto Rican community and is an-
chored by a lively, retail strip and a host of Puerto Rican cultural facilities and social services. 
Encroaching gentrification in the eastern portion of the neighborhood since the 1990s has 
prompted action to preserve affordable housing for working-class and low-income families. 
The western part of the neighborhood is primarily African-American. This area has been 
plagued by historic disinvestment, with few community organizations and a relatively weak 
commercial sector. Bridging the gap between the two halves of the community has been an 
area of intentional focus for  Humboldt Park’s NCP lead agency, Bickerdike Redevelopment 
Corporation.  
Bickerdike is one of Chicago’s largest and most well-established CDCs, with roughly 100 
staff. Although it concentrates on affordable housing development and preservation, it has 
historical roots in community organizing and a record of progressive advocacy and activism on 
housing and related issues. Bickerdike’s role is a facilitative and coordinating one within NCP. 
While it employs and manages the NCP staff, it otherwise participates in NCP task forces as 
an equal partner. Aside from the staffing component, it has almost entirely directed NCP 
resources to partner organizations, rather than using them to develop new areas of operation 
within Bickerdike.* 
     
*Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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Box 1.3 
Chicago Southwest 
Chicago Southwest is the largest of the 14 NCP planning areas, both geographically and 
demographically, with a total population of roughly 119,000. It is also among the most racially 
and ethnically mixed NCP areas and has undergone rapid demographic change over the past 
two decades; once a historically white, working-class neighborhood, by 1990, white residents 
were a bare majority. In 2000, that population had shifted to 46 percent Latino and 29 percent 
African-American, leaving mostly older white residents as a rapidly declining but still substan-
tial minority. The NCP effort in Chicago Southwest has been anchored by a CDC — the 
Greater Southwest Development Corporation (GSDC) — and by a closely affiliated communi-
ty-organizing group, the Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP), which GSDC had helped 
form in the 1980s. As co-lead agencies, GSDC and SWOP had the organizational capacity and 
the local legitimacy to convene local stakeholders in a community-wide planning process; both 
were well connected politically. 
In preparation for the NCP planning process, GSDC and SWOP conducted an extensive prelimi-
nary organizing effort. The lead agencies began by identifying 100 community leaders with 
whom they were not already connected, and they conducted one-on-one “relational meetings” to 
gauge their understanding of the neighborhood’s strengths and challenges. GSDC and SWOP 
eagerly embraced NCP’s comprehensive development orientation and its conception of lead 
agencies as relational conduits and catalysts. Over time, GSDC and SWOP systematically 
integrated NCP with their existing community development work. GSDC and SWOP did not 
establish a separate governance and accountability structure for NCP; rather, NCP operated 
through existing organizational structures, primarily SWOP’s area-specific “teams” composed of 
organizing staff and resident “leaders,” as well as periodic larger SWOP assemblies. 
Box 1.4 
Quad Communities 
Quad Communities Development Corporation (QCDC) is one of a handful of lead agencies 
created for the express purpose of implementing NCP. It was founded in 2003 with the strong 
involvement of the long-serving and influential 4th Ward alderman. Quad Communities is also 
distinctive within NCP in being the only NCP implementation area based on an aldermanic 
ward boundary, consisting of the portions of four community areas along Chicago’s Near 
South Side lakefront.* It is a high-poverty, predominantly African-American area with, until 
recent demolition, a high concentration of public housing developments. In the past two 
decades, the neighborhood has seen a small influx of primarily African-American middle-class 
residents to the stately gray-stone buildings that predominate in the southern portions of the 
ward. As a newly created organization tasked with implementing the NCP process, QCDC 
faced a daunting challenge. Being born of a respected alderman’s office was, for the most part, 
a distinct advantage for QCDC. Yet QCDC concluded early in NCP that, as a fledgling 
organization with a singular focus on convening and coordinating capacity, it could not attract 
the revenue that it would need to sustain itself; it needed programs or projects to anchor its 
work. Thus, the organization soon identified a niche commercial development. This was an 
area widely acknowledged as an unmet local need and, thus, an area where QCDC could 
engage directly without arousing territoriality. By 2007, QCDC was heavily focused on 
commercial retail development and support and on building its organizational capacity in this 
domain, while sustaining partnerships in education and workforce development. 
     
*The ward includes all of Kenwood and Oakland and parts of Douglas and Grand Boulevard. South 
Kenwood — an affluent area of large mansions and home to President Obama — was not included. 
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The Development of the NCP “Platform” 
Like the initiative, which has evolved over the course of 10 years, the NCP “platform” has 
also been a concept that has emerged over time for its implementers, to describe the nature of 
its work and its desired goals. In 2010, LISC Chicago characterized the platform in the 
following way: 
The Platform manifests multiple characteristics. It is foremost a system of rela-
tionships that joins often disparate individuals and organizations into a weave of 
functionality. It is a program delivery system that integrates multiple functions 
into a strategic response to multiple challenges at the neighborhood level. It is an 
accountability vehicle for investing funds, which attracts and leverages other 
funds at several levels of magnitude. And it is a system through which many 
Box 1.5 
Auburn Gresham 
Auburn Gresham is a small, predominantly African-American neighborhood on the southwest 
side of Chicago, consisting mostly of modest but well-kept single-family homes. It has seen a 
steadily shrinking population in recent decades, particularly involving a loss of younger 
residents, and, until recently, a rapidly declining retail corridor along 79th Street. At the same 
time, Auburn Gresham has a higher rate of home ownership than surrounding disinvested 
communities; an attractive and solid housing stock; and a stable population of older residents, 
many of whom are civically active. Having been founded in 2001, the Greater Auburn-
Gresham Development Corporation (GAGDC) had barely established itself as an organization 
when it joined NCP. A local alderman played a critical role in founding the organization, in 
collaboration with a powerful local institution and leader — the Catholic parish of St. Sabina 
and its activist pastor — as well as a few other community leaders with city-wide stature, most 
of whom have remained on GAGDC’s board throughout the past decade. 
GAGDC developed and now maintains a comprehensive orientation toward its local work. It 
organizes free breakfast for seniors and live blues performances, works with block clubs, 
offers tax counseling in its offices every spring, stages conference call-in sessions on home 
owner counseling and foreclosure prevention, and, more recently, began offering free Internet 
access to residents. One of its early seed-grant projects was the Litter Free Zone Initiative, a 
grassroots effort to promote recycling in the neighborhood through volunteer efforts and by 
engaging local high school students. The project has garnered city-wide recognition and has 
leveraged a federal contract. Through another project, the “Renaissance Festival” on 79th 
Street, GAGDC attracts hundreds of vendors and nonprofit information booths and brings out 
8,000 or so participants every summer. This annual event has become self-sustaining through 
widespread local merchant support.  
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other resources can flow, including technical resources, peer consulting and pro-
gram enhancements. 
While there are aspects of this description that apply both to the inputs of the initiative 
(such as funding provided by the initiative) and to its goals (attracting additional funds), MDRC 
researchers have attempted to conceptualize the platform as an “outcome” of the initiative: a 
statement of what it produces, which may be observed both at the local level and across the city. 
Accordingly, to determine how well this platform was built in different neighborhoods, and 
throughout Chicago, the analyses within the report emphasize several important factors: 
• Organizational capacity. Unlike other programs — most notably, its prede-
cessor, the Comprehensive Community Revitalization Program (CCRP) in 
the South Bronx — NCP did not attempt to help CDCs and other community 
organizations carry out work in multiple areas by themselves alone. Instead, 
it hoped to build the ability of local organizations to plan, to facilitate the 
work of others in comprehensive areas, to coordinate, and to sustain action 
— in other words, to act as an intermediary in much the same way that LISC 
does on the citywide level. To a lesser extent, NCP as an initiative attempted 
to build capacity in the sense of fostering financial stability among organiza-
tions, by providing grants and limited operating support.  
• Relationships. As described above, the NCP platform involves a “system of 
relationships.” The initiative was designed as an attempt to foster collabora-
tion among different local agencies, in that it recognized that a single group 
was not generally capable of acting alone to respond to the range of neigh-
borhood problems. One important claim in the policy literature is that the 
“value-added” that relationships provide by comparison with programs run 
separately and independently of each other is to promote better-targeted, 
more strategic, or more mobilized interventions. In addition, local networks 
may be better able to respond to shocks to neighborhoods or organizational 
systems and to take advantage of opportunities. The evaluation conceptual-
izes this dimension of the platform as related to how networks as a whole 
capitalize on major opportunities (such as federal stimulus funding) and to 
mobilize around difficult issues (such as foreclosures or unemployment). 
• Resources. NCP provides funding for both staffing and programmatic sup-
port to fulfill local plans, but it is also an attempt to attract, or leverage, addi-
tional resources so as to ensure that implementation may occur and be sus-
tained over time. This concept of leverage was a very important early-
described rationale for NCP, as the mechanism of the NCP seed grant was 
based on the premise that additional resources might follow these strategic 
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investments. Accordingly, the evaluation explores not only how major LISC- 
and MacArthur-induced investments occur, and the ability of community or-
ganizations to access these funds, but also how they are spatially concentrat-
ed within neighborhoods and how they vary across neighborhoods. The 
evaluation also examines new major investments sparked by NCP collabora-
tions that are not directly channeled through LISC Chicago and MacArthur, 
the ways that local organizations attempt to scale up investments, and the 
role of NCP-supported networks in these efforts. 
The Evolving Nature of the Program and Its Context 
Like any initiative of this time span, NCP experienced several important internal and external 
program shifts, particularly in the latter half of implementation: a shift away from small grants 
to larger, multisite projects that spanned several NCP neighborhoods; the impact of the econom-
ic recession on neighborhood plans; and a push to use the NCP platform as a driver of quantifi-
able changes in community conditions. All these changes provide a critical test of the enduring 
power of the initiative and its goals.  
• From seed grants to initiative-wide projects. Within the program, during 
its early years, NCP implementers relied on seed grants to support implemen-
tation. Starting around 2008, there was a general shift away from smaller 
grants to developing larger, multisite projects that span the 14 different NCP 
neighborhoods. These initiatives have taken several forms. One, Elev8, pro-
vides funding to NCP lead agencies and middle schools in five neighbor-
hoods to deliver health services and other forms of support to students and 
families. Another, Smart Communities, uses federal funding to increase the 
meaningful use of broadband technology in low-income neighborhoods. 
Other initiatives include a large, two-year foreclosure prevention program 
funded by MacArthur. While these programs build on the collective imple-
mentation experiences of the neighborhoods that carry them out, there is also 
a tendency for these programs to carry their own momentum and “stand 
alone,” independent of the broader community work occurring through NCP. 
As a result, an important question for the evaluation is whether the relation-
ships and networks that were built during the early years of NCP were sus-
tained during a later period, many years after planning, and where there may 
have been a “centripetal” direction away from collaboration. 
• The Great Recession. Outside of NCP, the Great Recession has had devas-
tating implications for Chicago neighborhoods, especially in its housing 
market. While the effects of this recession have varied across neighborhoods, 
20 
 
as described in Chapter 2, both hardships on the ground and the state budget 
crisis in Illinois placed significant strains on funding for many community 
programs. The 2012 report Beyond the Neighborhood describes how differ-
ent NCP organizations sometimes mobilized to respond to budget shortfalls 
or the foreclosure crisis.14 NCP’s creators have referred to the networks 
formed through NCP as being a source of “resilience,” meaning that they are 
collectively able to respond to threats and take advantage of opportunities, in 
a way that may make it possible to weather external forces.  
• Moving toward community change. As described above, in early inter-
views about the initiative’s theory of change, lead agencies felt that commu-
nitywide change goals were remote. Rather, they emphasized relationship-
building and systems-building — the NCP platform — as the likely out-
comes of their work. Over the course of NCP, however, the MacArthur 
Foundation became increasingly interested in assessing the outcome of its 
substantial investment and raised community change goals as a priority with 
LISC Chicago, especially as the foundation’s 10-year commitment to NCP 
came to a close. These discussions became a point of conflict between LISC 
Chicago and MacArthur, with both parties emphasizing somewhat different 
outcomes of the initiative. In these discussions, LISC Chicago raised con-
cerns about the emphasis that MacArthur was placing on community change 
outcomes, which it did not see as the short-term outcome of its work but as 
something that was associated with the strong interorganizational relation-
ships that NCP had fostered. For its part, MacArthur recognized the im-
portance of relationship-building as an outcome for NCP, but it was equally 
concerned about accountability and demonstrating progress on community-
level outcomes.  
This ongoing internal debate about NCP’s final outcomes served as a backdrop for 
planning efforts that began in 2010. At this time, LISC Chicago started to work with lead 
agencies and their partners on the next phase of NCP. In large part because of a push from 
MacArthur to focus NCP more on measurable community change goals, NCP lead agencies 
were asked to convene stakeholders to narrow their potential domains of activity into more 
selective areas of work that might become initiatives that the foundation supported — not only 
to build community capacity and local networks but also to strive to achieve change outcomes. 
The first round of transition planning in 2010 occurred within a limited time frame — from 
October to December. A second round that began in summer 2011 asked lead agencies to build 
                                                     
14Chaskin and Karlström (2012). 
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an intervention within a single issue area, in which it will work to demonstrate NCP’s efficacy 
toward quantifiable community-level change while still promoting a comprehensive approach 
to community development. LISC called planning for the new program “Testing the Model,” or 
TTM, because it represents a way that the platform may be used to support measurement and 
targeting toward population-level change. This shift provides another important test of the 
endurance of NCP relationships and the sustainability of projects that it once supported. 
Figure 1.1 presents a timeline of NCP and associated research activities. 
Research Questions 
This report’s research questions are occasioned by previous findings, by an understanding of the 
shifting nature of the program and its context, and by the singular opportunities that other 
programs have to learn from such an expansive and comparatively well-run initiative. The 
following questions and others are addressed in Chapters 2 through 6: 
1. How did the Great Recession test relationships and alter the nature of 
NCP work? The launch of NCP saw economic and safety environments that 
were generally improving, but the later years of the initiative had a much dif-
ferent climate for implementation. As described above, this question is im-
portant because the recession offered a type of “test” to NCP, as neighbor-
hood relationships and the work of local organizations were challenged by 
the harsher economic and funding environment. 
2. Can NCP “teach” organizations to carry out its model of comprehen-
sive, coordinated community investment, or is this a skill that cannot be 
easily transferred? The interim report notes that groups were able to carry 
out successful planning processes. But it is one thing to plan work that is not 
directly in the control of any one local organization and another thing to fa-
cilitate it. After nearly 10 years, what evidence is there that NCP achieved its 
mission — not to make community groups more able to take on comprehen-
sive activities but to plan and facilitate comprehensive action by others? 
What supported this mission and what cut against it? 
3. Given the shocks of the Great Recession and other factors related to 
late-stage programming, how did NCP sustain relationships over time? 
How did these relationships add value to programs carried out inde-
pendently of each other? While there were reported improvements in rela-
tionships in different types of neighborhoods in the earlier years, NCP was
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Figure 1.1 
NCP and Evaluation Timeline 
 
 
 
 
           1998  2003  2005 2012 
NCI Pilot/ NCP Site Selection    NCP Rollout and Early Implementation NCP Final Phase 
Evaluation 
launched 
(2006) 
NCI implemented in 3 communities  
(1998-2003) 
14 NCP lead agencies 
identified 
NCP launched (March 2003);  
18-month planning ensues 
Most NCP communities transition 
to implementation 
Recession; shifts in program to empha-
size larger programs 
Transition 
planning for new 
phase of NCP 
SOURCES: MDRC interviews and NCP program documentation.   
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not able to completely “turn around” deeply troubled relationships. Especial-
ly given the tendency of relationships to wear out over time without the im-
petus of funding, and the push by the program toward larger initiatives that 
did not always involve the entire community, how did relationships fare to-
ward the end of the NCP demonstration? 
4. What evidence is there of comprehensiveness over the course of the pro-
gram and of targeting of resources within neighborhoods? Where is 
there evidence of a “saturation” of comprehensive improvement efforts 
within neighborhoods? NCP moved successfully from planning to early 
implementation. But given the recession and state budget crises, was there a 
slowdown of action or a tendency to focus improvements in a single domain? 
Similarly, part of the justification for NCP is that it allows a strategic target-
ing of investments. Is there evidence of such targeting within NCP? 
5. With a shift in the structure of NCP, how does new work –– known as 
“Testing the Model,” or TTM –– build on the NCP platform? In what 
ways does it depart from the platform? And what are areas for future 
exploration? As is described in Chapter 6, NCP as it enters a new phase is 
undergoing changes that will test the relationships formed and will also pose 
opportunities to leverage change at the community level. How is planning 
toward that initiative going so far, and what questions does the model raise 
for future research? 
The Structure of This Report 
The report is divided into six chapters: 
• Chapter 1, “Building the NCP Platform,” attempts to motivate the research 
by describing how the Great Recession and late-stage implementation deci-
sions by LISC Chicago put the NCP model to the test. It introduces the pro-
gram, describes earlier findings, and lays out the factors of neighborhood and 
organizational characteristics that mattered for early NCP implementation. 
Given growing national interest in comprehensive community development, 
it also sets out the stakes of the research for different policy audiences. 
• Chapter 2, “NCP and the Great Recession,” describes patterns of change re-
lated to the Great Recession among NCP neighborhoods. It continues by de-
scribing how agencies viewed the effects of the recession on their neighbor-
hoods and organizations and how they responded to these changes. 
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• Chapter 3, “Building Organizational Capacity Through NCP,” describes the 
ways that the program built the capacity of local intermediaries to plan, coor-
dinate, and facilitate action by neighborhood groups. It also considers the 
ways that intermediaries themselves were supported financially, learned how 
to do work themselves in different areas, and helped build others’ capacity to 
carry out their respective missions. 
• Chapter 4, “NCP Relationships and What They Provide,” describes how rela-
tionships among community-level organizations were maintained in the latter 
years of the initiative and how community organizations were connected to 
larger-scale actors and entities. For the first time in the research team’s analy-
ses, it also examines the specific ways that relationships within NCP added 
value to the implementation of projects that might have been conducted sepa-
rately and independently of each other. 
• Chapter 5, “NCP Investments and Their Reach Within Neighborhoods,” de-
scribes the number of projects conducted under NCP and what they lever-
aged in terms of additional resources. For the first time in the evaluation of a 
CCI, it also employs geographic analyses of where NCP resources were con-
centrated within neighborhoods, to understand the extent to which compre-
hensive improvement efforts were saturated or targeted. 
• Chapter 6, “Learning from the NCP Platform,” moves to summarize lessons 
for the field, describing the contexts that may be most opportune for the im-
plementation of initiatives like NCP, the management and implementation 
structures that best support their success, and the factors that promote value-
added work on the ground. It also describes the next phase of MacArthur-
supported work related to NCP: a pilot initiative called “Testing the Model” 
that is built on the NCP platform. 
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Chapter 2 
NCP and the Great Recession 
During 2006, when implementation of the New Communities Program (NCP) in Chicago was 
at its height, the national housing market collapsed, bursting the speculative bubble that had 
been growing since the turn of the century and helping launch one of the worst financial crises 
in decades, now called the “Great Recession” (2006-2009).1 This context is critical for NCP, 
because these economic changes presented a test of the program’s goal of promoting “resili-
ence,” or the ability of groups to come together in difficult times. How did the Great Reces-
sion change Chicago, test relationships, and alter the nature of NCP work? 
The effects of the Great Recession on Chicago, as in the rest of the country, were con-
centrated among the indicators most closely connected to the housing and credit markets, 
especially foreclosures. NCP neighborhoods experienced these changes differently, and NCP 
lead agencies interpreted the magnitude and severity of the Great Recession in different ways 
— with some disputing that their neighborhoods had, in fact, experienced a new shock. Local 
groups were often directly affected by budgetary crises, and they valued NCP and the resources 
that the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) was able to attract as 
an alternative source of revenue during a difficult time. LISC’s support was critical in some 
cases to keeping agencies viable during the downturn. Despite the potential for competition for 
resources, NCP relationships were not generally negatively affected by the recession itself. At 
the same time, with limited but significant exceptions, local NCP relationships were not 
mobilized to change strategy or direction in response to foreclosure crises, unemployment, or 
other manifestations of the recession. Instead, tactics shifted to push ahead already-planned 
projects that were seen as needed by the community. This finding may suggest that “platform-” 
building, while important for NCP stability, may sometimes cut against adaptability, that is, the 
flexibility around which groups can mobilize together to quickly change course as a result of 
external shocks. 
NCP Neighborhoods: Quality-of-Life Conditions 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the NCP neighborhoods are distributed throughout Chicago; they also 
vary considerably in their histories, assets, and challenges. (For details, see Chapter 1, Table 
1.1.) The NCP evaluation has monitored various indicators of neighborhood quality of life since
                                                 
1National Bureau of Economic Research (2012). 
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Figure 2.1 
The NCP Neighborhoods 
 
 
NOTE: The map displays the Chicago municipal area within Cook County divided into the 80 neighbor-
hoods defined for the NCP analysis. The 14 NCP neighborhoods are labeled and shaded. 
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the onset of the study.2 These indicators can be grouped into three domains — Community 
Safety, Housing Market, and Economic Activity — and they serve to represent important, but 
not all, aspects of the contexts in which NCP was implemented. This chapter presents an 
overview of the quality-of-life conditions in the period immediately prior to NCP, which was 
likely an important reference point for the individuals engaged in the planning process. Then 
it describes how the conditions were changing as the NCP neighborhoods were finalizing 
their plans and implementing activities. Both the historical context and the rollout conditions 
are relevant for understanding both NCP and how the neighborhoods responded to the Great 
Recession.  
Historical Context (2000-2002) 
During the period immediately prior to the initiation of NCP, the nation was experienc-
ing a small recession, mainly affecting the labor market and business sector. Crime rates were 
declining and housing market activity was fairly stable. Similar conditions prevailed in Chicago, 
as can be seen in the quality-of-life indicators shown in Appendix Tables A.1 through A.9. 
However, there was significant variation among Chicago’s neighborhoods and specifically 
among the NCP neighborhoods. This discussion of the historical context for NCP is organized 
around neighborhood groups, which were defined by the sociodemographic characteristics of 
the residents and by housing characteristics. There are five neighborhood groups, as described 
in Box 2.1. 
The neighborhood group containing the most NCP neighborhoods (eight) is Group IV 
— neighborhoods with lower incomes, a high proportion of renters, and large minority popula-
tions. As can be seen in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, crime was a serious problem in these 
neighborhoods in the period prior to the rollout of NCP; in particular, the average violent crime 
rate for these neighborhoods was more than twice the rate for the city as a whole for the period 
2000-2002. During the same period, however, violent crime was declining at a faster rate — 
compared with the citywide trend — for the neighborhoods in this group. 
While all the NCP neighborhoods in this group had violent crime rates that were higher 
than the citywide rate, four of them (Englewood, Garfield Park, Washington Park, and West 
Haven) had rates that were among the highest among the Group IV neighborhoods. Some of 
the Group IV NCP neighborhoods (North Lawndale, Quad Communities, and Washington 
Park) were experiencing comparatively high negative trends in their violent crime rate, but 
most faced either stagnant or rising violent crime rates at the start of NCP.  
  
                                                 
2See Appendix A for further information on the measurement of these indicators. 
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Interestingly, during this period the housing market was relatively booming for the 
Group IV neighborhoods — both the number (Appendix Table A.3) and the overall total value 
(Appendix Table A.4) of home purchase loans were well above the citywide levels for these 
indicators in the period 2000-2002 and were also rising at a rate faster than the citywide trend. 
Possibly reflective of the high level of home purchasing in the Group IV neighborhoods, 
foreclosures were also rampant in these neighborhoods for the period 2000-2002 (Appendix 
Tables A.5 and A.6). On average, the Group IV filed foreclosure rate was almost five times 
greater than the citywide rate, but the foreclosure rate was growing only slightly faster than the 
citywide trend. 
Most of the Group IV NCP neighborhoods were consistent with the overall trend for the 
group, except for Englewood, which had less activity (lower rates), and South Chicago, which 
had both less activity and less growth (lower growth rate). Foreclosures were particularly an 
issue for some of the NCP neighborhoods in Group IV; some (Garfield Park, Washington 
Park) had extraordinarily high rates; some (Quad Communities) had extraordinarily high 
increases; and some (North Lawndale, Woodlawn) had both high levels and high growth.  
Finally, the business sector of the Group IV neighborhoods was smaller and less active 
than the citywide level for the period 2000-2002 but was growing at a slightly faster rate 
(Appendix Table A.7). Three of the Group IV NCP neighborhoods had comparatively lower 
levels of activity in the period 2000-2002 but differed in terms of their trend. One (Englewood) 
Box 2.1 
Chicago Neighborhood Groups 
Group I Moderate-income, predominately African-American residents; housing is 
mostly owner-occupied, single-family units. 
Group II Moderate-income, predominately white residents, about one-quarter of 
whom are foreign-born; housing is a mix of single-family and multi-unit 
owner-occupied dwellings. 
Group III Moderate-income, with concentrations of Latino residents, almost 40 
percent of whom are foreign-born; housing is mostly smaller multi-unit 
dwellings, split between owner-occupiers and renters. 
Group IV Low-income; housing is mostly renter-occupied, large multi-unit dwell-
ings. 
Group V High-income; housing is mostly large multi-unit dwellings, with more 
renters than owners. 
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had an extremely high level of growth; one (Woodlawn) was growing at a rate consistent with 
the Group IV trend; and one (Quad Communities) was fairly stagnant, compared with the 
other Group IV neighborhoods. Two of the Group IV NCP neighborhoods had higher levels of 
activity for the period 2000-2002 than the Group IV average rate; one of the these (West 
Haven) also had a much higher growth rate, and the other (Garfield Park) was fairly stagnant. 
Only two of the Group IV NCP neighborhoods (North Lawndale, Washington Park) had 
negative trends for the period 2000-2002. 
Four of the NCP neighborhoods were in Group III — moderate-income neighborhoods 
with a mix of owners and small rental properties and a relatively large concentration of Latino 
residents and immigrants. Overall in the period 2000-2002, crime rates were relatively low for 
these neighborhoods, on average (Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2), but property crime was not 
declining as quickly as the citywide trend, and the violent crime trend was stagnant. Two of the 
Group III neighborhoods — Chicago Lawn and Humboldt Park — had relatively high rates 
of property crime compared with the Group III average rate; the decrease in property crime was 
also slower in these neighborhoods. The other two Group III neighborhoods — Little Village 
and Pilsen — had both lower levels of property crime and a more negative trend. The rate of 
violent crime in Humboldt Park was also relatively high in the period 2000-2002 but was 
declining at a relatively fast rate; Pilsen was also experiencing a relatively faster decline in 
violent crime during this period. The other two Group III NCP neighborhoods — Chicago 
Lawn and Little Village — had positive violent crime trends for the period 2000-2002. 
Group III neighborhoods had, on average, a lower level of housing market activity in 
the period 2000-2002 than the citywide rates (Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4). However, both 
the total value of home purchase loans and the average home purchase loan amount were 
increasing slightly faster than the citywide trend. The foreclosure rate and trend among the 
Group III neighborhoods was similar to the citywide rate and trend for the period 2000-2002 
(Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6). The housing market activity in the Group III NCP neighbor-
hoods was fairly consistent with the overall Group III trends for the period 2000-2002. Hum-
boldt Park had somewhat higher levels of activity but slower growth, while Chicago Lawn 
and Pilsen had somewhat higher trends. Humboldt Park also had a higher rate of foreclosures 
in the period 2000-2002; the trend for this neighborhood was also higher than the overall trend 
for Group III neighborhoods. Chicago Lawn also had higher growth in its foreclosure rate for 
the period 2000-2002 but a somewhat lower rate, while Pilsen had slower growth and a slightly 
higher foreclosure rate. 
The Group III neighborhoods also had fairly modest levels of activity in their business 
sector in the period 2000-2002 (Appendix Table A.7). However, the levels of growth were 
higher than the citywide trend. The level of activity for Humboldt Park was somewhat higher 
than the Group III average, while Chicago Lawn and Little Village had lower levels in the 
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period 2000-2002. The trend in Little Village was relatively large, compared with the Group III 
trend, while Humboldt Park and Pilsen had less positive trends, and Chicago Lawn had a 
negative trend. 
The other two NCP neighborhoods were in groups characterized by moderate-income, 
owner-occupied housing that differ from each other primarily in terms of the racial composition 
of their population. Group I neighborhoods generally have large concentrations of African-
Americans, and Group II neighborhoods are predominately white. Auburn Gresham was in 
Group I, and Logan Square was in Group II. Crime was a significant issue in the Group I 
neighborhoods, where both property and violent crime rates were higher than the citywide rates 
for the period 2000-2002; property crime was also declining at a slower rate in the Group I 
neighborhoods, and violent crime was growing slowly (Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2). In 
contrast, the average Group II crime rates were lower than the citywide rates and were declining 
faster. For the period 2000-2002, Auburn Gresham had higher rates and growth in both 
violent crime and property crime than the Group I neighborhood average rate and trend. Logan 
Square had higher crime rates than the Group II average rates, but both property crime and 
violent crime were declining at a faster rate. 
On average, the Group I neighborhoods had a fairly stagnant housing market for the pe-
riod 2000-2002, compared with the citywide rates and trend, while the Group II neighborhoods’ 
average rate and trend were consistent with the citywide trend (Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4). 
Foreclosures were also somewhat higher among the Group I neighborhoods and somewhat 
lower among the Group II neighborhoods (Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6). Both Auburn 
Gresham and Logan Square had a somewhat more active and growing housing market than 
their respective neighborhood-group average rates and trends in the period 2000-2002. Both 
NCP neighborhoods were also experiencing relatively higher rates and growth in foreclosures 
than their respective neighborhood-group average rates and trends. 
Business sector activity for the period 2000-2002 in the Group I neighborhoods was 
generally at lower levels and growing slower than the citywide rates and trends for the period 
2000-2002 (Appendix Table A.7). In contrast, Group II neighborhoods had more activity and 
higher growth than the citywide averages. Auburn Gresham had relatively low levels of 
activity and was growing slower than the Group I neighborhood averages, while Logan Square 
had higher levels of activity and was growing faster than the Group II neighborhood averages. 
In sum, NCP neighborhoods exhibit considerable diversity in terms of their quality-of-
life trends, which is in keeping with the diversity in these trends among all Chicago neighbor-
hoods. While some common issues cut across all the communities participating in NCP, local 
context and interaction among trends across domains resulted in 14 unique environments in 
which to observe the implementation of a comprehensive community initiative like NCP.  
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NCP Rollout (2003-2005) 
During the time period when the NCP neighborhoods were developing their plans and 
starting implementation of neighborhood improvement activities, the national economy was in a 
state usually characterized as a “jobless recovery”: Most economic indicators were growing, 
except for employment, which remaining generally stagnant. The housing marking was boom-
ing, and crime rates continued to decline. These conditions generally prevailed in Chicago, but 
there was less activity and growth in the business sector (Appendix Tables A.1 through A.9). 
For the period 2003-2005, both property and violent crime were declining in the four 
neighborhood groups (Groups I, II, III, and IV) containing NCP neighborhoods, but the rate of 
decline in all four groups was slower, on average, than the citywide trend (Appendix Tables A.1 
and A.2). However, this represents a positive change for neighborhood Groups I and II, where 
violent crime was not decreasing in the previous period. 
Some of the NCP neighborhoods — Auburn Gresham (Group I), Englewood (Group 
IV), Humboldt Park (Group III), Logan Square (Group II), Pilsen (Group III), and West 
Haven (Group IV) — had decreases in violent crime greater than their respective neighbor-
hood trend. In some cases, the decline in violent crime was greater than the citywide decline, 
and, except for Pilsen, the rate of decline accelerated from the previous period. Three of the 
NCP neighborhoods — Chicago Lawn (Group III), Quad Communities (Group IV), and 
Woodlawn (Group IV) — experienced increases in the rate of violent crime during the period 
2003-2005. 
Chicago’s housing market was generally growing during the period 2003-2005; both 
the number and the total amount of home purchase loans were growing fairly quickly, but the 
average home purchase loan amount was declining slightly (Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4). 
Similar conditions prevailed in the neighborhood groups containing NCP neighborhoods, with 
Group II neighborhoods experiencing slower growth and neighborhood Groups I and IV 
experiencing higher growth. Foreclosures were also decreasing citywide, and the same was true 
in the four neighborhood groups, especially among the Group IV neighborhoods (Appendix 
Tables A.5 and A.6). 
Most of the NCP neighborhoods experienced housing market trends similar to their 
neighborhood average, with the exception of some neighborhoods in Group IV (North 
Lawndale, Quad Communities, West Haven, and Woodlawn), where growth rates were 
lower, and one Group IV neighborhood (Washington Park) that experienced explosive growth 
in the period 2003-2005. Overall, the 2003-2005 home purchase loan trends for the NCP 
neighborhood represent an increase over the previous period. NCP neighborhoods where 
growth declined, compared with the period 2000-2002, were North Lawndale (Group IV), 
Pilsen (Group III), West Haven (Group IV), and Woodlawn (Group IV). Generally, the 
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decline in foreclosure rates for the NCP neighborhoods were at or above the trend for their 
respective neighborhood group. The only exception — West Haven (Group IV) — had a 
stagnant trend. 
For the period 2003-2005, the amount of small business loans had a slightly negative 
trend, while jobs and employment were stagnant (Appendix Tables A.7, A.8, and A.9). The trend 
for Group II neighborhoods was similar to the citywide trends, while the other neighborhood 
groups diverged from the citywide pattern slightly. Specifically, the Group I neighborhoods had 
a slightly negative trend for the employment indicator, as did the Group III neighborhoods, 
which also experienced a stagnant trend in loan amounts for the period 2003-2005. For the 
Group IV neighborhoods, business loan amounts continued to grow in the period 2003-2005, 
albeit at a slower rate than the previous period, and employment had a small, positive trend. 
Auburn Gresham (Group I) and all the NCP neighborhoods in Group III (Chicago 
Lawn, Humboldt Park, Little Village, and Pilsen) had more negative trends than their 
respective neighborhood average for small business loans. Humboldt Park and Pilsen also 
differed from the Group III trends for jobs and/or employment in the period 2003-2005. Three 
of the NCP neighborhoods in Group IV (Englewood, South Chicago, and Woodlawn) had a 
negative trend for small business loans, while three neighborhoods (Garfield Park, Quad 
Communities, and Washington Park) had larger growth rates for this indicator. Overall, the 
quality-of-life outlook for the NCP neighborhoods for the rollout phase was fairly positive. 
While there are some exceptions as noted above, these neighborhoods were following course 
with other Chicago neighborhoods that shared similar population and housing compositions. 
How the Great Recession Changed Quality of Life in Chicago 
Nationally, one of the effects of the Great Recession of greatest concern to community devel-
opment has been the rapid rise in foreclosure rates. The initial rise in foreclosures was concen-
trated among subprime mortgage holders, whose inability to negotiate better terms (the usual 
course for subprime loans)3 led to defaults. As the recession deepened, the upward trend in 
foreclosures was reinforced as borrowers with more traditional mortgages became unable to 
meet their financial obligations due to job loss and other effects of the recession.4  
These and other trends that were characteristics of the recession have the potential for 
devastating effects on neighborhoods, especially those with residents already suffering from 
economic duress at the beginning of the cycle. Research investigating the effects of previous 
                                                 
3This was due to the tightening of the credit markets cause by the decline in value of the mortgage-backed 
securities.  
4This led to even further tightening of credit markets, as “regular” mortgages were also securitized. 
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recessions indicates that the negative effects are more pronounced in economically disadvan-
taged neighborhoods.5 In addition, these same neighborhoods are more likely to have experi-
enced a slower recovery from the previous recession at the beginning of the decade, particularly 
in terms of income and employment.6 While the Great Recession officially ended in June 2009, 
the extent of its effects are still under examination. Early reports suggest differential effects for 
racial and ethnic minorities, who, for various reasons, were likely to hold subprime loans, as 
well as more substantial effects for middle- and upper-income households, who are traditionally 
somewhat insulated from business cycle fluctuations.  
Figure 2.2 compares the average rate of filed foreclosures for all Chicago neighbor-
hoods with the average rate for the neighborhood groups containing most of the NCP neighbor-
hoods. Overall, the foreclosure rate during the Great Recession did not reach the peak foreclo-
sure rate during the previous recession. The foreclosure trend in Group IV neighborhoods — 
those with lower-income, minority residents — followed the same pattern as the overall trend 
but at higher levels. For the Group III neighborhoods — those with moderate-income, Latino 
residents — the trend in foreclosure rates varies from the overall trend; these neighborhoods did 
not experience as a large a decline in foreclosures after the earlier recession, and the foreclosure 
rate continued to increase after the end of the Great Recession. As shown in Figure 2.3, the 
effect of the Great Recession on capital flows was more uniform. 
Table 2.1 shows that the effects of the recession on Chicago as a whole were concen-
trated among the indicators most closely connected to the housing and credit markets. For the 
city as a whole, the trajectory of the total amount of home purchase loans, which reflect the 
capital flowing into Chicago neighborhoods, dramatically changed direction from an annual 
average increase of 18.3 percent in the three years before the recession (2003-2005; not shown) 
to an average annual decline of 29.1 percent in the years following the collapse of the housing 
bubble (2006-2009). Completed foreclosures exhibited a similar dramatic change, going from 
an annual average decline of 28.4 percent in the period 2003-2005 to an annual average increase 
of 24.5 percent in the years 2006-2009. Turning to the commercial credit market, the decline in 
the amount of small business loans intensified after the beginning of the Great Recession; the 
annual average decline increased from 5.7 percent in the period 2003-2005 to 15.4 percent in 
2006-2009. Interestingly, the trajectory of the mean home loan amount indicator, which reflects 
the value of residential real estate, was positive in the years following the onset of the Great 
Recession (2006-2009). Since the level of home lending activity was declining during this 
period (as indicated by the negative trajectory for total amount of home purchase loans), the
                                                 
5Ong et al. (2003); Hackworth (2001). 
6Doussard, Peck, and Theodore (2009). 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
Filed Foreclosures per 10,000 Owner-Occupied, Single-Family Housing Units 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center (MCIC). 
 
NOTES: The plotted line for each trend is smoothed using a nonparametric locally weighted regression 
technique known as LOESS. Filed foreclosures are calculated as the total number of single-family home 
foreclosures divided by the 2000 count of owner-occupied, single-family housing units (U.S. Decennial 
Census) multiplied by 10,000. 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Figure 2.3 
 
Total Amount of Home Purchase Loans per 10,000 Owner-Occupied, 
Single-Family Housing Units 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center (MCIC). 
 
NOTES: The plotted line for each trend is smoothed using a nonparametric locally weighted regression 
technique known as LOESS. Total home purchase loans are calculated as the sum of home purchase loan 
amounts divided by the 2000 count of owner-occupied, single-family housing units (U.S. Decennial 
Census) multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 2.1 
 
Neighborhood Quality-of-Life Indicators in Chicago: Average Annual Percentage Change, 2006-2009 
 
 
 
Neighborhood 
 
Property 
Crime 
 
Violent 
Crime 
 
Home  
Loan  
Total $ 
 
Home  
Loan  
Mean $ 
 
Filed 
Foreclosures 
 
Completed 
Foreclosures 
 
Business 
Loan  
Total $ 
 
 
Area Jobs 
 
Resident 
Workers 
Chicago -1.6 -4.5 -29.1 9.3 17.9 24.5 -15.4 1.9 -1.6 
   Neighborhood Group I (mean) -2.1 -4.7 -43.2 6.5 1.7 5.2 -21.7 0.2 -0.9 
          Auburn Gresham -0.0 -2.4 -46.2 5.7 -2.9 8.5 -27.2 -2.1 -0.6 
   Neighborhood Group II (mean) 1.6 -2.7 -29.0 4.6 41.2 80.1 -16.7 -1.7 0.4 
          Logan Square 0.1 -3.0 -29.1 6.9 65.9 109.1 -22.7 0.4 -6.5 
   Neighborhood Group III (mean) -2.8 -4.2 -41.7 -1.3 46.7 88.6 -13.4 -2.6 -1.1 
          Chicago Lawn -0.5 -2.1 -42.8 -3.1 36.3 41.1 -29.1 -3.0 -2.3 
          Humboldt Park 3.5 0.6 -43.3 7.2 19.2 41.7 -17.9 0.1 -3.2 
          Little Village -6.8 -1.4 -56.5 -9.7 50.7 51.5 -18.9 0.2 -3.1 
          Pilsen -10.5 -5.3 -34.4 4.6 41.4 98.4 -10.6 1.4 -1.5 
   Neighborhood Group IV (mean) -5.1 -8.6 -47.8 3.1 15.6 30.9 -24.9 1.4 -0.1 
          Englewood -0.9 -6.1 -47.5 20.7 -2.0 -1.1 -13.9 -1.5 -0.5 
          Garfield Park -8.2 -2.8 -54.5 3.5 1.9 23.3 -13.9 -19.4 -0.6 
          North Lawndale -4.4 -11.4 -59.0 7.8 -4.8 -5.1 -50.8 -7.2 -0.4 
          Quad Communities -0.8 -17.0 -39.9 3.9 2.9 15.6 -36.5 8.5 2.3 
          South Chicago -14.2 -11.0 -61.3 -3.2 14.2 0.7 -26.5 6.4 0.9 
         Washington Park -13.1 -4.8 -56.8 1.5 5.7 50.8 -51.9 -0.9 1.7 
         West Haven 0.0 -15.9 -49.0 4.6 46.5 69.5 -6.0 1.3 2.7 
         Woodlawn -2.9 -3.6 -43.4 7.5 21.0 32.1 -31.1 1.3 5.8 
   Neighborhood Group V (mean) -1.7 -8.2 -20.5 8.3 17.2 52.4 -13.7 2.0 -0.9 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center (MCIC). 
 
NOTE: The average annual percentage change was calculated using a regression method in order to minimize the influence of other observations.  
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positive trajectory for the indicator of the mean home purchase loan amount most likely reflects 
the population of borrowers who were able to secure credit during this period; that is, only those 
borrowers who had excellent credit ratings and relatively substantial assets were able to secure 
loans.7 
While these increased trajectories of distress were seen throughout Chicago, they also 
varied by neighborhood type. For Group I neighborhoods (minority, moderate-income, single-
family housing), the decline in the credit availability indicators was more severe, compared with 
the overall city trend, but the increase in foreclosure rates was much smaller. The NCP neigh-
borhood in this group, Auburn Gresham, is fairly similar to others in its group, with the 
exception of crime rates trends; its crime trajectories declined less than other Group I neighbor-
hoods.  
For the predominantly white, moderate-income, neighborhoods marked by single-
family homes (Group II), the foreclosure rates increased at a much higher rate than the overall 
city foreclosure rates. This is particularly true for the Group II NCP neighborhood, Logan 
Square.8 Comparing the Group II neighborhoods’ experiences with the Group I neighborhoods’ 
experiences in regards to foreclosures is particularly interesting, as these two neighborhood 
groups have the largest proportion of single-family, owner-occupied homes. Specifically, the 
rate of change in the Group I neighborhoods’ foreclosure rate was the lowest in the city for the 
period 2006-2009; for some neighborhoods within this group, foreclosure rates continued to 
trend downward after the collapse of the housing market. In contrast, the Group II neighbor-
hoods experienced the largest increase in foreclosures after the collapse of the housing market. 
However, the level of foreclosures in the Group I neighborhoods are several orders of magni-
tude higher than the level in the Group II neighborhoods, in part because the Group I neighbor-
hoods generally did not experience the large decline in foreclosures after the early 2000s 
recession that was typical for most other neighborhoods. 
For Latino neighborhoods of moderate income, marked by a mix of renters and home 
owners (Group III), the foreclosure rates also increased at a much higher rate than the overall 
city foreclosure rates. The percentage change in the rates for this group of neighborhoods is 
fairly similar to moderate-income white neighborhoods, and the percentage change in mean 
home loan amount is small, but negative. Most of the NCP neighborhoods in this group had 
lower increases in their foreclosure rates than the overall group; the exception is Pilsen. Qualita-
tive research described Pilsen as being subject to some gentrification, and it also differed in that 
                                                 
7Further analysis of the quality-of-life indicators and their trajectory response to economic conditions 
can be found in Williams, Glaster, and Verma (2012). 
8Although Logan Square is not predominately white, the number of single-family, owner-occupied homes 
places it in Group II. 
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its mean home loan amounts followed the city trend by increasing during this period; the same 
is true for Humboldt Park. Little Village had a greater decline in its housing market indica-
tors, while Pilsen had a less negative change in these indicators. Finally, the property crime 
rates in both Little Village and Pilsen actually decreased more in the recessionary period than 
in the previous period (2003-2005). Trends in Chicago Lawn, the other NCP neighborhood in 
this group, were generally consistent with the overall Group III trends. 
For predominately African-American neighborhoods with lower income and a high 
proportion of renters (Group IV), the decline in both the number and the total amount of home 
purchase loans was larger, relative to the city decline. However, the decline in both property and 
violent crime in this period increased over the previous period (2003-2005). While foreclosures 
for this group were in line with the city’s rate, two of the NCP neighborhoods, Washington 
Park and West Haven, had relatively larger increases in either filed or completed foreclosures. 
Several of the NCP Group IV neighborhoods (North Lawndale, South Chicago, and Wash-
ington Park) had larger percentage declines in their housing market indicators. Most of the 
Group IV NCP neighborhoods experienced a modest increase in their housing values; the 
exceptions are Englewood (a 20 percent increase) and South Chicago (a small decline). 
Garfield Park experienced a large decline in its number of jobs, while both Quad Communi-
ties and South Chicago had modest increases in this indicator.  
For racially mixed, relatively high-income neighborhoods marked by significant pro-
portions of renters (Group V), the decrease in housing market activity was lower than in the city 
and other neighborhood groups. The Group V neighborhoods also had a relatively large 
increase in completed foreclosures. Otherwise, indicator trends in these neighborhoods were 
consistent with the overall city trends. (No NCP neighborhoods belonged to this group.) 
In sum, the most profound effect of the recent economic downturn is seen on the indica-
tors that reflect the credit markets: Lending activity in both the housing and the commercial 
markets declined substantially. This decline was less pronounced in higher-income neighbor-
hoods and more pronounced in lower-income neighborhoods; some moderate-income neigh-
borhoods also experienced a more pronounced decline, particularly those with predominately 
nonwhite populations. Generally, the decline in the housing market was accompanied by an 
increase in mean home purchase loan amounts. Although the increase was modest in most areas 
of the city, a few neighborhoods experienced significant growth in this indicator. The decline in 
commercial lending activity was, overall, accompanied by fairly stagnant trends in job growth 
and employment. However, both indicators varied considerably across the city’s neighbor-
hoods. 
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NCP Perceptions of the Downturn 
Neighborhood organizations acknowledged the severity of the changed economic climate. But, 
as might be suggested by the foregoing quantitative analyses, which found different patterns of 
change in different types of neighborhoods, there were also different perceptions of the impact 
of the Great Recession in different types of Chicago neighborhoods.  
For neighborhoods that were experiencing growth prior to the downturn — particularly, 
the Latino neighborhoods and historically disinvested African-American communities that were 
undergoing some form of gentrification — the decline in local economic health and stability 
were seen to alter the forces behind changing community compositions. Earlier in NCP, lead 
agencies in gentrifying neighborhoods saw an influx of more affluent residents, and they 
focused their efforts on preventing displacement of longtime residents who could no longer 
afford to live in the area. In the wake of the recession, however, foreclosures surpassed gentrifi-
cation as the primary concern regarding the dislocation of established residents. As a staff 
person explained:9  
I think the economic crisis has sort of given rise to a different kind of demon, 
and that’s the foreclosure crisis. . . . We don’t want to see populations displaced 
in Humboldt Park, but I think as great a threat as gentrification is to displacement 
right now, the foreclosure crisis is causing similar challenges. 
Lead agencies described ways that the recession also halted or significantly altered 
housing development efforts in neighborhoods that had been attracting investments and projects 
in the years before the recession. Staff from one neighborhood contrasted the current communi-
ty outlook with the outlook just prior to the downturn: 
When we were in 2007, Business Week had us as the top 10 up-and-coming 
neighborhoods in the nation and we had all kinds of investors and projects on the 
boards. Our housing committee was so busy then. [Since the recession,] a couple 
of projects . . . just went to the wayside, you know, a transit-oriented develop-
ment that had been approved by the city and the transfer of land was in the pro-
cess. The developer alerted the city and . . . we’re just backing away from this 
project. 
In contrast, for some other lead agencies, the recession was perceived as an extension of 
the economic conditions already affecting the neighborhood. These groups believed that 
longstanding patterns of disinvestment were already in place. As one explained: 
It’s been hard here since ever, you know what I mean. Like, it’s always hard. It’s 
funny to me. It’s, like, poor neighborhoods are always poor. The recession might 
                                                 
9All quotations are from interviews that MDRC conducted with 132 staff, implementation partners, and 
other stakeholders. Interviews are anonymous. 
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make you a little bit poorer, but we’ve maybe felt it more as an organization. 
And, yeah, maybe there’s a little bit higher unemployment rate. But when you’re 
always a low-income community, it’s just sort of hard to see how a recession is 
hitting you because you were low income from the beginning. 
Lead agency staff from another group described the national recession as an extension 
of patterns, resulting in minimal additional impact on an already-disadvantaged community: 
Our low-income community and African-American neighborhoods, the reces-
sion — these communities have been in recession for much longer than a nation-
al recession that we’re experiencing right now, right? So we’re not seeing . . . a 
hardcore shift in people’s mental models in terms of this recession. This is more 
of an “Oh, well, this is time to adapt again, right?” People have been adapting 
most of their lives. 
Because of these mixed perceptions — with some groups disputing that the Great Re-
cession, in fact, represented a change in community conditions — it is not surprising that groups 
did not always mobilize to respond to the recession, as described below. 
NCP Responds to the Great Recession:  
The Role of LISC Chicago and the MacArthur Foundation 
During the recession, LISC Chicago was able to respond to the needs of NCP community 
partners and could leverage new opportunities, such as stimulus funding, that the recession 
presented. It was both the strength of the networks that many lead agencies had fostered over 
the preceding years and the ongoing work of LISC Chicago in promoting the network of NCP 
communities — along with the stature of its funder — that enabled LISC Chicago to take 
advantage of new, large, public sector cross-community projects.  
Some notable federal- and city-level projects that LISC Chicago helped secure include a 
state-sponsored summer youth employment initiative; an initiative to promote broadband 
adoption and capacity, called “Smart Communities”; and the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program, a federal development program that responds to foreclosed properties. These cross-
community initiatives have benefited many lead agencies and their partners. During the reces-
sion, LISC Chicago was also able to strengthen ties with Atlantic Philanthropies, ensuring the 
implementation of another cross-neighborhood program, Elev8, providing comprehensive 
services in five communities, and with other organizations, such as World Sports Chicago, to 
secure funding for youth development and recreation. 
The majority of these opportunities were brought to LISC Chicago as a result of strong 
relationships with the public sector and with foundations. For example, LISC Chicago’s 
relationship to the Department of Family and Support Services provided an “in” for the summer 
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youth employment program. LISC Chicago was approached by the city’s Department of 
Innovation and Technology and was asked to write the proposal for the broadband initiative, 
Smart Communities. In other instances, LISC Chicago “tapped into the existing platform” to 
identify other opportunities; in anticipation of stimulus funds, LISC Chicago brought together 
NCP communities and compiled a list of “shovel-ready” projects that could be activated 
immediately.10 
During this period, the MacArthur Foundation also infused additional financial re-
sources to NCP lead agencies during the recession, especially to support foreclosure prevention. 
One staff person described how NCP helped sustain MacArthur’s involvement and channel 
resources through their agencies: 
They’ve made sure that our model was visible throughout LISC, because we 
were the group that was taking it on. . . . LISC has tapped us when they have 
wanted to engage other community groups . . . funded through the New Com-
munities program. So they’ve taken actions that are very supportive of our visi-
bility, all of which has been good for us. 
Finally, LISC Chicago provided substantial technical assistance and other supports to 
lead agencies in the wake of the financial downturn, helping agencies reevaluate their economic 
health and sustainability. Box 2.2 describes the result of some of those efforts. 
The majority of lead agencies were satisfied with the postrecession role of LISC Chica-
go and MacArthur. As one staff member commented: 
I’m really pleased with the role they’ve played. . . . I’ve never really had an in-
teraction with them where I didn’t feel like I was taken seriously and if there was 
a way to respond, they would respond . . . they’ve been really incredibly commit-
ted to the process and to working with the realities of the groups on the ground. 
Others described ways that LISC Chicago moved to continue to support and sustain 
threatened funding for local efforts, such as transit-oriented development projects in Auburn 
Gresham or sports funding through World Sports Chicago. As one lead agency staff person 
commented: 
They understand through our community planning process and through every-
thing we work on and through knowing our community, what the needs are of 
our community as well. So when they hear about someone that can help us con-
vert green space, they make that connection. Not to mention all the funding. 
  
                                                 
10Beyond the Neighborhood (Chaskin and Karlström, 2012) describes many of LISC’s efforts to broker 
resources from the public and private sector. 
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While the majority of lead agencies felt that LISC Chicago was responsive to their 
needs during the recession, a few groups felt that they were not deeply supported by NCP 
funding and voiced criticisms about what they perceived to be a prescriptive strategy on the part 
of LISC Chicago and the city when applying for stimulus-supported programs: 
Box 2.2 
LISC’s Role in Supporting the Financial Stability of Lead Agencies 
Two lead agencies that encountered particular difficulties related to the Great Recession 
demonstrate LISC’s role in supporting the financial stability of leads during NCP. One is 
Enlace in Little Village, which was among the newest of the midsize lead agencies, with 
no staff until 1998 but rapid growth thereafter. By 2008, it had 25 full-time staff, with 
significant state and city contracts for Chicago Public Schools community schools and 
public safety work. Its internal fiscal management and controls, however, had not kept 
pace with the expansion, and as the State of Illinois increasingly resorted to delayed 
payments in the face of a worsening budget crisis in 2009, the organization’s own finan-
cial situation became unexpectedly precarious, “to the point,” says a LISC Chicago staff 
member, “of, would they have to close their doors?” Enlace alerted LISC Chicago to these 
problems, and LISC Chicago acted quickly and successfully to help the organization get 
its finances in order, bringing in a financial consultant to work closely with the organiza-
tion’s leadership. This was an instance of LISC Chicago’s dual role as funder and partner. 
On the one hand, it was based on an unusual level of trust that had developed between 
Enlace’s NCP staff and its LISC Chicago program officer, and it could not have happened 
“if not for the trust that they had in us, and understanding that we really did have their best 
interests at heart.” On the other hand, LISC Chicago was forceful in its insistence on rapid 
changes: “We froze dollars to them until they did these things; we met with their board. 
. . . We had, I think, the full-court press.” 
St. Edmund’s Redevelopment Corporation, the small community development corporation 
(CDC) that served as the original lead agency in Washington Park, provides a partially 
parallel example with a different outcome. This organization had struggled to broaden its 
focus into other areas of community work and to partner with other organizations in a very 
sparse organizational landscape. Due to continued primary reliance on its role as a tradi-
tional housing-oriented CDC, it was seriously hobbled by the collapse of the housing 
market in 2007-2008. LISC Chicago was not brought into the situation until it had reached 
a point where these difficulties were, says a LISC Chicago staff member, seriously detract-
ing from the NCP work of community engagement and project implementation. The 
election of a new alderman to replace one whose engagement in NCP had not been pro-
ductive provided an occasion to reorganize the Washington Park NCP, staging the plan-
ning process that had not originally taken place and eventually forming a new lead agency. 
Although LISC Chicago was able to help St. Edmund’s survive the housing crisis, the 
blow that these pressures dealt to the organization’s viability were thus a central reason for 
the decision to terminate its role as an NCP lead agency. 
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Stop writing stuff for us without telling us. . . . The city does it. LISC will do it. 
. . . A lot of these federal grants, a lot of these stimulus grants people got written 
in. I think the city is the wors[e] perpetrator than LISC. . . . LISC does partner 
with people, but yet there’s a paternalism. . . . 
These views were not the norm, as resources that were secured were generally wel-
comed by community organizations. Both LISC Chicago’s relationships with the lead agencies 
and the comprehensive nature of NCP activity in local neighborhoods meant that efforts to 
“write in” neighborhoods to stimulus-supported programs supported active constituencies 
within NCP. 
Effects on Community Organizations and Their Responses 
The Great Recession had a significant impact on state, local, and foundation budgets, which, in 
turn, had implications for the financial health of local organizations and the projects that they 
conducted. Several lead agencies made reductions in staffing or reduced expenses, such as 
phone lines or health benefits, and other organizations expressed a heightened awareness of 
their financial standing and felt that their agencies were behaving more conservatively as a 
result of the funding environment. At least five lead agencies described a decline in resources, 
posing challenges to existing programs and to starting up new initiatives. However, at least half 
of those groups also reported being able to take advantage of new opportunities created by the 
federal, state, and city programs that were meant to counteract the negative effects of the 
recession, as described above. 
As the broader economic environment changed, some projects were no longer feasible. 
This was especially true for the financing of affordable housing developments. Housing projects 
were modified by at least four lead agencies, as some shifted units from owner to rental units to 
accommodate the changed market. For others, a lack of financial support caused projects to be 
abandoned. For example, in Little Village, a large 23-acre development at 26th Street and 
Kostner failed to leverage the investment needed for the project; in East Garfield Park, the 
lead agency no longer promoted new housing investments in any substantial way. 
Lead agencies took varied approaches to keep NCP action moving forward and to con-
tinue projects and plans put into place before the recession. The most common strategies were 
to shift efforts to take advantage of new funding streams or to modify existing projects (such as 
affordable housing developments, as described above). In many ways, the comprehensive 
framework of NCP allowed these shifts to occur, as it became possible to promote projects 
other than housing development under the auspices of the initiative. In other instances, NCP 
provided an avenue for technical assistance to allow such supports to occur, as was the case for 
Quad Communities as the lead agency adjusted plans for a commercial development project 
with the help of LISC-brokered technical assistance. A last strategy was to focus on efforts that 
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could be supported only with NCP staff time but not with additional programmatic resources. 
North Lawndale, for instance, chose to focus on supporting local, volunteer block clubs because 
this effort only required NCP staffing support and not additional resources. 
A less common but significant response to the recession was to mobilize partners to re-
spond to the specific problems that it brought about in foreclosures, crime, or violence. In 
Chicago Lawn, the lead agency worked together with churches, schools, and other community 
partners in a multipronged strategy to address the foreclosure crisis. With additional support 
provided from the MacArthur Foundation, this effort involved advocacy activities to influence 
lenders’ behavior and the actions of city, state, and federal regulators; a concentrated outreach 
effort to reach households that were at risk of foreclosure; an expansion of counseling pro-
grams; and attempts to fill vacant properties with qualified home buyers. Although partners in 
Humboldt Park did not come together and coordinate activities to address employment or 
foreclosure issues, they did mobilize to try to influence state funding to the neighborhood, as 
described below. 
With the exception of the mobilization of local networks by the Southwest Organizing 
Project, or SWOP, in Chicago Lawn (to respond to foreclosures) most lead agencies did not 
conclude that their work needed to shift significantly in order to respond to the recession, but 
they felt that the structure of NCP was flexible enough to work in different areas so as to 
provide guidance and support going forward. Lead agencies generally described the overall 
strategy of NCP — especially its support of organizational capacity-building, network devel-
opment, and comprehensives — to be essentially intact.11 It is notable that no lead agencies felt 
that the recession itself occasioned a need to create a new or “emergency” NCP plan or to 
substantially revisit planning processes, although comments above from some lead agencies 
about the recession representing “business as usual” in local neighborhoods may also have 
played into this dynamic. 
Relationships and the Recession 
In general, lead agencies did not report that it was difficult to form new relationships during the 
economic downturn, nor did their ability to maintain existing partnerships suffer. This is not to 
say that NCP neighborhoods were unaffected by the recession. However, most lead agencies 
and partners described a culture of limited competition and increased cooperation and reported 
that the recession, in many cases, brought agencies closer together. 
                                                 
11Chapter 5 considers whether the comprehensiveness of NCP shifted or was maintained in later years of 
the initiative. 
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For example, staff in Auburn Gresham said that there was no animosity among part-
ners in regards to funding, and they noted that continued collaboration was seen as a way to 
attract new opportunities for funding. Although some said that partners did not see each other as 
often as before because they were focused more intently on fewer projects or were inundated 
with clients seeking services, there was not the sense that relationships deteriorated. 
In Humboldt Park, the crisis was, in fact, credited with creating more powerful rela-
tionships. When funding was more plentiful, partners were willing to “duke it out,” as one staff 
person described, to ensure their share of resources, but with tighter funding, groups reported 
working in partnership to “stop the hemorrhaging.” Humboldt Park inspired the creation of a 
Budget Advocacy Group, bringing together 12 neighborhood organizations to advocate for 
funding at the local and state levels.12 According to one partner: 
[The state budget crisis] kind of creates partnerships amongst us, because with-
out each other, nobody’s going to get anything. And so it’s been that sort of, 
“We’re all desperate, so let’s go together and get what we can.” And I think 
that’s been good for us, because when I came to the neighborhood [several part-
ners] wouldn’t talk to each other, wouldn’t sit in a room together, wouldn’t do 
anything. Now we’re, you know, we’ve partnered on grants together, we’re at 
the NCP meetings all the time together, and so that stuff has been helpful. 
Finally, cross-neighborhood projects spurred by the recession gave rise to some new part-
nerships among lead agencies themselves. For example, the city’s Smart Communities initiative, 
supported by stimulus funds from the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), 
brought together NCP agencies in Auburn Gresham, Chicago Lawn, and Englewood. Instead 
of working independently, these agencies collaborated to implement the program.  
Conclusion 
The Great Recession — sparked by the collapse of the housing market about midway through 
NCP — was a significantly transformative force upon neighborhoods, even if it did not affect 
all neighborhoods in the same way. Unlike previous recessions, the Great Recession spread 
from the housing market to other areas of the economy. Unprecedented foreclosure rates and a 
continuing slow recovery presented challenges for NCP neighborhoods on multiple levels. One 
particularly pointed challenge for the initiative involved leverage, or the ability of projects to 
attract additional resources from the public or private sector. 
Faced with these challenges, LISC Chicago and the MacArthur Foundation moved to 
compensate for these lost sources of revenue by taking advantage of new funding sources, and 
                                                 
12The work of the Budget Advocacy Group is described in Chaskin and Karlström (2012). 
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they were well regarded by lead agencies and their partners in their ability to channel new 
funding through NCP.13 Lead-agency budgets were affected by the recession, and agencies 
shifted tactics to keep projects moving. However, the supports and relationships provided by 
NCP were more successful at maintaining relationships than at mobilizing them to respond to 
manifestations of the recession. Foreclosure prevention efforts in Chicago Lawn were a signifi-
cant exception to this pattern, as they brought together actors in a coordinated fashion to reach 
significant numbers of households at risk of default. The fact that relationships were more 
sturdy than adaptable within NCP raises questions about the trade-offs that may occur between 
institution- or “platform-” building and the inputs that would make it easier for community 
organizations to mobilize together to change course as a result of external shocks. 
 
                                                 
13The subject of leverage is considered further in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 
Building Organizational Capacity Through NCP 
The New Communities Program (NCP) rests on the premise that comprehensive community 
development may best be achieved not by a single organization but by the mobilization and 
coordination of many neighborhood actors. Program designers made a choice to rely on a single 
lead agency that is charged with facilitating collective work and is responsible for catalyzing 
action that is not fully in its control — a challenging task under the best of conditions. It is 
additionally challenging for organizations to become effective neighborhood-wide conveners or 
“intermediaries” when they do not already have these skills or where the local environment 
does not provide incentives to collaborate. Accordingly, this chapter first describes the strategies 
used by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) for building these 
“NCP” capacities, and then it turns to examine two critical areas of capacity and the extent to 
which they were built: (1) the ability to convene stakeholders and engage them in collective 
decision-making and coordination around projects and (2) the ability to build other organiza-
tions’ capacity and sustainability.1 What evidence is there that NCP was able to “teach” 
organizations to carry out its model of comprehensive, coordinated community invest-
ment, or is this a skill that cannot be easily transferred?  
LISC Chicago provided a structured and intentional approach to building groups’ abili-
ties to plan and a flexible, less structured approach toward building capacity after the planning 
period. This flexibility benefited many NCP efforts and lead agencies, while leaving particularly 
challenged lead agencies feeling inadequately supported. Because of LISC’s flexibility, lead 
agencies took different approaches to implementation, and not every group attempted the 
facilitative strategies that could result in learning new capacities. Overall, NCP has built on 
existing strengths among lead agencies, rather than producing new ones, inasmuch as agencies 
developed deeper skills at coordination and collaboration when they had this orientation and 
experience at the beginning of NCP. The fact that established, multi-issue and community 
organizing groups advanced their “intermediary” abilities by working with NCP is notable, as 
one might have expected that it would be difficult to demonstrate the “value-added” of NCP 
among such organizations. In contrast, traditional community development corporations 
(CDCs) have had a particularly challenging path to developing NCP capacities, as their skills at 
building affordable housing and providing needed services directly and independently did not 
always translate to the NCP model. Finally, despite NCP’s emphasis on facilitating action by 
others, almost all NCP lead agencies took direct responsibility for the implementation of some 
                                                 
1The results of this capacity-building in terms of improved relationships and better-coordinated projects 
are described in Chapter 4. 
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major programs, suggesting that the ability to implement programs well and directly may be an 
important contributing factor in successfully executing a community intermediary role, at least 
insofar as it complements and supports a lead agency’s ability to convene and facilitate rather 
than supplanting or undermining it.  
LISC Chicago’s Strategies for Promoting Organizational Capacity 
and Growth 
LISC Chicago was most structured in its expectations and support during the quality-of-life 
planning process, as lead agencies reached out to local stakeholders to develop projects for 
community improvement. It provided an extensive NCP Planning Handbook to guide lead 
agencies and other participants through the planning process, and it set specific expectations 
about the planning process, including its task forces, subcommittee structures, outreach, and 
meeting steps.2 The organization also hired a professional planning firm, Camiros, Inc., to 
facilitate meetings, and it provided in-house writers, or “scribes,” to document and summarize 
discussions. Many lead agencies — especially those with less prior legitimacy as community 
conveners — benefited from the prestige provided by the initiative and by the MacArthur 
Foundation; from the subsequent publication of the quality-of-life plans in professionally 
designed and illustrated booklets; and from NCP’s communication strategy, based on an 
extensive website with a steady stream of articles on the work of NCP. 
As the initiative entered the implementation phase, LISC Chicago took a much less 
structured and less uniform approach to supporting and guiding lead agencies and their partners. 
Although it expected lead agencies to sustain relationships and develop partnerships with other 
organizations during implementation, it followed the lead of the Comprehensive Community 
Revitalization Program (CCRP) — the comprehensive community initiative (CCI) in the South 
Bronx on which NCP was most closely modeled — in giving them full latitude with regard to 
governance and accountability mechanisms.3 This approach fits well with LISC Chicago’s core 
commitment, in NCP, to letting neighborhoods set their own agendas and priorities. 
LISC Chicago’s early resource supports were also designed to be flexible and respon-
sive. As described in Chapter 1, they were provided primarily in the form of “seed grants” — 
modest funding for projects that could kick-start action, leverage additional outside funds, and 
help build relationships between lead agencies and community partners. There were no formal 
                                                 
2New Communities Program (n.d.). 
3Miller and Burns (2006). 
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criteria for seed grants, except that they promoted the quality-of-life plans, which were them-
selves intentionally broad. As one LISC Chicago staff member explained:4 
The criteria is if it’s in the quality-of-life plan or in some way helps further that 
vision of the quality-of-life plan. . . . Beyond that it is purely what I call judg-
ment and what I joke about being case law — What have we done in the past? 
At times, when they saw a need or an opportunity, LISC Chicago program officers 
themselves suggested seed grants to lead agencies. In neighborhoods where LISC Chicago did 
not feel that the lead agency was sufficiently active in brokering seed funding to partners, LISC 
Chicago program staff would build relationships and supply funding directly to community 
organizations that they perceived to be in need of support. LISC Chicago staff also offered 
technical assistance and advisory guidance according to need, and they devoted intensive 
attention to helping the newer organizations develop their organizational structure and demon-
strate their capacity to community partners.5 As the initiative progressed, LISC Chicago was 
able to offer lead agencies and their partners the opportunity to participate in several larger and 
more sustained programs and initiatives based on public funding streams or other private 
foundations. These sometimes reinforced convening and coordinating capacities. For instance, 
the Elev8 community schools initiative, funded by Atlantic Philanthropies in five NCP commu-
nities, required lead agencies to conduct a community planning process and to oversee an 
ongoing collaboration between the school and outside health care and after-school providers.  
Although LISC Chicago’s expectations were less defined during implementation than 
in planning, it continued to fulfill an accountability function as well as a support role. It replaced 
three troubled lead agencies during the first few years of the initiative, and it reacted to other 
instances of lead-agency weakness or crisis by convening agency leadership and boards and 
withholding NCP funds until required changes were made. Such pressures, however, seem to 
have been brought to bear primarily with regard to organizational inadequacies in staffing or 
fiscal management, rather than in cases where “NCP” capacities were not developed. If lead 
agencies incurred consequences for limited capacity-building, it was primarily insofar as LISC 
Chicago generally selected those agencies that it deemed to be higher functioning for the 
multisite “platform” projects that became increasingly prominent in later years. 
                                                 
4All quotations are from interviews that MDRC conducted with 132 staff, implementation partners, and 
other stakeholders. Interviews are anonymous. 
5This is described in Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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Convening and Coordinating Stakeholders 
Although LISC Chicago expected lead agencies to sustain relationships and develop partner-
ships with other organizations during implementation, it left considerable leeway to local 
groups about how to involve others. It did not create standards for outreach beyond the planning 
process, nor did it promote any particular coordination or accountability structures at the 
neighborhood level. This resulted in significant variability in implementation arrangements. 
More than half of NCP neighborhoods attempted to convert the quality-of-life planning struc-
tures — with a range of community stakeholders participating in central steering committees 
and issue-specific subcommittees — into implementation vehicles, with varying degrees of 
success. Three groups incorporated NCP work into their existing governance and coordination 
structures, while others took a primary decision-making role themselves — especially CDCs in 
traditionally disinvested or gentrifying neighborhoods that saw few viable partners. Although 
the maintenance of convening structures did not guarantee the development of convening and 
coordination capacities, experience across the 14 NCP neighborhoods suggests that it was an 
important factor and that the inability to do so usually indicated difficulties in this area. 
Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation’s ability to transform planning structures in-
to sustainable implementation vehicles in Humboldt Park is an important example of NCP’s 
success in building this form of capacity among lead agencies. In being designated the NCP 
lead agency, Bickerdike inherited an inclusive structure for collective development planning 
and collaborative implementation that already existed in the neighborhood and that other 
organizations expected it to sustain. Bickerdike had previously participated in this effort but had 
not led it. As lead agency, it was tasked with learning how to manage a structure that would 
include 12 collective decision-making structures, or task forces. Bickerdike’s commitment 
required a major investment of time on the part of its executive director, who continued to lead 
quarterly task force meetings and subsequent NCP planning processes. When participation 
seemed to flag a few years into implementation, the central task force conducted a new planning 
exercise in order to reinvigorate these structures and attract broader participation.  
The other historically established lead agencies — the Logan Square Neighborhood 
Association (LSNA) in Logan Square and the dual lead agencies in Chicago Southwest, the 
Greater Southwest Development Corporation (GSDC) and the Southwest Organizing 
Project (SWOP) — also demonstrated a sustained capacity to convene community stakehold-
ers for planning and governance purposes throughout the initiative. Since the two community 
organizing groups (LSNA and SWOP) had their own collective governance structures and 
planning methodologies prior to NCP, this capacity cannot be attributed strictly to NCP. What 
NCP did provide was a framework for more intensive initial planning and a boost in legitimacy 
in new areas of work that allowed them to expand their reach beyond their existing institutional 
membership to other major stakeholders in the community. LSNA, for instance, had long 
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convened teams of residents and other stakeholders to lead issue-specific work, held quarterly 
membership meetings, and staged an annual “congress” for updating the organization’s “holistic 
plan.” NCP quality-of-life planning broadened this process by involving nonmember organiza-
tions and prompted LSNA to restructure its plan more inclusively: 
We completely changed the format of our plan. We really changed the way we 
looked at the organization, changed the way we looked at our strategies, and it 
wasn’t just like LSNA will do this, this, and this. We were much more deliberate 
about . . . who was doing what. 
Throughout NCP, LSNA’s collective planning and governance structures served as vehicles for 
sustained engagement and coordination and allowed the plan itself to remain more responsive to 
shifting priorities than in most NCP neighborhoods. 
Midsize and newly formed lead agencies have had more mixed results with regard to 
sustaining collective governance structures and building convening capacity. About half of 
these agencies attempted to sustain such structures, proportionally distributed among the three 
agency types. Traditional CDCs had the greatest trouble sustaining them over time, while newer 
agencies that focused on convening seem to have done so at some cost to their organizational 
development. 
Of the two midsize multi-issue organizations, only The Resurrection Project (TRP) 
in Pilsen attempted to sustain an NCP convening structure throughout the initiative. Although it 
is a community organizing group that also builds affordable housing, it did not absorb NCP 
structures the way SWOP and LSNA did but kept them semiautonomous, much as Bickerdike 
did. The Pilsen NCP operates via five topical task forces that come together in a combined 
supervisory structure called the “Pilsen Planning Committee.” TRP chairs the housing task 
force itself, while other community partners chair task forces on the economy, family, commu-
nity image, and education. Unlike in Humboldt Park, this governance and implementation 
structure did not derive from a rich history of collective planning but from a more challenging 
one. Having participated in NCI — the predecessor to NCP — TRP felt that Pilsen represented 
a difficult environment for collaboration. As a result, during planning processes for NCP, TRP’s 
leadership took a new direction. Building on strong alliances with three other major organiza-
tions, TRP succeeded in broadening the quality-of-life planning process considerably and in 
producing what many jokingly referred to as the “hell-froze-over plan,” because formerly rival 
organizations were brought together to create it. TRP’s convening role during this process was a 
new one, but both TRP’s leadership and the key planning partners came away from the exercise 
convinced that maintaining the planning task forces would be the best way to sustain the new 
atmosphere of cooperation and collaboration. “That’s where I think it made a big difference,” 
says a TRP staff member, “because instead of us trying to define it ourselves like we knew 
everything, we really looked to each other and to each other’s strengths and really leaned on 
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each other.” Although TRP staff acknowledge that some task forces have been more productive 
and accountable than others — with one having recently ended — a capacity for convening and 
collective planning and governance has been built among TRP and its community partners 
through NCP. 
Two of the newly formed NCP lead agencies maintained planning task forces as gov-
ernance structures — Teamwork Englewood and the East Garfield Park NCP — but 
although they have continued to convene them, these structures have not proved as effective for 
implementation purposes as the more established organizations discussed above. In both cases, 
the scarcity of other community organizations capable of implementing programs have been 
challenging. The two other, newer organizations — the Greater Auburn-Gresham Develop-
ment Corporation (GAGDC) in Auburn Gresham and the Quad Communities Develop-
ment Corporation (QCDC) in Quad Communities — did not attempt to sustain convening 
structures beyond the planning phase. Both achieved rapid organizational growth by implement-
ing projects directly (as discussed below). At the same time, GAGDC has maintained and even 
improved its local stature as a community convener over the course of the initiative in a way 
that QCDC has not. Two differences in approach appear to be relevant here. QCDC made an 
early decision to prioritize commercial development, while GAGDC has maintained a broadly 
comprehensive approach, with implementation activities in multiple quality-of-life areas. And 
more than virtually any other NCP entity, GAGDC has prioritized resident engagement and has 
developed informal mechanisms to promote it, putting the organization in a civic leadership 
role. Additionally, QCDC operates in a denser and more contentious organizational environ-
ment than the sparser and more harmonious one in Auburn Gresham. 
Three of the six traditional CDCs serving as lead agencies attempted to sustain conven-
ing structures into the implementation phase. In one case — the Woodlawn Preservation and 
Investment Corporation (WPIC) in Woodlawn — this structure quickly proved unworkable, 
prompting LISC Chicago to seek different leadership. The Near West Side Community 
Development Corporation (NWSCDC) in West Haven managed to sustain task forces for 
several years, but the agency’s heavy reliance on direct implementation made the structure less 
important to outside participants. When periodic meetings lapsed due to a staffing change, “it 
kind of died,” says a staff member. “It was difficult to try to get folks reengaged after they had 
had a two-year separation from the process.” Claretian Associates’ efforts since taking over as 
South Chicago lead agency in 2005 have fared better. It initially instituted quarterly NCP 
meetings, but when attendance waned with the Great Recession (2006-2009), it folded them 
into a housing advisory group. Since 2009, it has sustained a convening structure that focuses 
on safety issues, and it is one of the few NCP entities that holds periodic community infor-
mation meetings, every other month.  
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Building Capacity Beyond Lead Agencies 
NCP was not designed only to build capacity among lead agencies, to promote their ability to 
coordinate and convene, but also to help other community organizations benefit from the 
greater flow of resources and expertise associated with the program. During the early years of 
NCP, the formal mechanism for engaging a broader group of organizations in the community 
were project and technical assistance seed grants that averaged approximately $25,000. Virtual-
ly all lead agencies brokered seed grants to other groups. But seed grants alone were not 
designed to be sustainable sources of funding. As a result, some lead agencies focused on 
creating access to additional resources beyond seed grants, partnered more directly with 
agencies on projects, and provided or brokered technical assistance for specific subject areas. 
The most successful of these efforts involved support from LISC Chicago as an intermediary, 
and, in some of the more severely challenged neighborhoods, it played a more active role by 
developing direct relationships with and providing direct support to fledgling organizations.  
For example, Bickerdike in Humboldt Park attempted to direct seed grants and other 
funds to benefit the many smaller organizations that took part in the implementation process, 
sometimes asking larger organizations to carve out room for these newer groups. As one 
interviewee recalled: 
A lot of funders will gravitate to the bigger guys in the pond, and to the detri-
ment possibly of others, so one of the things that I’ve done consciously in some 
cases is, how can I funnel some smaller grants or some other things to other or-
ganizations? 
In the western part of the neighborhood, which had few formal not-for-profit organiza-
tions, one organization that received particular attention was the West Humboldt Park Devel-
opment Council (WHPDC). This organization was a special target for NCP assistance, since its 
own mission involved helping block associations and other groups build their own capacity. At 
the start of NCP, WHPDC had only two full-time staff, but Bickerdike and LISC Chicago 
supported this organization directly, investing in and helping create access to one of its key 
ventures: a community land trust that acquires vacant land and builds affordable single-family 
homes reserved for low-income buyers. WHPDC credited NCP and LISC Chicago with helping 
expand its scope and strength, in building new bridges between the eastern and western portions 
of the neighborhood, and in funding key staff there.  
In contrast to the breadth of Bickerdike’s seed-grant approach, GSDC and SWOP in 
Chicago Southwest focused more intensively on a few organizations for capacity-building. 
This yielded dramatic organizational growth in the case of the Inner-City Muslim Action 
Network (IMAN). IMAN is a comprehensively oriented community development and activism 
organization serving the area’s growing Middle Eastern community, and it was one of the 
organizations brought into the GSDC/SWOP network during the NCP planning phase. In order 
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to help IMAN expand its small volunteer community health center, GSDC bought a long-vacant 
bank building on 63rd Street for $800,000 and arranged a zero-percent-interest lease-to-own 
plan (to accommodate Islamic law on charging interest on loans). The clinic is now a major 
local provider of no-cost and low-cost preventive and chronic health management services, with 
25 volunteer physicians, nurses, and medical students.  
The case of IMAN also shows the important role that LISC Chicago was sometimes 
able to play in developing capacity among organizations beyond the lead agency. Through 
GSDC’s relationship with IMAN, LISC Chicago’s program officer was able to form a direct 
relationship with the organization and directly support several aspects of IMAN’s growth by 
funding a communications director, seeding a capital campaign, helping to furbish its new 
offices, and supporting a prominent mural project. IMAN has since been centrally involved in 
the NCP foreclosure, safety, youth, and cultural bridge-building work, and it is viewed by LISC 
Chicago as “almost a quasi-lead agency in and of themselves based on the work that they do 
and the reach that they now have and the focus on this comprehensive approach to the work.”  
Newer lead agencies have been less able to build others’ capacity, even when they have 
focused their energies on this task, as they found themselves needing to concentrate on building 
their own capacity and organizational viability before they could effectively support others in 
this way. In some cases, the same sparse organizational landscape that led to the organizations’ 
formation in the first place made it more difficult to work with other groups. For example, 
GAGDC in Auburn Gresham has mostly worked with very small and informal entities, such 
as block clubs, a “grand-families” organization, and other volunteer-oriented community 
associations. These relationships have helped build GAGDC’s profile within the neighborhood 
but have less often helped build the capacity of these volunteer groups in demonstrable ways.  
In the same way, the approach of QCDC in Quad Communities has been driven by its 
focus on commercial development. As a result, its primary efforts have been to strengthen small 
retail businesses, and it has not usually extended capacity-building work to other forms of 
community organizations. In contrast, the more collaboratively oriented new entities — Team-
work Englewood and the East Garfield Park NCP — have made greater efforts to help small 
local organizations build capacity. Staff describe results of these efforts as mixed: “Those 
smaller neighborhood organizations, we really are trying to support and trying to engage 
[them],” said one NCP director, but “I would say it’s the capacity. Capacity is the major, major 
challenge that we have with our groups.” These two neighborhoods secured among the lowest 
levels of LISC Chicago and outside funding throughout the initiative. (See Chapter 5.) 
In NCP neighborhoods where lead agencies had fewer partners or made little effort to 
work with them, LISC Chicago has often taken a particularly direct and active role. An Enlace 
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staff member described the leverage that seed grants could provide LISC Chicago for strength-
ening local organizations in such environments: 
What happens is, before LISC provides grants, they want to see that you have a 
business plan, that you have a functioning board. And if they’re not convinced 
that you’ve done those things yet, then you may not receive some of the funding. 
So I think LISC does well in helping groups get to a point where they increase 
their capacity, so they can effectively implement the grants. 
LISC Chicago’s efforts were particularly extensive in the Washington Park neighbor-
hood, which had very few local organizations, a dynamic of mistrust and contention among 
groups, and a lead agency (St. Edmund’s Redevelopment Corporation, a small traditional 
CDC) that had difficulties taking up a comprehensive and relational community development 
approach. A LISC Chicago staff member characterized most organizations in Washington Park 
as “one-person shops” with minimal organizational capacity or infrastructure: 
We really tried to work with what we had on the ground. . . . And so really work-
ing to try to help those individuals to build that, it takes time. To really know 
about board and board governance and how to recruit and what the responsibili-
ties are. Trying to develop a 501c3, and bylaws, and legally what does this mean. 
. . . It’s workshops, it’s having one-on-ones, it’s bringing in coaches to have con-
versations with leadership. 
Even with these efforts, most of these entities did not have the organizational prerequi-
sites to receive NCP seed grants directly from LISC Chicago, so a fiscal intermediary was used 
to help administer them. When an NCP planning process was conducted for Washington Park 
in 2008, however, a number of these organizations participated, and they were subsequently 
involved in creating a new lead agency and forming its board. 
Traditional CDCs have generally had the sorts of difficulties described for St. Edmunds. 
A partial exception may be Claretian Associates in South Chicago, which has seen a number 
of its 20 or so task force member organizations go out of business during the economic down-
turn, which indicates some limitations in its capacity to help partner organizations but which has 
also helped establish several small new arts and service organizations. 
Among midsize lead agencies, it is primarily the two multi-issue organizations with 
community organizing backgrounds that have demonstrated a capacity to strengthen other local 
organizations. TRP in Pilsen points to its task force structures as a mechanism for helping 
several participants to weather organizational crises and leadership changes through the support 
of other partners, and the flow of seed grants and leveraged funding has helped several arts and 
services organizations consolidate and expand. Enlace in Little Village has helped consolidate 
a new youth boxing program, a job training and placement organization, an immigrant rights 
organization, and a church that works with day laborers.  
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Direct Implementation Capacities 
Unlike NCI, its predecessor initiative, the structure of NCP did not require lead agencies to 
implement projects themselves. On the other hand, LISC Chicago was very flexible about 
whether agencies did this, based on local contexts and opportunities. In practice, most have 
implemented programs directly and, in doing so, have emerged as a more critical element in the 
neighborhood-level success of the initiative than might have been originally envisioned. For 
established organizations, such implementation has usually entailed building new capacities in 
areas outside their prior competency. For newer organizations, developing these capacities has 
proved essential to organizational viability, and those that have been less successful at finding 
implementation areas to work in directly have tended to struggle. At the same time, those newer 
organizations that focused too exclusively on direct implementation found that this had its own 
challenges and limitations.  
QCDC in Quad Communities provides perhaps the most striking example of a new 
organization developing direct capacity to implement programs, although it also exemplifies 
some potential pitfalls of this focus. QCDC decided early in the NCP implementation phase to 
focus its efforts on commercial real estate development as an unoccupied niche in the neighbor-
hood and a better source of revenue and stability than its original convening role. With LISC 
Chicago’s support, it commissioned a comprehensive analysis of developable land and worked 
with key stakeholders to develop a master plan for the area, focusing on the once-bustling 
commercial boulevard of Cottage Grove Avenue. It helped provide technical assistance to new 
retail businesses; secured a large commercial real estate developer for a mixed-income, mixed-
use project; partnered with the Chicago Housing Authority on a mixed-income housing devel-
opment; and helped establish a Special Service Area (SSA) — or local tax district — to raise 
revenue for revitalizing the corridor. This energetic engagement in a single domain of work 
provided QCDC with a surprisingly strong start for a new organization, strengthening its local 
reputation, attracting attention and funding from foundations and the city, and thus allowing it to 
hire additional staff. But its strong reliance on this domain also made QCDC singularly vulner-
able to the economic crisis that began in 2008. As commercial credit tightened, its major 
developments were put on hold, and it had to quickly shift its retail strategy from attracting new 
businesses to helping keep existing ones afloat. Some of its community partners felt excluded 
from this focused effort on retail, and QCDC’s community standing suffered, with critics 
maintaining that it took on more than it could handle in the high-stakes arena of commercial 
development. Having relinquished its convening role, QCDC had no obvious venue for reen-
gaging and addressing such critics. It has, however, remained an active participant in a range of 
community planning processes and has taken a coordinating role in local education and work-
force development efforts during the later years of NCP. 
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GAGDC in Auburn Gresham has taken a similar approach to QCDC’s in establishing 
organizational viability by implementing projects directly. GAGDC began as a commercial 
development entity and gained an early revenue stream by administering the 79th Street SSA 
that it was founded to help establish. But whereas QCDC narrowed its focus, GAGDC has 
gradually expanded into a range of service areas, many of which manifest its orientation toward 
resident engagement, volunteerism, and neighborhood pride. One of its first seed-grant projects 
was a summertime “Renaissance Festival” on 79th Street, which it has made self-sustaining 
through widespread merchant participation and which now attracts hundreds of vendors and 
nonprofit information booths, offers live entertainment and children’s attractions, and brought 
out an estimated 10,000 participants to the sixth annual festival in 2011. Another early project 
was a Litter Free Zone Initiative — a grassroots effort to promote recycling in the neighborhood 
through volunteer efforts and engaging local high school students, which later garnered 
citywide recognition and a federal contract. GAGDC organizes free breakfasts for seniors and 
live blues performances; it works with block clubs; it offers tax counseling in its offices each 
spring; it holds resident conference calls on home-owner counseling and foreclosure prevention 
information; and it more recently offers free Internet access to residents. Not all of these 
services are revenue generating, but enough of them have brought significant city and state 
contracts to allow the organization to grow rapidly.  
While newer and smaller organizations tended to focus most heavily on direct imple-
mentation, virtually every NCP lead agency has done this to some extent. SWOP in Chicago 
Southwest implemented a number of projects itself, despite the fact that, as a staff member put 
it, “we’re an organizing entity, and so our basic structural goal is, we don’t do stuff in the 
neighborhood, we build the capacity of those that can do it, and then we hold them accountable 
to do it.” But in the case of a parent mentor program within the Elev8 community school 
initiative, for instance, SWOP saw an opportunity for community organizing in a school setting: 
“We don’t like running programs, but we’re running this one because we were looking to build 
a base of parent leaders that were independent of the school, but fully part of the school.” Even 
Bickerdike in Humboldt Park has staffed and run some programs itself, despite strong 
reservations about shifting its scope. This has been either for strategic reasons (for example, a 
summer basketball league run by the NCP organizer to increase contact between the eastern and 
western segments, an NCP priority) or because task force members emphatically asked it to (for 
example, the Cease Fire gang intervention program) or because the program was designed by 
LISC Chicago to be managed by lead agencies (for example, “Smart Communities,” the digital 
technology program). Because of NCP’s separate status within Bickerdike, however, its NCP 
staff sometimes felt that direct implementation stretched them beyond their capacity. In con-
trast, organizations with a broader mission and a more organizationally integrated NCP effort 
were often able to deploy existing staff to such work when needed.  
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Two midsize lead agencies provide an illuminating contrast with regard to the conse-
quences of lead agencies taking a direct implementation approach to NCP. NWSCDC in West 
Haven, a traditional CDC, had been strongly focused on affordable housing and commercial 
retail development at the start of NCP but was gradually stymied in these endeavors both by 
being located in a small area with limited opportunities for growth and by the economic 
downturn. However, its role as NCP lead agency helped the organization take a central role in 
youth programming and sports, which have gradually replaced the earlier development areas as 
its core organizational focus and now provides it with a basis for organizational survival. This 
“solo” approach, however, has not helped it develop NCP capacities or cultivate organizational 
networks. Enlace in Little Village took a similarly “go-it-alone” approach in the early years of 
NCP, achieving considerable organizational growth through violence prevention and education 
contracts at some cost to organizational relationship building. In 2008, after a failed attempt to 
engage community partners in reviving the NCP task force structure, the organization decided 
to recapture a measure of its community-mobilizing and activism origins by hiring a trained 
community organizer to fill the NCP “organizer” position. This has allowed it to develop 
greater coordination, brokering, and collaboration capacities and to build a stronger NCP effort 
in the neighborhood. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 3 shows that lead agencies with different starting points have differed in their ability to 
build NCP capacities. The oldest and largest lead agencies have built on existing strengths and 
have used the NCP framework to consolidate their convening and planning capacities and to 
help build capacity among other community organizations. Midsize organizations with a multi-
issue orientation and experience as conveners or community organizers have also built these 
capacities, sometimes with greater difficulty. New organizations experienced considerable 
challenges, as might be expected, and faced especially strong trade-offs and choices between 
continuing to act as conveners and developing an ability to implement programs directly. The 
fact that at least two of the four have achieved solid organizational viability, however, is 
noteworthy, given the well-known difficulties of launching comprehensive work via newly 
formed local intermediaries.6 Finally, small-to-midsize CDCs with little organizing and conven-
ing experience struggled to acquire NCP capacities — three of these were, in fact, replaced as 
NCP lead agencies by LISC Chicago when it was determined that they could not adequately 
fulfill their NCP roles. In contrast, those groups known for community organizing — LSNA, 
SWOP/GSDC, and TRP — have been able to build on existing NCP-relevant strengths. The 
consistency with which community organizing has been associated with positive outcomes and 
                                                 
6Chaskin (2000); Brown and Fiester (2007); FSG Social Impact Advisors (2011). 
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capacity-building across the initiative suggests that there may be benefits to focusing more 
intentionally on incorporating elements of this tradition into the way that NCP and similar CCIs 
are conceived and implemented. 
The role of LISC Chicago in helping to promote NCP capacity-building was considera-
ble during the planning period. However, LISC did not set expectations for continued partner 
engagement through the kinds of governance and convening mechanisms that had proved 
effective during the planning process. In part, a reluctance to intervene during implementation 
may be due to competing roles that LISC Chicago has faced as a “managing intermediary.” On 
the one hand, LISC Chicago has consistently characterized itself as a vehicle for promoting 
community priorities and a “partner” to NCP lead agencies, rather than an ordinary funder, 
which would allow it to obtain a level of trust to help it be supportive strategically. As one staff 
member indicated, “to walk alongside you and be able to be the honest broker, have those tough 
conversations, figure out what’s wrong, and support corrective measures.” On the other hand, 
LISC Chicago has felt the need to suspend funding to lead agencies when its support and 
guidance have not produced the desired results. “It’s a fine line that we’ve walked,” says the 
staff member; “Where do you cross a line between being a traditional funder versus your 
partner?”  
Broadly speaking, however, LISC Chicago’s shift from highly structured supports in 
the planning phase to less structure during implementation was significant for lead-agency 
experiences. Among stronger lead agencies that have been able to implement NCP more easily, 
there was widespread appreciation for LISC’s flexibility and responsiveness. But lead agencies 
that have struggled have more commonly described LISC’s capacity supports as uneven and 
inconsistent and have expressed in interviews a desire for more formalized mechanisms for 
transmitting a wide range of practical capacities, as well as greater guidance with regard to their 
own progress in implementing NCP. Thus, it may be that LISC’s approach has most benefited 
those who already had the best preconditions for building NCP capacities, while leaving some 
of those with less of the prerequisite skills and orientations without the sort of guidance that 
might have helped them overcome their challenges. 
 
  
61 
Chapter 4 
NCP Relationships and What They Provide 
The New Communities Program (NCP) attempts to build relationships among community 
organizations and to connect these groups to actors outside the neighborhood. As the initiative 
evolved, several factors tested these relationships and what they were able to accomplish. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Great Recession and associated state fiscal crisis brought a new set 
of stressors that might have resulted in increased competition for resources. As well, NCP’s 
shift in emphasis from seed grants to larger-scale, multisite projects offered not only new 
possibilities for collaboration but also the potential for operating these programs in isolation 
from the broader NCP network. Finally, as the initiative approached its 10-year mark in 2012, 
uncertainties related to continued funding and shifts in the NCP model might also make it more 
difficult to sustain the collaboration. Given these dynamics, how did NCP sustain relation-
ships over time, and how did these relationships add value to programs carried out 
independently of each other? 
NCP helped build and sustain relationships from relative positions of strength. Where 
community groups had trusting ties, neighborhoods built on these and sustained them even 
through the challenges of the later stages of the initiative. Where there were greater histories of 
antagonism among community partners, NCP improved relationships during the planning 
period and through early implementation, but it was challenging to sustain these ties in about 
half the cases. Where few other local organizations existed, lead agencies tended to create 
strong connections among a limited number of organizations, but the resulting network was not 
expansive. Because of these dynamics, there were fewer opportunities for networks to add value 
to the implementation of projects.  
In contrast, in neighborhoods where there were many community-based organizations, 
good working relationships, and a high-capacity lead agency, groups were able to leverage new 
funding and could often enhance collaborative programming. Even though NCP emphasized 
relationships in areas outside of housing development, housing and foreclosure prevention was 
an area in which NCP networks could be especially instrumental. Finally, while MDRC’s 
interim report described challenges in developing ties between local actors and powerful groups 
outside neighborhoods, or between neighborhoods, the later years of implementation saw many 
of these barriers overcome.1 Cross-neighborhood and “vertical” relationships with powerful 
agencies were greatly facilitated by the brokering activities of the Local Initiatives Support 
                                                 
1Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) and by NCP’s growing use of multi-neighborhood 
initiatives, which created their own informal practice networks among lead agencies. 
Building and Sustaining Relationships 
As described in Chapter 2, relationships throughout NCP weathered the Great Recession (2006-
2009) and its associated funding and neighborhood challenges. Independent of the recession, 
however, relationships over a 10-year period might be expected to deteriorate, after the initial 
convening of groups for planning and the enthusiasm of early implementation. This was not the 
general pattern within NCP, however, as relationships more often deepened than they did fall 
apart.2 At the same time, two factors were the most important in whether relationships were 
sustained or enhanced over the course of NCP: (1) the number of local partners and (2) their 
histories of collaboration. In addition to the “horizontal” relationships built during the early 
stages of NCP within the neighborhoods, later NCP implementation was more conducive to 
developing cross-neighborhood ties and relationships with powerful actors outside neighbor-
hoods. LISC was particularly instrumental in brokering some of these relationships. In some 
cases, these relationships provided important opportunities for learning smart practices; howev-
er, efforts to bring together organizations across neighborhoods were not always sustained over 
time. Finally, although it might be expected that the political legitimacy of the lead agency 
would predict relationship development throughout NCP — and was, in fact, important during 
planning and early implementation — this factor was not critical later on. 
Number of Local Organizations 
During mid-to-late stages of NCP, in neighborhoods where there was an abundance of 
local organizations — such as Logan Square, Humboldt Park, Chicago Lawn, and Pilsen — it 
was easier to maintain collaborative implementation and governance structures that could better 
sustain and enhance relationships. The NCP task force in Humboldt Park (described in 
Chapter 3) represents one of the most successful cases where the lead agency helped build a 
durable structure for convening local groups, which itself improved on and expanded an 
existing network. The lead agency in Logan Square, the Logan Square Neighborhood 
Association (LSNA), also relied on its membership to maintain engagement of organizations 
and other stakeholders in the neighborhood. LSNA used its quarterly and annual membership 
meetings as a means of demonstrating progress and communicating accountability about 
projects that were part of NCP. In Pilsen, The Resurrection Project (TRP) maintained the 
task forces created during the planning process to continue engaging member organizations and 
                                                 
2Chapter 6 describes the ways that relationships also sustained the challenging test of transition planning, 
although they were also strained by it.  
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described how the richness of local organizational life combined well with NCP’s emphases on 
relationship-building. An observer noted: 
Not every community has as many stakeholders, or what I would call tangible 
assets in the community to build from. . . . But I think where there has been a 
strong emphasis in building institutional relationships, that’s where I think the 
model of demonstrating that by acting collectively you’ll be able to do more, is 
where it’ll work best. The challenge comes in areas where there’s very little, and 
as a result of that there’s all sorts of both suspicion as well as expectations of 
what would be delivered by somebody anointed as a lead agency.3 
Although it was challenging in Pilsen to maintain strong task forces in every domain, 
the existence of additional actors who may be brought into the network tends to refresh their 
work, as with them come the ability to plan new initiatives. A relatively dense organizational 
landscape contributed to create the conditions by which lead agencies could further deepen and 
expand local relationships. Box 1.3 in Chapter 1 describes how the Southwest Organizing 
Project (SWOP) in Chicago Lawn both employed and expanded on its networks over the 
course of NCP. 
In neighborhoods with fewer organizations — such as East Garfield Park, Englewood, 
West Haven, and Washington Park — sustaining relationships beyond the initial stages of NCP 
was more challenging. In East Garfield Park, for example, it became difficult to make inroads 
into new institutions, such as schools, without local partners. A dearth of local businesses also 
made it difficult to develop momentum for economic development, in a way that could demon-
strate NCP’s value to other businesses, thereby expanding their network. In Englewood, the 
lead agency initially tried to build capacity of smaller, more informal organizations in the 
neighborhood, but then it relied on a strategy of partnering with more established (but still 
relatively small) organizations. While it developed some important relationships related to food 
and urban agriculture, the network remains somewhat narrow. In Washington Park, where a 
new lead agency took over NCP work in 2009, a lack of partners was seen as a distinctly mixed 
blessing: “We have the advantage of not having any long-term relationships as organizations, so 
there’s no long-term baggage, . . . but there are certain realities.” The lead agency has built 
strategic relationships with organizations that have the capacity to carry out projects, but the 
networks that were formed have not been extensive.  
While it was challenging to deepen and sustain relationships in neighborhoods with a 
dearth of organizations, Auburn Gresham — a neighborhood with few organizations — stands 
as an important exception. Although the Greater Auburn-Gresham Development Corpora-
                                                 
3All quotations are from interviews that MDRC conducted with 132 staff, implementation partners, and 
other stakeholders. Interviews are anonymous. 
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tion (GAGDC) has not developed a convening structure that could bring together organizations 
in the neighborhood, its relationships with two organizations have deepened over the course of 
the initiative. This small network has allowed partners to undertake collaborative education and 
work projects with local public schools. While not an expansive network in terms of its part-
ners, GAGDC has tried to link its efforts on education to other domains. Enlace in Little 
Village has also proved an important exception to this tendency, after struggling to sustain 
relationships in the early years of the initiative. 
Histories of Collaboration 
Not only the density but also the tenor of local relationships played a large role in the 
course of the initiative. In such places as Humboldt Park, Chicago Lawn, Logan Square, and 
Auburn Gresham, as described above, good working relationships were deepened through NCP. 
(In Auburn Gresham, working relationships in part helped overcome the relative dearth of 
organizations in that area.) These neighborhoods saw the additional influx of resources as 
incentives for collaboration, and they viewed the comprehensive focus of the initiative as an 
opportunity to expand relations to other domains. For example, Chicago Lawn saw the expan-
sion of its organizing connections to include more service agencies. In Humboldt Park, health 
was an area where new actors were brought into local networks. In Logan Square, affordable 
housing developers were brought more deeply into partnership with the lead agency.  
In neighborhoods with a history of strained relationships, such as Woodlawn and North 
Lawndale, it was more difficult to sustain inclusive networks of local organizations after 
planning and early implementation. In Woodlawn — a neighborhood with a history of tension 
among community powerbrokers — planning committees were sustained into the implementa-
tion phase as a way of maintaining participant engagement. Rather than one lead agency, 
however, NCP was led by the partnership of three entities: the Woodlawn Preservation and 
Investment Corporation (WIPC), The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), and the University of 
Chicago. After the death of a well-respected community figure, Bishop Arthur Brazier, leader-
ship transition within NCP made this joint structure less viable and less inclusive of other, 
smaller community organizations, as it moved to focus more on establishing the identity of a 
new collaborative, the Network of Woodlawn. 
Relationships Outside the Neighborhood 
Relationships between lead agencies, city or state government, foundations, or large 
companies were often critical for NCP implementation, either for the resources that they could 
provide or for other assistance that they could lend projects. During the early years of the 
program, lead agencies and their partners reported these types of relationships forming less 
frequently than ties within neighborhoods. In later years of implementation, however, there was 
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more evidence of cross-neighborhood relationships forming, especially as promoted by NCP’s 
“platform projects” (larger investments centered on education, broadband technology, and 
youth development that emerged over the course of the initiative).  
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) played an im-
portant role in brokering these opportunities to neighborhoods and in creating the space for lead 
agencies to come together. As the initiative gained visibility within the philanthropic communi-
ty and in City Hall, LISC Chicago was approached by those seeking to invest in Chicago 
neighborhoods. According to a program officer, funders saw NCP as having built the necessary 
infrastructure to secure investment as well as an opportunity for their investment to have 
spillover effects. While this represented a new set of challenges for LISC Chicago, it generated 
not only new sources of funding for lead agencies but also the opportunity to work across 
neighborhoods. 
Platform projects, some of which are described in the following section, related to fore-
closures, arts, sports, broadband, and education, and all presented opportunities for lead agen-
cies to come into contact with each other in formal and informal ways. For example, “B-Ball on 
the Block” — a recreation program that originated in one NCP neighborhood as a response to 
gang violence — was adopted by many other NCP agencies. Programs like Smart Communi-
ties, an initiative to increase access to technology, allowed contiguous neighborhoods to apply 
jointly for funding. As one of the partners in this project noted: 
Chicago Lawn, Englewood and Auburn Gresham we said to ourselves, “We all 
border each other. Why not get together?” So it just made sense for us to partner 
and really defuse the competition aspect of it, and LISC bought into it. They 
said, “Okay, that’s interesting.” So for them it’s a form of leverage because now 
we’re bringing more resources. 
For NCP neighborhoods that were not able to leverage platform projects, there was 
sometimes a sense of being left out or of not being in the “favored” group. While only a few 
lead agencies’ staff expressed this view, and LISC Chicago convened all lead agencies twice a 
year, it is a dynamic that influenced their perceptions of their role in NCP and of LISC Chicago, 
and it is a note of caution to future efforts in managing multisite opportunities that serve only a 
few within a broader programmatic structure.  
In addition to platform projects, most lead agencies maintained ties with other NCP lead 
agencies, which, in many cases, offered actors the opportunity to learn from each other’s 
practices and, in some cases, to collaborate. SWOP, for instance, shared its approach to foreclo-
sures and more broadly its organizing approach with other lead agencies. LSNA shared its 
parent-mentor model with other Elev8 sites and worked with Washington Park to jointly 
market their urban agriculture and food and nutrition work. Also, executive directors of all lead 
agencies met on a regular basis — on some occasions, convened by LISC — to discuss areas of 
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common concern, policy-related issues and potential strategies for addressing the city. Although 
these meetings declined over time, lead agencies spoke of them positively. Several organiza-
tions mentioned that NCP made it possible for such learning and collaboration to happen. At the 
same time, lead agencies felt that these sorts of opportunities did not happen often enough, nor 
were they built into the structure of the initiative. 
Because LISC Chicago was able to bring NCP leaders in contact with city and state 
leaders, lead agencies had opportunities to become more visible to these groups through their 
participation in NCP. Although many lead agencies had these relationships in place before 
NCP, the initiative elevated the stature of organizations that did not have these connections. 
Auburn Gresham and Quad Communities were particularly strong examples of newer 
agencies that described becoming visible to citywide actors through their participation in NCP. 
A staff person in South Chicago described the dynamic of inter-neighborhood and citywide 
network formation:  
I think NCP has given us greater weight outside our community than inside our 
community because inside our community people knew us. . . . We were already 
helping the families inside our community but NCP has given us greater weight 
from those looking into our community from outside and the resources that they 
bring and the connections and being able to work . . . between other neighbor-
hoods with our similar demographics where we wouldn’t have had that relation-
ship before.  
Related to this point of NCP’s conferring legitimacy on newer actors, it might be ex-
pected that the political legitimacy and stature of the lead agency would predict its ability to 
facilitate relationships throughout the neighborhood. Political legitimacy was, in fact, an important 
factor during planning and early implementation, especially as ties to local political leadership 
provided credibility to lead agencies as they started to convene and support other organizations in 
Little Village, Quad Communities, and Auburn Gresham. However, this factor was not as 
critical during later stages of NCP, as the strategies taken by lead agencies proved to be more 
important than their starting place. Chapter 1 describes this dynamic with reference to strategies 
taken by Quad Communities (Box 1.4) and Auburn Gresham (Box 1.5).  
What Relationships Were Able to Accomplish 
Lead agencies valued relationships both in and of themselves and in their ability to leverage 
additional resources for neighborhoods. Program designers also viewed the relationships as an 
accountability vehicle and a delivery system for additional resources.4 However, another 
important potential claim about the consequences of relationships is that better coordination 
                                                 
4Mooney (2010). 
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among local groups can improve service delivery or project implementation. That is, program 
designers also hoped that relationships would allow for better-targeted, more strategic, or more 
mobilized interventions.5 Accordingly, below are considered (1) the improved implementation 
of individual projects through participation in the NCP network; (2) the ways that networks 
contributed to the implementation of NCP’s larger, “platform” initiatives; and (3) how collabo-
rations attracted new funding and implementation of larger projects, drawing on funding from 
outside NCP. 
Enhancing the Implementation of Individual Projects 
In general, NCP was more successful in catalyzing a substantial number of projects 
than it was in improving their individual effectiveness. Lead agencies and their partners often 
described several ways that individual projects launched under the auspices of NCP could 
benefit from being part of the initiative. For example, they involved an ability to share space or 
colocate initiatives, such as bringing multiple partners to a school for enrichment activities. 
Many groups described informal connections among community partners that could be useful 
for concrete tasks; for example, one lead agency was called on by another to provide names for 
a group looking to hire bus drivers for its youth program. Other lead agencies felt that there was 
additional prestige or better positioning of them or their partners due to NCP participation and 
LISC’s efforts; for example, connections with LISC’s MetroEdge program provided the 
capacity to analyze the potential for local business development and, in doing so, brought 
together lead agencies and elected officials. 
While these benefits were considered to be significant, within NCP, evidence of more 
substantial coordination of projects with each other was more limited. As might be expected, 
given the number of projects and community partners promoted through NCP, coordination 
sometimes had an unplanned quality — disseminating literature at events, for example, or 
providing informal channels for outreach. There were some significant exceptions to this 
finding, mostly in places where there were strong existing structures to coordinate implementa-
tion. For example, Pilsen’s work in education provided a significant number of instances of 
successful collaboration and coordination, despite the fact that both the school system in general 
and individual public schools in Chicago are often difficult partners for community organiza-
tions. TRP’s education task force has brought together principals and teachers from both public 
and parochial schools in a way that was credited with building a constituency for curricular 
reform. Other examples are provided in the following sections.  
                                                 
5Kubisch, Auspos, Brown, and Dewar (2010). 
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Housing Development and NCP 
While NCP was designed in part to help comprehensive development corporations 
(CDCs) move past a sole focus on affordable housing as part of their local strategies, housing is 
an area that was more often helped by NCP relationships than other domains of work. Staff in 
half the lead agencies that built affordable housing developments described ways that they were 
able to use NCP to help build constituencies for projects, overcome NIMBYism or other 
opposition, and in general develop consensus about the need for the development. In Logan 
Square, for example, when construction of the Zapata Apartments faced opposition from those 
worried about additional affordable housing, organizers mobilized local networks to request 
their support for a zoning change that would allow construction. In the same neighborhood, 
local networks also helped push through construction of a Green Exchange, resulting in an 
environmentally friendly job incubator. In North Lawndale, resistance to construction of Dr. 
King Legacy Apartments fell after the engagement of its opponents in the design process — an 
engagement that the lead agency credited to NCP planning. Humboldt Park supported the 
development of a substantial community land trust in West Humboldt Park through NCP 
networks. In Pilsen, NCP was directly credited with facilitating relationships that resulted in the 
acquisition of new properties for construction: 
We [used to fight] with Pilsen Neighbors and Alivio Medical Center. Three 
blocks east, almost exactly where we’re at, three blocks east are two buildings. 
. . . Those are buildings that we developed because we were able to purchase 
land from Alivio Medical Center. And so now we will — we have 45 units of 
rental apartments in Casa Morelos and about 77 rental apartments for people 55 
years of age and older. That would not have happened if it wasn’t for NCP. 
These examples demonstrate how the use of relationships was important to build sup-
port for housing development projects and move them forward. Chapter 1 provides an addition-
al example of how NCP-facilitated networks helped move forward a stalled development 
project in Quad Communities (Box 1.4). 
“Platform” Projects: Elev8 
As noted in Chapter 1, toward the middle and later stages of the initiative, a number of private 
and public funding opportunities for large-scale projects emerged — “platform” initiatives that 
served multiple neighborhoods, addressing employment, foreclosures, education, and digital 
technology access. The scale of these projects could provide opportunities for both local and 
cross-neighborhood collaboration. But there was variation in the ways that these large platform 
projects were implemented, especially the extent to which NCP-developed networks were used 
to enhance their implementation.  
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One notable platform project is Elev8, an educational initiative of the Atlantic Philan-
thropies that was intended to improve the achievements and life outcomes of low-income 
middle school students. LISC Chicago and the MacArthur Foundation helped bring the Elev8 
model to Chicago, and the program is a significant example of additional leveraged investments 
that were attracted to NCP. The program targets middle school students through four main 
components: (1) extended-day learning opportunities; (2) school-based health care; (3) social 
supports for students and families; and (4) parent, student, and community engagement. In 
Chicago, Atlantic Philanthropies committed an initial $18 million to the implementation of 
Elev8. Because the program was implemented through NCP and by NCP lead agencies and 
their partners, it is instructive to understand how NCP networks were deployed to assist Elev8 
programming. At the same time, as a large, multi-year initiative, the experiences of partners in 
the two neighborhoods evolved over time. Accordingly, the discussion below represents a 
snapshot of implementation from around the period of 2010 rather than an assessment of the full 
trajectory of the initiative in both places.  
Two organizations — the Greater Auburn-Gresham Development Corporation 
(GAGDC) in Auburn Gresham and the Quad Communities Development Corporation 
(QCDC) in Quad Communities — illustrate variation in how NCP networks added value to 
Elev8 programming. Both were relatively young organizations and did not have significant 
experience in the area of education. In Auburn Gresham, GAGDC built on its relationship with 
a charter school to implement Elev8, deepening the partnership of these two organizations and 
helping bring in additional partners to Elev8, which, in turn, allowed GAGDC to expand its ties 
to other schools. In contrast to GAGDC — at least earlier in the initiative — Elev8 at QCDC 
remained more of a stand-alone project with few connections to QCDC’s strongest partners or 
to other parts of the agency’s work.  
GAGDC’s involvement in education began around 2006, when a local high school was 
being phased out by Chicago Public Schools (CPS). In an effort to salvage the high school, 
GAGDC partnered with Perspectives Charter Schools network, helping select Perspectives as 
the school operator, in an effort to continue servicing middle and high school students in the 
area. GAGDC partnered with Perspectives to implement Elev8. In partnership with Access 
Community Health Network, in 2009, GAGDC opened a health care center at the Perspectives 
charter school that served the school’s students only. However, GAGDC saw the new health 
center as an opportunity to offer health services to other students in the neighborhood and to the 
community at large, and it approached local public schools to bus students to the health center 
so that they could receive medical services. This move allowed GAGDC to develop relation-
ships with other local public schools. 
GAGDC used its relationship to local businesses to seek additional resources for Elev8. 
For instance, it partnered with the local CVS pharmacy to carry out health education with Elev8 
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and a health fair, and CVS has donated supplies to the Elev8 health center as well as construc-
tion support for the center (which was facilitated by LISC.) As GAGDC developed its relation-
ship with public schools in the neighborhood, it brought its Litter Free Zone Initiative — a 
grassroots recycling program — to schools by creating competitions for students to bring in 
recycling, with the winning school obtaining a prize, such as a pizza party. Taking advantage of 
its new foothold in local public schools, GAGDC started its School Yard Project, which is 
intended to engage parents and to connect schools in the neighborhood to local service provid-
ers. This has resulted in what was described as a strong, mutually beneficial relationship with 
Perspectives: “We have kind of a familial relationship that we are each other’s go-to. When we 
get an opportunity for a grant, and we need a community partner, then that’s automatic. . . . I 
kind of believe it’s the same way that, they come to us.” 
Like GAGDC, QCDC in Quad Communities brought several new partners to Elev8 at 
Reavis Elementary School, including health, literacy, and after-school arts providers. These 
parties were not, however, the core local partners with which QCDC worked earlier in the 
initiative, and some were from outside the neighborhood, resulting in some tensions with local 
actors. According to interviewees in 2010, early implementation of Elev8 brought further strains, 
due to changes in personnel within partner organizations. QCDC’s relationship with Reavis 
school has also been strained at times, as the school did not allow it to undertake some of the 
work needed to implement the original Elev8 plan. For example, as an underperforming CPS 
school, Reavis is under pressure to improve its academics and, thus, preferred to focus on 
academic subjects for extended-day programs. In contrast, partners supported the Elev8 extended 
programming focus on arts and other enrichment activities, and the parties were not able to 
resolve these tensions. An additional source of tension emerged when Elev8 funds were chan-
neled through Reavis, which created delays in disbursement as payments moved through CPS 
bureaucracy. Finally, QCDC did not bring to Elev8 other aspects of its work that focused on 
education or youth. For example, the Dyett High School Youth Farm, which stands not far from 
Reavis and which seemed to be a logical partner for Elev8, was not incorporated as one of the 
partners in the program, even though the farm hoped to be able to bring produce to local schools. 
“Platform” Projects: Foreclosure Prevention 
Another important program funded by MacArthur and channeled through NCP neighborhoods 
was a foreclosure response program. As was the case with Elev8, the way that networks were 
deployed to enhance this program also varied among neighborhoods. In Chicago Southwest, 
SWOP moved through its organizing network to bring the issue to prominence and change the 
way local actors saw the urgency of the foreclosure crisis and to conduct extremely extensive 
and targeted outreach efforts to home owners in distress. The organization also made effective 
use of ties to prominent elected officials and other allies to negotiate with financial institutions, 
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and it was successful in creating a pilot program that allowed those facing foreclosures to 
modify the terms of their loans. In neighborhoods like Auburn Gresham and East Garfield 
Park, lead agencies had difficulties finding suitable partners, and they used their ties to local 
organizations mainly as vehicles for transmitting information about services available to those 
facing foreclosure. These efforts were not as extensive as in Chicago Southwest and were 
somewhat disconnected from other aspects of NCP work, making it more difficult for the entire 
NCP network to be deployed around local foreclosure problems. More generous funding for the 
initiative in Chicago Southwest may have contributed to these differences in local mobilization. 
As a well-established organization with solid ties to local organizations and institutions, 
as well as to political figures and decision makers, SWOP was well positioned to address issues 
related to foreclosure. SWOP’s work on this issue dates back to the late 1990s, when the 
organization launched a campaign to regulate subprime mortgage lending. In the early 2000s, 
SWOP educated policymakers in a way that allowed a state agency to regulate mortgage 
brokers and set lending regulations — and otherwise restrict what SWOP’s membership 
considered to be predatory lending. As part of its response to foreclosures, in 2006, SWOP 
decided to work with the leadership at one church highlighting the magnitude of the crisis, and 
from there it spread work to other churches: 
[As we presented to the church,] we had statistical information saying that this is 
a broad problem throughout the parish, and we had individual stories that say 
this is absolutely connected to the parish. [The pastor] was fairly passionate 
about it, but when he found out his deacon and his choir director had both lost 
homes, it really ignited him in terms of why this was important.  
Churches became important vehicles for delivering information about foreclosure relief, 
as pastors delivered this information from the pulpit and conducted surveys with church 
membership. SWOP used this information to further target its prevention services. Around the 
same time, it negotiated with Bank of America the launch of a pilot program to help modify 
loans of home owners in distress who met certain conditions. Through its local partners, SWOP 
engaged in an outreach campaign to residents in the neighborhood, and the organization was 
able to touch 25 percent of those eligible for loan modifications through its door-to-door 
campaign. 
As in other neighborhoods, foreclosures were deeply felt in Auburn Gresham, a 
neighborhood with relatively high rates of home ownership as part of Chicago’s “Bungalow 
Belt.” GAGDC, which did not have extensive experience regarding foreclosures, encountered 
the issue as it engaged with local residents about other areas of work:  
[We would ask,] Why is Mrs. Jones’s home boarded up? What happened? And 
Mrs. Jones was gone just like that. We couldn’t even find Mrs. Jones. We were 
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able to track down her relative and Mrs. Jones had to move in with her child be-
cause she lost her home to foreclosure. 
Through MacArthur, Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) in Auburn Gresham re-
ceived funding that allowed it to hire new staff and offer free workshops on foreclosure preven-
tion. GAGDC reached out to block clubs to publicize these workshops, and NHS credited 
increased inflow at its office to GAGDC’s efforts. At the same time, GAGDC’s outreach was 
not as active or as intensive as in Chicago Southwest, and not every element of the NCP 
network was brought to bear on the foreclosure problem. This issue became particularly 
apparent regarding the question of unemployed home owners facing foreclosure. With the 
economic downturn, many newly unemployed owners were unable to make mortgage pay-
ments, and NHS was often unable to intervene with lenders to negotiate when the mortgage 
holder had little prospect of making payments in the near future. Although the workforce 
development center in Southwest was an engaged partner in its foreclosure work, a key partner 
of GAGDC — St. Sabina Employment Resource Center — was not engaged in these efforts. 
To fight foreclosures in East Garfield Park, the lead agency brought in Metropolitan 
Tenants Organization, which worked with tenants in the Chicago metropolitan area, and opened 
a housing center to provide services to renters. The center was strategically located at Bethel 
New Life, an organization that also offers employment services, and this allowed the lead 
agency to create a “one-stop” center where residents could receive a variety of services related 
to housing, employment, and legal assistance. The housing center had to relocate, however, 
when Bethel faced downsizing, thus disrupting service delivery and the network as a whole. 
Collaborations to Attract Funding from Outside NCP to 
Implement Larger Projects 
The preceding section describes the collective implementation of projects that NCP attracted to 
Chicago neighborhoods. Another area where relationships could have important consequences 
relates to collaborations among community partners to receive larger grants from non-NCP 
sources than they might otherwise attain, resulting in joint implementation of larger projects. In 
many ways, these types of projects provide the most substantial evidence of what “added value” 
NCP relationships provide, as they demonstrate that NCP has successfully taught groups the 
ability to seek additional funding in a way that might prove sustainable after the completion of 
the initiative. 
Overall, neighborhoods did not capitalize on this type of collective funding effort, with 
some notable exceptions. These exceptions include Claretian Associates in South Chicago, 
which has a particularly strong orientation toward community arts programs and has linked 
artists and arts organizations with schools and development organizations in joint endeavors; it 
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has also formed collaborations based on its “green” orientation. LSNA has established widely 
recognized community-based teacher development and in-class parent mentorship programs in 
Logan Square public schools, which several other NCP lead agencies are now emulating.  
Within NCP, Humboldt Park has focused most consistently on building collaborations 
that can be implemented jointly. Working through its task force structure, implementation 
committees continue to organize collaborative work in their areas of focus. Starting in 2006 
with the Community of Wellness — a collaboration that attracted funding for multiple partners 
concerned with health careers, outreach, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and physical 
activity — NCP then moved to propose joint projects that attracted new funding for safety and 
reentry issues. Both Bickerdike staff and key task force participants have described a culture 
shift within the neighborhood that relates to collective action, as opposed to individually driven 
grant seeking: 
I think the difference is that people now see grants and they don’t just see them 
as, “Oh, I can apply for this.” It’s, “The safety committee can apply for this, the 
reentry committee, the Community of Wellness,” and so they’re thinking of it as 
a community thing versus an individual thing. Now we all know they have an 
individual stake in it, . . . but I think how people are looking at funding is com-
pletely different now based on these collaborations than they were before. 
Other neighborhoods have found it more challenging to develop collaborations for im-
plementing new projects, sometimes for lack of partners or due to conflict or a lack of interest 
among them. Teamwork Englewood, which took a strongly collaborative and coordinating 
implementation approach, found few viable organizations with which to partner effectively. 
Lead agencies in West Haven, East Garfield Park, North Lawndale, and Washington Park 
have faced similar challenges. In Quad Communities, QCDC tried to link its commercial 
development work to quality-of-life goals in other domains by starting a youth farm at a local 
high school and a community farmer’s market. Its vision was that produce from the youth farm 
would both be sold at the farmer’s market, thereby increasing the availability of healthy food 
options in the community, and be a food supply source for restaurants along its commercial 
corridors. QCDC’s efforts to realize this vision were significantly hampered by the fact that all 
the groups involved were new and untested; as a start-up itself, QCDC was stretched thin in the 
effort to coordinate the work. An early QCDC partnership with a local arts organization to 
renovate a façade nearly put the latter out of business due to upfront costs incurred by the arts 
agency and a workforce development contract that QCDC could not pay after banks withdrew 
their commitments in the economic crisis.  
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Conclusion 
Chapter 4 describes ways that relationships were sustained in NCP despite the challenges of the 
Great Recession, program fatigue, and other local factors. Growth in relationships was most 
significant in places with good prior relations and where a high-capacity lead agency supported 
them. At the same time, in places with histories of contentiousness, relationships improved most 
significantly during planning and early implementation but tended to revert to form after time. 
The fact that relationships and their value to implementation were more likely to grow in 
neighborhoods that had a strong set of community partners with good relationships among them 
suggests some caution about the targeting of initiatives like NCP and about the amount of 
assistance that may need to be provided to other neighborhoods in order to realize the initia-
tive’s potential. 
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Chapter 5 
NCP Investments and Their Reach 
Within Neighborhoods 
Comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) such as the New Communities Program (NCP) 
proceed under the belief that neighborhood improvement is best achieved through a multi-
pronged effort, instead of a sole focus on physical, “bricks-and-mortar” improvement to 
housing. Through 2008, NCP’s early implementation demonstrated the completion of projects 
in multiple domains under its auspices,1 but the impact of the Great Recession (2006-2009) on 
housing markets and on state budgets may have altered the flow of resources to neighborhoods 
— making it more difficult to attract additional investments, or “leverage,” from both public 
and private partners. How well did NCP implement projects, draw resources, and attract 
investments during the second half of the initiative? A related area of inquiry involves the 
location of these investments. Community development research has suggested that housing 
investments, especially after reaching a certain threshold, may contribute to reduced crime or 
increased property values.2 No research has tracked the actual location of comprehensive 
improvement efforts within CCIs, however, to show the extent to which areas within neighbor-
hoods become “saturated” by such activities. Given the fact that NCP planning generally 
encouraged as many projects as possible to be identified, there was the potential that implemen-
tation might be thinly spread, especially in large neighborhoods. What evidence is there of 
targeting of investments within NCP? 
Despite the recession, implementation continued at a similar pace in the later phases of 
NCP, suggesting that there was not a “winding down” of investments. In terms of the number of 
domains, the comprehensiveness of NCP action also continued, and over $900 million in NCP 
funding and leverage from other sources were committed to the 14 neighborhood areas (de-
scribed in Chapter 1, Table 1.1). The recession moved project activity away from real estate 
development, with the result that more leverage came in foundation- or federally supported 
initiatives than from loans or grants associated with housing construction. These significant 
investments demonstrate that the NCP “platform” remained a vehicle for substantial improve-
ment efforts. Neighborhoods with more partners and with high-capacity partners reported more 
resources leveraged through NCP — even when there were tensions reported in local relation-
ships. In three neighborhoods studied, spatial analyses demonstrate the conscious targeting of 
comprehensive improvement activities along commercial corridors and other areas, demonstrat-
                                                          
1Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
2Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin (2011); Galster, Cutsinger, and Lim (2007). 
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ing that NCP was able to channel efforts within communities. At the same time, in only one of 
these three neighborhoods were efforts targeted to areas of greater distress. The lack of an 
association between quality-of-life conditions and NCP investments may reflect that many of 
the projects designed to address economic need were services that were inclusive of the whole 
neighborhood and also that many parts of NCP neighborhoods were equally distressed. 
Projects Implemented Through NCP 
NCP attempted to address urban problems and sustain the quality of life in Chicago neighbor-
hoods by implementing projects in multiple domains. Lead agencies in each NCP area engaged 
stakeholders to collaborate in a planning process that identified varied neighborhood projects. In 
order to circumvent the issues that had prevented previous comprehensive neighborhood 
initiatives from translating plans into action, NCP also included several strategies to ensure that 
significant projects advanced past the planning stage. As described in Chapter 1, these included 
distribution of implementation responsibilities among multiple community partners, the use of 
seed grants to attract “leverage” to complete projects, and the promotion of collaborations 
among community organizations that would facilitate creation of pooled funding streams to 
support project implementation. 
Lead agencies reported implementation of 838 projects over the course of NCP.3 
These totals include projects that were funded with seed grants, projects that were funded with 
other resources provided through LISC Chicago (including loans and lines of credit), and 
projects that were funded entirely by other sources. In some cases — such as projects involv-
ing multiple partners sharing implementation responsibilities or projects that were implement-
ed across funding cycles — multiple seed grants and loans were used to fund different compo-
nents of a single project. These figures do not include grants made exclusively for 
organizational capacity-building projects with lead agencies and their partners, which was 
another important dimension of NCP investment, nor do they include direct funding to lead 
agencies for administration of NCP. 
                                                          
3The investigation of the NCP projects presented here is based on the lead-agency reports submitted to 
the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) over the course of the initiative, 
covering project implementation activity from 2002 to 2011. While these reports are fairly comprehensive, 
in general, reporting was not systematic, meaning that there was considerable variation in the project 
reporting practices, both across and within lead agencies. In particular, there was no consistent definition of 
what constituted a “NCP project,” meaning that lead agencies likely varied in the extent to which projects that 
had no NCP-based funding were included as well as how multicomponent projects were reported (that is, as a 
single project or as multiple projects). In addition, lead agencies had no standard for calculating or estimating 
leverage. Finally, these summary figures are not comparable to the totals given in the interim report (Green-
berg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin, 2010), which counts each grant as a separate project; this analysis uses 
the lead agencies’ reports to identify broader projects (which can include multiple grants). 
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In order to examine the variety of the projects implemented under the auspices of NCP, 
projects were coded into five domains, each including broad areas of local intervention reflected 
in the quality-of-life plans and each engaging different types of public and private institutions:4 
• Social Services include projects that were primarily directed toward neigh-
borhood residents, providing services to address their needs and support their 
welfare. The projects include efforts to improve local schools, youth devel-
opment initiatives, public safety programs, public health campaigns, and hu-
man services delivery. 
• Real Estate Development includes projects that were focused on housing 
and commercial real estate development. 
• Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts encompasses beautifica-
tion projects, such as neighborhood cleanups and mural installations; efforts 
to promote a positive community image through street fairs, tours, marketing 
campaigns, and other means; and community art and culture events. 
• Public Policy and Organizing includes projects that were directed toward 
development and enhancement of local participation and those directed at 
public policy, such as development and support of block groups, leadership 
development efforts, and civic education programs. 
• Economic and Workforce Development projects include efforts to develop 
and expand the neighborhood economy, focusing on both residents and busi-
ness. These projects include both economic development activities — which 
sought to support and expand the businesses and employers located within 
the neighborhood — and resident-focused job training and placement, asset 
building, and financial literacy efforts. 
The first column of Table 5.1 shows the distribution of NCP projects, by domain. 
Almost half (46.8 percent) of the projects were in the Social Services domain; most of the rest 
of the projects were in the Economic and Workforce Development (20.4 percent) or Public 
Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts (20.6 percent) domains. These results confirm the  
                                                          
4Note that projects may include components from multiple domains — for example, an anticrime initia-
tive that includes efforts to organize neighborhood residents or advocacy strategies. For these cases, the 
projects were classified according to the domain at which the efforts were targeted (that is, public safety 
[Social Services domain]) rather than by the means by which the project goals were to be accomplished (that 
is, organizing). 
78 
 
findings of earlier project analyses: The initiative, as intended by design, helped move most 
groups beyond a previous focus on housing development to support other domains of activities. 
Consistent with the distribution of projects, funds delivered to neighborhoods through 
LISC Chicago over the course of the initiative were also spread across domains other than real 
estate development. As shown in the second column of Table 5.1, close to 40 percent of the 
NCP funding distributed since 2002 was for Social Service projects; Real Estate Development 
accounts for 32 percent, while Economic and Workforce Development accounts for 26 percent. 
This distribution of pass-through funding reflects the relative financial cost of the different types 
of projects. For example, while Real Estate Development constituted only 7 percent of the 
projects, the average (mean) NCP funding allocated for each project in this domain was over 
$300,000, reflecting the costliness of development activities.5 In contrast, about a fifth of the 
projects were in the Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts domain, which accounted 
for about 4 percent of the total NCP resources expended since 2002, reflecting the lower cost of 
these type of efforts (with the average NCP funding per project representing only $13,000). 
The domain that involved the fewest reported projects is Public Policy and Organizing 
— explicit efforts to change public policy. While several planning areas identified this domain 
                                                          
5NCP funding includes loans and lines of credit. 
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Table 5.1  
NCP Projects, Funding, and Leverage, by Domain 
 
 
Domain 
Projects 
(%) 
NCP Funding 
(%) 
Leverage 
(%) 
Economic and workforce development 20.4 25.9 21.4 
Public policy and organizing 5.1 1.1 0.1 
Public spaces, community image, and the arts 20.6 3.9 3.2 
Real estate development 7.0 32.0 66.1 
Social services 46.8 37.1 9.3 
 
SOURCE:  MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago. 
 
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, 
non-LISC investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support. 
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as part of their comprehensive strategy to improve their neighborhood, most of the activity 
focused on implementing projects that did not aim to change policy. However, it is important to 
note that organizing and advocacy were often strategies or components of projects in other 
domains. For example, the NCP Foreclosure Response project in Chicago Southwest — an 
effort to provide counseling and assistance to local home owners and renters affected by the 
collapse of the housing market in 2008 — also pursued, as a major strategy, a public policy 
component directed toward organizing communities, securing resources, and informing legisla-
tion. As described in a recent report, implementing difficult but significant projects often 
involved influencing public officials so as to ensure support. An effort to move toward transit-
oriented development in Auburn Gresham, for instance, required work with Metra, a regional 
transportation body.6 
Leveraged Resources 
NCP as an initiative acknowledged that direct funding through the initiative alone was not 
enough to carry out identified projects, making “leverage,” or the ability to attract other invest-
ments, an especially important part of the initiative. Overall, the NCP projects generated over 
$900 million in leverage — that is, about $17 for every NCP dollar invested. The distribution of 
leverage by project domain is shown in the third column of Table 5.1; not surprisingly, by their 
very nature, Real Estate Development projects constitute the lion’s share of the leverage (66 
percent), with Economic and Workforce Development projects generating about a fifth of the 
total leverage.  
About three-quarters of the Real Estate Development projects generated leverage; the 
ratio of leverage of NCP funding across this domain was 35:1. No other types of projects were 
as successful at generating leverage, even though at least half the projects in each of the other 
domains did generate some leverage, at funding ratios ranging from 1:1 (Public Policy and 
Organizing) to 14:1 (Economic and Workforce Development and Public Spaces, Community 
Image, and the Arts). While this result is clearly influenced by the relative costliness of projects 
in the Real Estate Development domain, it also indicative of differences in the institutional 
structure that govern the flow of resources for projects in the various domains. That is, a variety 
of resources and mechanisms exist to provide funding for development projects, including 
lending and public investment programs focused on less-advantaged communities. Thus, a 
relatively small investment of NCP funding — needed to fund the preliminary work necessary 
to secure these existing and available resources — can and did yield large returns for the NCP 
neighborhoods. In contrast, other domains may not have institutions set up to attract public or 
private resources to add to initial investments at such a scale. 
                                                          
6Chaskin and Karlström (2012). 
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However, many neighborhoods were able to generate leverage for projects in other do-
mains. Some examples of these efforts include: 
• Humboldt Park’s Community of Wellness initiative, which implemented a 
number of activities to improve the physical and mental health of neighbor-
hood residents, brought in almost $8 million in outside finding to support 
these activities. 
• The Green Exchange initiative in Logan Square, directed to providing job 
training and employment for low-income workers in the community, was re-
ported to generate more than $6 million of leverage. 
• The 63rd Street Streetscape program, which beautified and improved a cen-
tral commercial corridor in Chicago Southwest, was reported to have 
brought in $600,000 in private donations from the Islamic community in 
Chicago Southwest and surrounding neighborhoods, as well as over $1 mil-
lion in additional financial resources (tax and personal income). 
• Many of the NCP neighborhoods implemented a Center for Working Fami-
lies, which, among such other activities as financial counseling and job 
placement services, sponsored tax counseling projects to assist families in 
applying for the Earned Income Tax Credit. These projects were reported to 
bring over $1 million in additional income to some of the neighborhoods. 
As these examples illustrate, “leverage” had multiple meanings in terms of the NCP 
projects; overall reported leverage included both additional resources that were secured to 
implement projects as well as resources that were generated as a result of project implementa-
tion.7 These different conceptions of leverage are all meaningful, but lead agencies varied in the 
ways that they viewed and reported leverage. As a result, total leverage generated should not be 
viewed alone to demonstrate the “success” of NCP. In addition, it is important to note that not 
all the NCP projects were designed to generate leverage. For example, using limited funding, 
several neighborhoods implemented small projects that were designed to build trust among 
community partners. Other small projects included such activities as a mural installation, a park 
cleanup, or development of a walking tour — one-time activities requiring a small commitment 
of financial resources well within the scope of the NCP funding. While all these projects were 
intended to benefit the neighborhoods where they were implemented, the expected return for the 
investment might not be best measured in leverage alone. 
                                                          
7Additionally, methods for estimation of generated leverage are typically not well documented. 
81 
Change Over Time 
As discussed primarily in Chapters 1 and 2, the Great Recession, which started about halfway 
through the time period considered in the NCP project analysis, created significant changes in 
the environment within and surrounding the NCP neighborhoods. Several aspects of the NCP 
response to the recession, discussed above, motivate an inquiry into changes in the focus of 
NCP action over the course of the initiative. 
Chapter 2 notes that the NCP lead agencies did not report substantial shifts in their work 
due to the recession, with the exception of slowdowns or delays in housing construction and 
issues related to foreclosure. The MacArthur Foundation provided a hefty investment in several 
communities to support foreclosure prevention work through increased staffing to local neigh-
borhood housing service offices and through related efforts. In addition, LISC Chicago began to 
seek funds from federal sources — taking advantage of several stimulus and homeowner relief 
funding programs instituted in response to the economic downturn — and had to build its 
capacity to manage these types of contracts. As described in Chapters 1 and 2, around the time 
that the recession hit, LISC Chicago started to put together proposals jointly with the City of 
Chicago, serving as the bridge to the participating neighborhoods in efforts like Smart Commu-
nities and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. In these ways, public funding to combat the 
recession offered new opportunities for both LISC Chicago and the NCP neighborhoods. As a 
staff member at LISC Chicago commented: “The economic downturn was a time of expansion 
for us. It was actually one of our stronger fund-raising years.”  
For the NCP neighborhoods, these opportunities involved new areas of activity. In par-
ticular, with the support of LISC Chicago and the NCP Foreclosure Response project, several 
neighborhoods began working to prevent foreclosures and to mitigate their effects on neighbor-
hoods. Others were able to expand their work due to the increased funding and other support 
targeted to this issue, and they could take advantage of new funding sources. For example, 
Logan Square was able to take advantage of a federal stimulus grant to Illinois, Put Illinois to 
Work, which brought 73 people to work in the organization and the neighborhood. 
However, for many of the NCP neighborhoods, the recession presented organizational 
challenges. In Logan Square, some of its programs, which depended on state funding for 
operation, experienced cash flow issues due to delayed and eliminated payments from the state; 
the lead agency also reduced its staff in response to lower funding. In East Garfield, some 
strong local organizations were hard hit; one of the strongest organizations in the neighborhood 
that works on development and provision of social services reduced its staff and had to sell 
some of its property. Given these funding constraints, other organizations needed to be more 
sophisticated about approaching funders. As one lead agency noted: “If they are being funded 
externally they’re becoming savvier in terms of reporting outcomes and proving that what they 
do is meaningful and works.” 
82 
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of NCP projects, by domain and time period.8 The 
only domain for which the activity level (number of projects) was unchanged between the two 
periods is Public Policy and Organizing. Not surprisingly, the level of activity in Real Estate 
 
Development dropped considerably. The share of projects in the Economic and Workforce 
Development domain also declined, with a shift in focus toward programs serving community 
residents, particularly unemployed workers and home owners dealing with foreclosure. In 
contrast, there was more NCP activity in the Social Services domain after the onset of the 
recession. Finally, the postrecession increase in activity within the Public Spaces, Community 
Image, and the Arts domain was driven, in part, by increased efforts to improve the built 
                                                          
8The project reports used for this analysis were periodic and, in several cases, covered multiple years of 
activity.  For many projects, the actual starting period is not explicitly stated but, instead, is inferred based 
on the first report in which the project appears. 
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Figure 5.1
NCP Projects, by Domain and Time Period
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago.
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, non-LISC 
investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support.
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environment — perhaps a reaction to the increased difficulty of affecting this dimension of 
community quality via traditional means (Real Estate Development). 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the distribution of NCP resources also reflects a shift in im-
plementation activity between the two time periods. In the period before the recession, about 
two-thirds of the NCP resources that were distributed among the neighborhoods was in support 
of Real Estate Development projects, with about a fifth going toward Economic and Workforce 
Development projects. After the recession, over half the NCP funding was for Social Services 
projects; the share of NCP resources supporting Economic and Workforce Development 
projects also increased, to about 30 percent. In addition, the flow of resources from NCP 
sources increased after the recession started: About 60 percent of the total NCP funding for 
projects that were implemented in the planning areas was expended in 2008 or later. Notably, 
the per-project level of NCP funding for projects in the postrecession main spheres of activity 
— Economic and Workforce Development and Social Services — was much higher in the later 
period. Finally, while the percentage of resources supporting Public Policy and Organizing 
projects is small and appears to be similar in both time periods, the per-project level of NCP 
resources for these types of projects increased by over 800 percent after the recession. While the 
overall amounts are small relative to the overall flow of NCP resources, this change indicates an 
important shift in the direction of NCP activity. 
Leverage also changed between the two periods: About 60 percent of the total leverage 
generated by the NCP projects was secured in the years before the recession. The reduction in  
the availability of “outside” resources is certainly one factor in the change in the distribution of 
activity among the domains.9 These shifts indicate a change in focus for NCP action that was 
motivated by the changing economic climate, both to address emergent needs of community 
residents and to empower them to take a more active role in the formation of public policy in 
the wake of the collapse of the housing market.10 
Neighborhood Variation 
As discussed above, the NCP project reporting was not very systematic, and so comparisons of 
project activity across neighborhoods for purposes of evaluation or ranking can be misleading. 
However, examination of the differences in the distribution of projects by domain can provide 
insight into the priorities of the NCP neighborhoods in terms of action. Specifically, this is of 
  
                                                          
9The total number of projects is roughly the same in the two time periods. 
10Almost all the Public Policy and Organizing projects that were implemented in 2008 and later dealt 
with housing or foreclosures in some respect. 
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interest due to similarity across neighborhoods in terms of plans; almost all the neighborhoods 
planned to address challenges common to less-advantaged neighborhoods, including strategies 
to reduce crime, expand economic opportunities for neighborhood residents, improve education 
and youth services, and the like. Thus, the projects that were implemented under the auspices of 
NCP may indicate the relative priority for these challenges in each of the planning areas. Of 
course, NCP action was constrained by structural factors, such as neighborhood and institutional 
capacity, and so the results shown here are suggestive rather than conclusive. 
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the NCP projects, by domain, for each of the 14 
planning areas. Overall there are more similarities than dissimilarities. For example, all the 
neighborhoods implemented projects in a range of domains, with Public Policy and Organizing 
being the least common type.11 While Social Services projects made up a substantial portion of 
each area’s NCP activity, several neighborhoods emphasized this type of action to a greater 
degree — specifically, Englewood, Humboldt Park, Woodlawn, Little Village, East 
                                                          
11Again, recall that the project types are defined based on the outcomes of the project rather than on the 
strategies used to achieve them. 
The New Communities Program
Figure 5.2
NCP Funding, by Domain and Time Period
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago.
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, non-LISC 
investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support.
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Figure 5.3
The New Communities Program
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago.
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, non-LISC investments, other kinds of 
support, and projects that do not list any funding or support.
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Garfield Park, and Chicago Lawn. In three of these neighborhoods — East Garfield Park, 
Englewood, and Woodlawn — youth development projects appear to have been the driving 
factor behind the emphasis on activities within the Social Services domain. In the other three 
neighborhoods, a relatively greater emphasis on public safety initiatives drove the dominance of 
the Social Services domain. While these results could indicate that youth issues and/or public 
safety were more prevalent for these neighborhoods, they also could indicate relative differ-
ences in opportunity. That is, these differences could represent variation in the neighborhoods’ 
ability and capacity to implement projects of these types. 
Another difference of note is the relative frequency of Real Estate Development pro-
jects. In particular, a few neighborhoods (Pilsen, West Haven, North Lawndale, and Quad 
Communities) were much more heavily involved in activities in this domain, while others 
(East Garfield, Englewood, Little Village, and South Chicago) had relatively little activity in 
this domain. Finally, Economic and Workforce Development and Public Spaces, Community 
Image, and the Arts received around the same levels of activity in almost all the neighborhoods. 
The distribution of NCP funding and leverage of neighborhoods is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Several of the planning areas received a greater share of the total NCP resources expended over 
the course of the initiative for project implementation, while others received a smaller share. In 
some cases, areas receiving relatively large shares — such as Quad Communities — were more 
involved in Real Estate Development, and so the greater access to NCP resources may have 
been driven by the domain focus of the neighborhood. There is also a loose association between 
the share of NCP resources and total NCP project investments: Most, but not all, neighborhoods 
that received larger shares of NCP funding had larger overall project investments. 
Additional analyses of the distribution of NCP resources and its relation to the mix of 
activities in the various neighborhoods indicates that the flow of seed grants and loans was not 
equally spread across the 14 neighborhoods. However, an uneven flow does not necessarily 
indicate an inequitable distribution. For instance, capacity-building support and in-kind re-
sources provided by LISC Chicago are not included in these analyses. In addition, as discussed 
in the 2010 interim report and elsewhere in this report, neighborhoods differed in terms of their 
capacity to implement projects, both at the beginning of the initiative and throughout its course. 
It appears significant that the neighborhoods that reported the fewest implementation partners 
— East Garfield Park, Auburn Gresham, Washington Park, Englewood, and South 
Chicago — were also the ones that tended to leverage the least amount of resources in Hum-
boldt Park, Woodlawn, Chicago Lawn, Logan Square, and Quad Communities — tended 
to have more total leverage. This pattern might have prevailed even in the absence of NCP, 
since neighborhoods with more organizations will obviously generate more funding. Even
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in neighborhoods that were described as occasionally challenging –– Woodlawn, Pilsen, and 
Quad Communities –– the presence of core actors able to implement projects resulted in 
significant leverage reported under the auspices of NCP. 
Spatial Patterns of Neighborhood Investments 
Most of the NCP planning areas are fairly large, encompassing several square miles. Even with 
$900 million in overall leveraged investments, there is the risk that, among 14 neighborhood 
areas and 10 years of an initiative, improvement efforts might be thinly spread. The highly 
inclusive nature of the planning process — lead agencies were encouraged to be open to 
projects identified by community partners — might also have resulted in a diffusion of effort. 
Since the literature suggests that a certain threshold may be needed for housing investments to 
The New Communities Program
Figure 5.4
NCP and Total Funding, by Neighborhood
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago.
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, non-LISC 
investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support.
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result in measurable changes to neighborhoods, it is important to determine how NCP was able 
to target efforts so as to “saturate” certain areas with improvement efforts, even though NCP 
promotes investments in areas other than housing. 
The spatial distribution of the NCP projects was examined for three neighborhoods: 
Chicago Lawn, Humboldt Park, and Quad Communities. The means used to locate NCP 
projects within the neighborhoods varied, depending mostly on the project’s domain. Real 
Estate Development projects and many of the projects in the Public Spaces, Community Image, 
and the Arts domain were designed to improve and enhance specific locations within the 
neighborhood. Many of the implemented Economic Development projects were also targeted to 
enhance fairly clearly defined commercial or industrial corridors. However, as discussed above, 
provision of services and assistance for neighborhood residents was a large component of NCP 
action; for this analysis, these projects were located within the neighborhood, based on the 
residential location of the individuals targeted for and/or served by the project. For example, a 
Social Services project that enhanced programming at a local elementary school is “located” in 
the attendance zone of the targeted school.12 
Not all projects could be located. For example, most of the Community Image projects 
were intended to enhance the perception of the NCP neighborhood as a whole. Likewise, most 
of the Public Policy and Organizing projects were directed externally; that is, the intent of these 
projects was to facilitate neighborhood action on the municipal, state, or national level. Many of 
the projects providing services to individuals were also not targeted to specific residents or 
populations within the neighborhood, as their intent was to enhance service delivery for the 
neighborhood as a whole. Given that a large share of the NCP projects were of this type, only 
45 percent of the projects in the three case-study neighborhoods were located; however, these 
located projects represent 77 percent of the total NCP resources invested in the three neighbor-
hoods and 90 percent of the total leverage reported.13 
Almost all the Real Estate Development projects were located; about two-thirds of the 
Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts projects and half the Economic and Workforce 
                                                          
12There is a distinct difference between the location of a project and its area of effect.  For example, 
development or improvement of a park, which is physically located at a specific point in the neighborhood, 
may and probably did have an area of effect that was much larger. This analysis focuses on locations, not 
areas of effect, and so it is not concerned with measuring or describing outcomes achieved by the local 
planning areas. 
13Slightly more of the projects in Quad Communities (51 percent) were located than in the other two 
neighborhoods, where 42 percent of the projects were located. Additionally, while the proportion of NCP 
funding and leverage located in Humboldt Park (82 percent and 85 percent, respectively) and Quad Commu-
nities (79 percent and 99 percent) were fairly high, more of the resources invested in Chicago Lawn (63 
percent and 78 percent) were not located. 
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Development projects were located. As was expected, less than a third of the Social Services 
projects and none of the Public Policy and Organization projects were located, reflecting that 
these types of projects tended to be more generally targeted toward the neighborhood as a 
whole. However, given the greater overall prevalence of Social Services projects, they represent 
about a third of the located projects. A similar proportion of the located projects were in the 
Economic and Workforce Development domain, while about a quarter were Public Spaces, 
Community Image, and the Arts projects. 
In addition, while each of the NCP planning areas has a defined geographic location, for 
the three case-study neighborhoods, action was not restricted by these boundaries. Figure 5.5 
shows the geographic areas where one or more NCP projects were located for each of the case-
study neighborhoods; the darker shaded area on each map shows the defined planning area, 
while the lighter shaded areas show the areas outside the defined areas where some NCP action 
occurred. These outside-of-area investments generally represent a small number of projects 
whose target areas extend beyond a neighborhood — for example, a commercial corridor or 
school attendance area that crossed neighborhood boundaries. As none of the located projects 
are completely outside the planning areas’ defined geographic boundaries, the spatial analysis 
focuses solely on the NCP-defined geographies. 
Figure 5.6 shows NCP activity, in terms of the number of projects and the total amount 
of NCP funding, for the located projects in each case-study neighborhood. The shading of the 
maps reflects the density of activity, with darker areas indicating a greater number of projects or 
a larger NCP investment total; projects that occurred in multiple subareas within each neighbor-
hood are included in the project count for each subarea, while the NCP investment is divided 
evenly among the subareas. In all three neighborhoods, NCP projects and investments exhibit 
spatial clustering at varying degrees. Note the differences between activity level as measured by 
the number of projects and activity level as measured by total NCP investment. In both Chicago 
Lawn and Humboldt Park, the area of concentrated activity as measured by the number of 
projects is larger than the area of concentrated investments; in Quad Communities, the areas of 
concentrated investments border the area of concentrated projects. 
In general, the areas with the more intensive NCP activity correspond to commercial 
centers within the neighborhoods. These areas were the focus of much of the Real Estate 
Development and the Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts projects implemented by 
the local planning areas. As shown in Appendix B, across the three neighborhoods, projects and 
investments in Real Estate Development were the most clustered; this is likely at least partially 
a function of the smaller number of projects in this domain, as well as reflective of the spatially
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Figure 5.5 (continued) 
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Figure 5.5 (continued) 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of lead-agency annual progress reports provided by LISC Chicago. 
 
NOTE: This analysis includes NCP projects reported to have received support grants from LISC Chicago, 
non-LISC investments, other kinds of support, and projects that do not list any funding or support. 
 
discrete nature of these types of projects. While the distribution of Economic and Workforce 
Development and Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts projects is less concentrated 
(compared with the Real Estate Development projects), these tend to be most prevalent in the 
same subareas as the Real Estate Development projects, reflecting the focus of all three plan-
ning areas on improving their commercial corridors. Social Services projects are the most 
diffuse; in all three neighborhoods, these projects were the most evenly distributed. 
Overall, the NCP activity in Chicago Lawn — the largest of the three case-study neigh-
borhoods — was the most clustered spatially. While there was activity across the neighborhood, 
its focal point was on the eastern side. This long-term pattern of investments in Chicago Lawn 
is in part due to the institutional organizing model employed by the NCP lead agency, the 
Southwest Organizing Project (SWOP). As one staff member described the Chicago Lawn NCP 
initiative: “We’re institutional. . . . We don’t have individual members, we have churches and 
mosques and schools. . . .” The pattern also reflects the fact that both SWOP and many of its 
NCP partners are located on the eastern side of Chicago Lawn, on or around 63rd Street. These 
partners include the Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN), which implemented many of 
the neighborhood’s health and welfare NCP projects; Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS), 
which led implementation of several NCP projects related to housing; and the Southwest 
REACH center, home of the Chicago Lawn Center for Working Families and the Chicago 
Lawn Smart Communities project. Marquette Elementary, Morrill Elementary, Eberhart 
Elementary, and Gage Park High School — schools that housed several Chicago Lawn NCP 
projects, such as Elev8, Parents as Mentors, and the Voices of Youth in Chicago Education 
(VOYCE) Project — are also based in eastern Chicago Lawn. 
SWOP is located near the Greater Southwest Development Corporation (GSDC), which 
also served as the implementing partner for many of the neighborhood’s projects, particularly 
those in the Economic and Workforce Development domain and the Real Estate Development 
domain, with much of its efforts focused on revitalizing the 63rd Street corridor located on the 
eastern side of the neighborhood. Many of the NCP activities were focused on developing a 
neighborhood brand by engaging in antiforeclosure activities and improving the physical aspect 
of the 63rd Street corridor, in hopes of making the neighborhood more attractive to investors. 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Figure 5.6  
 
Spatial Distribution of NCP Projects and Funding, by Neighborhood 
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Figure 5.6 (continued) 
 
b. Humboldt Park 
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Figure 5.6 (continued) 
c. Quad Communities 
NCP Projects  
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of project location data provided by LISC Chicago and verified by lead 
agencies. 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
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In part because projects were clustered in Chicago Lawn, there was greater association 
between NCP activities and quality-of-life indicators within the neighborhood. Specifically, 
NCP action in Chicago Lawn was more likely to occur in areas with “negative” quality-of-life 
indicators, such as crime levels and poverty rates, and was less likely to occur within areas with 
“positive” quality-of-life indicators, such as home and business investment.14 This pattern of 
association was strongest for Real Estate Development and Public Spaces, Community Image, 
and the Arts projects, and it was reversed for Economic and Workforce Development projects. 
Social Services projects were least likely to be associated with quality-of-life indicators.  
Humboldt Park, the second-largest of the three case-study neighborhoods, exhibited 
some spatial clustering of activity, with NCP action being concentrated in the eastern, Puerto 
Rican side of the neighborhood, whereas there were fewer organizations in the western, Afri-
can-American side. Like Chicago Lawn, the distribution of NCP projects in Humboldt Park 
reflects the geography of neighborhood organizations, as explained by one interviewee:15 
The fact that there’s a lot more programming happening on the eastern end is by 
default, more so just because there’s more organizations who had already been in 
the process of programming.  
However, the NCP lead agency in Humboldt Park, Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation, 
made efforts to engage and collaborate with organizations in the western part of the neighbor-
hood. These efforts were complicated by the organization’s historical focus on the eastern side 
of the neighborhood: 
It took us a while because we have less history working in the west part of Hum-
boldt Park, to sort of wrap our heads around, you know, it’s a very different sort 
of community structure in terms of its civic institutions, its religious institutions, 
how people relate to each other, sort of who are the important entities and the go-
to people in the community. 
Despite the lead agency’s awareness of challenges reaching out to groups from western 
Humboldt Park, it was able to direct resources to that community, most notably through 
partnership with West Humboldt Park Development Council and with Chicago Commons. 
These groups did participate in several neighborhood-wide initiatives, including the Community 
of Wellness, business development activities, digital divide, and youth-focused efforts. There 
were also some Real Estate Development projects, such as the Rosa Parks Apartments, which 
                                                          
14Association between NCP activity and quality-of-life indicators was assessed by calculating the rank-
order correlation between the number of projects and NCP investment with each quality-of-life indicator. 
15All quotations are from interviews that MDRC conducted with 132 staff, implementation partners, and 
other stakeholders. Interviews are anonymous. 
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were situated in western Humboldt Park and which allowed the reach of NCP to extend outside 
its traditional core of constituents on the eastern side of the neighborhood. 
Quad Communities, the smallest of the three case-study neighborhoods, exhibited the 
lowest level of spatial clustering for NCP activity overall. In part, this reflects the strategy of the 
NCP lead agency, QCDC, to broker many neighborhood-wide services or initiatives, especially 
involving education or workforce development. The neighborhood-wide focus of these types of 
efforts is reflected in the low level of spatial clustering in Quad Communities’ NCP activity. In 
addition, unlike in the other neighborhoods, some organizational participants in the NCP 
activities in Quad Communities were not concentrated within the neighborhood. 
Some spatial clustering of NCP action was found within domains. Specifically, Real 
Estate Development and Economic and Workforce Development activities were spatially 
clustered on the western side of the planning area, reflecting the focus of activity on the devel-
opment and improvement of the Cottage Grove and Drexel Boulevard commercial corridors. 
Social Services projects were clustered on the eastern side of the neighborhood, which contains 
the population center of the neighborhood and many of its schools. There is little association 
between NCP activity and quality-of-life indicators in Quad Communities, but this is more a 
function of the lack of variation in the quality-of-life conditions within the neighborhood than a 
lack of relation between NCP action and neighborhood conditions. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the later stage of the initiative, local NCP activities were successful in moving 
beyond planning to project implementation — a feat that has proved challenging to comprehen-
sive community initiatives in the past. Local areas were also successful in promoting action in a 
wide variety of domains. Over 800 projects were implemented, bringing over $900 million in 
NCP and “outside” resources to the 14 neighborhood areas over the 10-year course of the 
initiative. This overall finding suggests that the NCP “platform” was a substantially effective 
vehicle for directing comprehensive community improvement efforts to neighborhoods. Despite 
the Great Recession, NCP activity did not “wind down” toward the end of the initiative, with 
LISC Chicago’s efforts to attract new funding sources for NCP supplementing where real estate 
transactions became more difficult. Neighborhoods varied, in terms of both the mix of projects 
implemented and the level of resources that flowed in under the auspices of NCP. In large part, 
this variation represented the number of partners available to implement NCP projects, as well 
as the capacity of these actors. Even among neighborhoods where the tenor of relationships 
among groups was described as challenging, the presence of more organizations tended to allow 
for greater total leverage reported under the auspices of NCP. 
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The fact that NCP was able to cluster improvement efforts toward different parts of the 
neighborhood is also a significant test of the NCP model. Despite highly inclusive tendencies in 
the planning process, which might have resulted in a diffusion of efforts, the NCP lead agencies 
that were studied were able to target or “colocate” improvement efforts in a strategic manner. 
Because there was a limited period of follow-up, research was not able to conduct quasi-
experimental analyses to understand whether trajectories in areas with colocated investments 
diverged from comparable neighborhood areas. At the same time, a lack of coordination among 
investments (as described in Chapter 4) raises questions about whether NCP always maximized 
the value of colocated efforts. As described in Chapter 6, the new pilot within NCP –– known as 
“Testing the Model” (TTM) –– allows opportunities for the initiative to capitalize on the poten-
tial for coordination among colocated efforts so as to reach toward community change goals. 
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Chapter 6 
Learning from the NCP Platform 
The New Communities Program (NCP) is one of the country’s largest comprehensive commu-
nity initiatives (CCIs), and it addressed critical challenges for these types of programs over the 
course of its 10-year implementation. NCP has moved past planning and into implementation of 
nearly 850 projects and $900 million of leveraged investments in 14 neighborhood areas in the 
City of Chicago. Program implementers developed a viable “intermediary” structure, whereby 
both the Local Initiatives Support Corporation of Chicago (LISC Chicago) and the NCP lead 
agencies have fulfilled roles so as to avoid disabling tensions among funders, implementers, and 
local partners. Lead agencies, especially those which already had substantial stature within their 
neighborhoods, saw enhanced abilities to plan, coordinate, and catalyze comprehensive im-
provement projects. After 10 years of operation, and as NCP enters a new stage, it is appropriate 
to consider lessons that have emerged through its experiences among varied Chicago neighbor-
hoods. Chapter 6 considers themes about the initiative’s successes and the implications of the 
challenges that it faces for the next phase of NCP. It then addresses three critical topics related 
to the next generation of CCIs and offers lessons about the targeting of such initiatives.  
A Review of the Findings 
Three important themes from this report’s findings suggest the advantages and limitations that 
may be inherent in the NCP model itself: (1) its ability to build on local strengths, (2) its 
creation of a stable “platform” to channel investments and weather a changed economic 
environment, and (3) its challenges in reaching into the implementation of projects so as to 
improve them and their ability to coordinate with each other. 
Building on Strengths 
As described in Chapters 3 through 5, NCP tended to improve organizations’ abilities to 
plan, convene, and catalyze local action when a foundation of these capacities was already in 
place. Those groups that were better established and that had more experience facilitating 
comprehensive community development through community organizing were the ones that saw 
the greatest gains in their ability to conduct the NCP model. The fact that organizations with 
substantial histories and resources would credit further capacities built into NCP suggests that 
initiatives of this sort may enhance the ability of even some of the strongest community devel-
opment organizations to build local relationships and spark the implementation of comprehen-
sive improvement projects.  
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Similarly, NCP also enhanced relationships in neighborhoods where there were gener-
ally established histories of collaboration and that had a relative abundance of available partners 
to carry out local projects. Even in these settings, where it might be difficult to see what value 
NCP added to local partnerships, the program was able to expand networks, deepen ties among 
organizations, and sometimes provide the basis for more effective programming, as in the case 
of Chicago Southwest’s foreclosure initiative, described in Chapter 4.  
The Stability of the Platform 
Finally, as described in Chapter 5, multiple projects that represented hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars of investments flowed throughout the program, across both primarily Latino and 
largely African-American neighborhoods. But when examining variation across neighborhoods 
in leveraged investment through NCP, the neighborhoods with more, and larger, organizational 
partners generally received more funding and more leverage. This pattern suggests that com-
munities with existing organizational capacity were often the ones that were able to realize 
opportunities for investment through NCP.1  
As described in Chapters 3 through 5, NCP was more limited in its ability to build ca-
pacity among smaller and less-established organizations and among groups that were not 
experienced conveners. There were some notable exceptions to this pattern, especially in Quad 
Communities and Auburn Gresham, which grew in capacity over the course of NCP and 
through which NCP made or leveraged larger, comprehensive investments. But, in general, 
neighborhoods with fewer organizations and where there was less trust among groups were 
especially vulnerable to falloff in relationships over time. A dearth of partners was associated 
with more limited funding to neighborhoods. These findings about operating NCP in more 
challenging environments raise questions about the need to carefully target initiatives such as 
NCP, and they perhaps should moderate expectations that policymakers might have about 
outcomes when they are situated in neighborhoods that have fewer partners and more challeng-
ing relations among them. It might also prompt designers of these initiatives to have a more 
targeted approach to providing technical assistance during implementation and to encourage 
approaches that combine community organizing and outreach with community development, so 
as to respond to challenges inherent in neighborhoods with fewer community organizations. 
                                                     
1One exception to this pattern was Quad Communities Development Corporation (QCDC), which, as 
highlighted in Chapter 5, was able to leverage significant Real Estate Development funding early in the 
initiative, though this tapered after the Great Recession hit (2006-2009). This exception may be due to several 
factors, including the fact that Real Estate Development generated more leverage for all NCP sites than 
other domains did and QCDC’s close ties to its alderman. 
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Reaching into Project Implementation 
NCP was a substantial vehicle for catalyzing and channeling implementation of local 
projects. Over 800 projects, many with multiple components, were supported over the course of 
the initiative, in contrast with levels of implementation in similar initiatives over time. Lead 
agencies were able to identify these initiatives and generally maintained consensus about their 
importance over a long period of time. As described above, these are significant accomplish-
ments for a community development initiative, especially given the number of lead agencies 
that were relatively inexperienced or newly formed. 
At the same time, LISC Chicago and lead agencies were more limited in their abilities 
to use NCP to improve the quality of individual community projects or to help coordinate in 
concrete ways among them, in large part because there was reluctance to direct lead agencies to 
continue to convene partners in a way that could help create these structures; further, lead 
agencies themselves did not have the resources to focus on individual project improvement. In 
this way, the sheer number of NCP projects conducted may be seen as a hindrance that made it 
impossible to focus on more than a few through the lens of implementation. Both lead agencies 
and LISC Chicago were sometimes reluctant to direct other groups’ efforts, especially given a 
need to maintain relationships (for lead agencies) or (for LISC) a desire not to undercut com-
munity control of interventions. In addition, the broad quality-of-life plans provided little 
incentive for projects to be coordinated concretely with each other, and one purpose of seed 
grant funding was to provide funding flexibility without onerous requirements on participants. 
As a result of this flexibility, however, LISC Chicago and lead agencies were sometimes left 
with few strategies to develop monitoring and accountability tools.2 
As described in Chapter 4, collaborative implementation — the adoption of complex, 
multipartner, multistrategy projects — was often difficult to achieve, and even when larger 
initiatives invited this collaboration, the promise of collective efforts was not always fulfilled, as 
different actions by network partners were not always coordinated with each other. These 
limitations of coordination may be understandable in an initiative with over 800 projects, but it 
may also speak to the need for a new set of management roles and expectations among commu-
nity partners that helps improve the quality of individual efforts.  
                                                     
2Multisite initiatives whose program design and funding came from external funding partners (such as 
Elev8 and the Centers for Working Families) were an exception to this rule; in these instances, funders had 
built in mechanisms for program tracking and accountability. 
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How the NCP Experience Speaks to the Next Generation of 
Comprehensive Community Development Programs 
Comprehensive community initiatives (CCIs) are increasing in prominence as a policy strategy 
at both local and federal levels. For example, the adoption by LISC groups around the country 
of a comprehensive framework for development, through the Building Sustainable Communi-
ties (BSC) program, represents an important shift for the intermediary and one that has implica-
tions for community development practice around the country. Federal policy has moved to 
embrace CCIs through the vision of the White House’s Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative 
(NRI). The premise of the initiative echoes the rationale for NCP:3  
The Obama Administration recognizes that the interconnected challenges in 
high-poverty neighborhoods require interconnected solutions. Struggling 
schools, little access to capital, high unemployment, poor housing, persistent 
crime, and other challenges that feed into and perpetuate each other call for an 
integrated approach so residents can reach their full potential.  
Despite their growing adoption, evidence that CCIs represent a superior approach to 
other neighborhood change strategies is limited. NCP provides opportunities to consider some 
of the assumptions behind these initiatives, including (1) the importance of colocation and 
coordination (the emphasis above on high-poverty neighborhoods); (2) the value of comprehen-
siveness (“challenges that feed into and perpetuate each other”); and (3) the power and chal-
lenges of institution-building (the development of an “integrated approach”). 
Colocation and Coordination 
The Obama administration’s approach — reflected in NRI but demonstrated through 
such flagship initiatives as Choice Neighborhoods and Promise Neighborhoods — suggests that 
some high-poverty neighborhoods require intensive attention and investment in order to 
improve outcomes for individuals. This view has support within the community development 
literature, as findings suggest that there may be a “threshold” of colocated, concentrated 
investments that can result in “spillovers” that can convey benefits even beyond the program 
itself. Quasi-experimental research has shown that affordable housing investments can increase 
property values4 and decrease crime.5 As described in Chapter 5, NCP was successful at 
funding and targeting investments within neighborhoods, especially along commercial corridors 
where there might be additional potential growth as a result of improvement efforts. The Quad 
Communities Development Corporation (QCDC) attempted many revitalization strategies 
with the goal of creating businesses that could anchor a higher-income population in the 
                                                     
3White House Office of Urban Affairs (n.d.). 
4Galster (2009); Goetz, Lam, and Heitlinger (1996). 
5Freedman and Owens (2011). 
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neighborhood. In Chicago Lawn, there was evidence of concentrated investments along an area 
in need of revitalization in order to attract, maintain, and anchor other economic development 
efforts. In Humboldt Park, targeting not only was found in the eastern, Puerto Rican side of 
the neighborhood, which was much denser in terms of organizational partners, but also extend-
ed into the western, African-American side of the neighborhood.  
Each of these cases makes clear that it is possible for CCIs to focus efforts in ways that 
might be meaningful over time, despite the tendency within the planning process to “let a 
thousand flowers bloom” and, with that, to spread limited resources thinly. As described in 
Chapter 4, there was much less evidence that initiatives were able to coordinate interventions 
with each other in a way that overcame the natural tendency of projects to operate in isolation. 
Only in limited cases — such as the foreclosure effort in Southwest Chicago or the Community 
of Wellness in Humboldt Park — did initiatives emerge in a manner that deployed networks in 
focused or mobilized ways. The case of Elev8 at Quad Communities and the foreclosure 
initiative at Auburn Gresham suggest that it was quite challenging for lead agencies both to 
catalyze the many projects that were part of NCP and to help these efforts support each other. A 
greater intentionality concerning this coordination and guidance from the initiative might be 
important, especially given the fact that NCP programs are often smaller than large-scale 
redevelopment projects and that, as such, they may be less likely to provoke community change 
simply through scale of their limited investment. 
What Comprehensiveness Can Achieve 
As described in Chapter 1, NCP comes from a history of initiatives that, starting in the 
1980s, made comprehensiveness the central component of their underlying strategy toward 
improving communities. Led in many ways by LISC Chicago, comprehensiveness has become 
a significant guiding principle for LISC nationally and one that allows community development 
corporations (CDCs) to move beyond a focus on affordable housing into other areas of work. 
But comprehensiveness has its own challenges, including the possibility that it might diffuse 
limited resources among many different types of projects. In many ways, “comprehensiveness” 
already exists within neighborhoods — simply by virtue of there being varied types of service 
or community development programs within them. Given these potential issues, what lessons 
does NCP offer related to the “value-added” of a comprehensive orientation toward community 
change? 
One significant benefit of comprehensiveness was that it allowed LISC Chicago to at-
tract other sources of funding when the housing market collapsed due to the Great Recession 
and it became much more difficult to finance affordable housing construction. Chapters 2 and 5 
describe how LISC Chicago sought out and obtained resources (in areas as varied as broadband, 
education, and foreclosures) that could both help supplement the loss of housing financing to 
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neighborhoods and counter the effect of the recession. It would likely have been very difficult 
for LISC Chicago to have leveraged these additional resources without its track record of 
having promoted comprehensive work with community partners through NCP and without 
having the stature of the MacArthur Foundation’s investment behind it. 
For the lead agencies as well, comprehensiveness could also allow groups to take ad-
vantage of new and varied funding sources. One example of this dynamic can be seen in the 
contrast between the Greater Auburn Gresham Development Corporation (GAGDC) and 
Quad Communities Development Corporation (QCDC) — both newer organizations at the 
start of NCP. At the beginning of NCP, GAGDC had not yet formed a significant identity 
within the neighborhood, but it became a multi-issue organization and a significant broker of 
resources by the end of the initiative. This process was enhanced by its ability to work in 
multiple spheres and to advance different projects as opportunities arose. In contrast, QCDC 
made a strategic decision to focus many of its energies on commercial economic development, 
thereby limiting its ability to continue to convene partners in other areas of work. In the eco-
nomic downturn, when financing became difficult to obtain for such projects, the organization 
was less able to sustain relationships or demonstrate progress in the niche of work that it had 
identified as important to its longer-term sustainability.6  
At the same time, being open to promoting comprehensiveness did not guarantee that 
every area of work would be implemented equally well. As described in Chapter 4, lead 
agencies were sometimes challenged to coordinate or implement projects in areas that were not 
their core capacities. That is, lead agencies without substantial direct experiences in foreclosure 
prevention, or without high-capacity partners for educational programs, were at a disadvantage 
when coordinating these larger-scale programs, as they lacked the expertise to understand ways 
to bring partners together effectively. In some ways, the challenges faced by less experienced 
groups within these new areas of work echoes the fear on the part of NCP’s original designers, 
that it might be counterproductive to have community organizations take on work in varied 
areas with which they had little experience. Instead, NCP’s initial seed grant structure was 
designed to focus on collective responses to local problems and to spread work among many 
partners.  
In some more limited instances, a comprehensive orientation toward community prob-
lems could promote greater openness to new or emerging challenges faced by neighborhood 
residents, even if this new problem was not squarely in the domain in which some community 
groups were accustomed to intervene. One major finding of Chapter 2 is that very few groups 
re-planned or shifted the efforts of their networks as a result of the Great Recession (2006-
                                                     
6GAGDC was helped by relatively more cohesive local networks in its neighborhood, while QCDC was 
harmed by ideological splits.  
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2009). One reason for this was that NCP may have promoted a firm division of labor, whereby 
different types of organizations could fit their existing work into a broader, comprehensive plan. 
As described in Chapter 4, however, the foreclosure crisis provoked a different type of response 
in Chicago Southwest, where churches, schools, and other community organizations whose 
work was not related to housing quickly became more convinced that foreclosures represented a 
community crisis that threatened their own efforts in the neighborhood. These actors, in turn, 
came to play strategic roles in a larger, MacArthur-funded foreclosure intervention within the 
neighborhood.  
The Power and Challenges of Institution-Building 
One of the goals of NCP was to support durable relationships — as suggested by the 
metaphor of the NCP “platform.” This platform, as a vehicle for funding and a way of identify-
ing relationships to support implementation, remained a very stable one through the course of 
NCP. Despite its potential to undermine relationships, the Great Recession did not, on the 
whole, fragment local networks, and the platform remained a substantial vehicle for delivering 
resources even as the recession tested its primary source of leverage: housing construction 
loans. LISC Chicago’s ability to attract new and different forms of investment during this 
period also suggests how the NCP platform was able to adapt to new funding sources. In fact, 
groups cited the recession as an event that was more likely to draw organizations closer togeth-
er, as they sought funding collectively through some of the stimulus-related programs that LISC 
Chicago helped facilitate. The facts that implementation energies did not dwindle during the 
latter part of the initiative and that leverage and project development continued despite the 
possibility of program fatigue further suggest that NCP relationships were durable ones. 
At the same time, as described in Chapters 2, local relationships were not generally re-
oriented to respond in targeted ways to the recession’s specific manifestations, in increased 
unemployment or housing foreclosures. Formal re-planning was infrequent during the initiative, 
although programs such as Elev8 and Smart Communities required additional community 
planning as part of the application process. Finally, as described in Chapter 5, despite some 
significant efforts at policy change among neighborhoods, projects tended not to support 
advocacy or systems change efforts through NCP itself, and when they did so, they tended to 
use other coalition vehicles. These findings suggest that the NCP platform has acted as a 
stabilizing vehicle — that is, an impetus to come together, seek new funding, and enhance 
community institutions that serve to coordinate among neighborhood partners.7 But the NCP 
platform itself has not always promoted quick action to coordinate projects during crises or to 
mobilize for policy or systems change.  
                                                     
7Continued support for the Elev8 network in Chicago may be seen as an example of this stability, despite 
significant changes within Chicago Public Schools (CPS) more broadly. 
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Targeting and the Question of Neighborhood Context 
As described above, a new wave of CCIs and comprehensive community development initia-
tives is emerging within federal and local policy. Based on analyses above, what types of places 
appear more conducive to comprehensive, coordinated, community development initiatives? In 
terms of organizational characteristics, as described above, multi-issue and high-capacity 
organizations were most able to develop the NCP skills of convening and facilitation, especially 
when they had some history of community organizing. In terms of neighborhood characteristics, 
settings where there are many potential implementing partners with generally good relationships 
between organizations may also be best suited to collaborative implementation. Neighborhoods 
with fewer partners often struggle — although NCP could still be launched in these settings, as 
it was in Auburn Gresham, where there were fewer groups but where a small multi-issue 
organization could receive significant implementation grants. 
These aspects of organizational context — the capacity of local organizations, their 
number, their experience facilitating comprehensive neighborhood improvement, and the 
relations among them — appear to be the most important factors for NCP implementation. At 
the same time, one broad pattern associated with NCP implementation in Chicago relates not to 
organizational context but to economic and demographic context, and it needs to be interpreted 
further. Because of patterns of residential segregation within Chicago, NCP neighborhoods tend 
to be predominantly African-American neighborhoods or predominantly Latino. Some of the 
most challenging environments for implementing NCP were primarily African-American, 
historically disinvested neighborhoods. For example, every lead agency that LISC Chicago felt 
the need to replace was located in these settings. Policymakers interpreting this finding might be 
tempted to conclude that demographic context might be a stand-in for other aspects of neigh-
borhood capacity. 
This assumption would be questionable, for several reasons. First, Latino neighbor-
hoods were, in fact, considerably diverse in their NCP experiences. Some, such as Little 
Village, as described in the interim report, took an approach toward implementation that was at 
first seen as excluding other potential partners.8 In Pilsen, tensions among community groups 
were often significant and needed to be overcome during the course of planning and implemen-
tation, just as often occurred among African-American neighborhoods such as Woodlawn or 
North Lawndale. And, regardless of relationships among them, the presence of anchor institu-
tions or CDCs often allowed a conduit for substantial investments, especially in areas related to 
affordable housing construction or preservation.  
                                                     
8Greenberg, Verma, Dillman, and Chaskin (2010). 
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What appears more significant for NCP implementation is that African-American 
neighborhoods were also those with CDCs founded in the mid-1980s, a period of growth for 
these types of groups. During this period, historically disinvested neighborhoods were often 
targeted for the creation and support of housing-focused CDCs, due in part to the large stock of 
abandoned property that could be renovated and rebuilt through their efforts. Programs such as 
the National Community Development Initiative (NCDI) helped form CDCs to rehabilitate the 
local housing stock. While CDCs often have a much more diverse history and conduct a fuller 
range of activities than housing, capacities that were built through such initiatives as NCDI were 
primarily related to the production and renovation of the housing stock. In fact, these policy 
efforts formed the context from which LISC Chicago felt it needed to depart, through NCP, in 
promoting a more comprehensive approach that involved other actors. Given the general 
difficulty of sparking organizational change, it is not surprising that organizations that were 
“built” primarily to do something different from NCP found its model more challenging, as they 
were more accustomed to the work of direct implementation than facilitation or coordination. 
Transition Planning and the Shift to “Testing the Model” 
In the final two years of the initiative, planning once again had become an important part of 
NCP. Whereas the 2003 quality-of-life planning process emphasized relationship, network, and 
community capacity-building, this new round of planning focused on community change 
outcomes and the initiatives that would require focused effort to obtain these outcomes. This 
second round planning resulted in a new theoretical framework, called “Testing the Model” 
(TTM), which would define the next phase of the MacArthur Foundation’s support of NCP. At 
its core, MacArthur and LISC’s vision for TTM attempts to build on past NCP successes while 
pushing the initiative to a new level of focus — harnessing the power of the platform to achieve 
measurable community-level improvements. The highest-capacity lead agencies from NCP 
were selected to join TTM. In this vein, TTM still aims to improve capacity, develop relation-
ships, and deliver resources to neighborhoods. However, TTM also asks lead agencies to 
identify a specific community-wide challenge (such as youth safety, vacant properties, educa-
tional attainment) on which they will concentrate and coordinate efforts and around which they 
will target multistrategy, multipartner approaches to enacting quantifiable, community-wide 
goals.  
Planning for the Next Phase of NCP 
In 2010, program designers began planning for a new phase of NCP. As described 
above, NCP had built a “platform” of relationships that could be leveraged so as to respond to 
community problems. Moving forward, the MacArthur Foundation and LISC Chicago became 
interested in demonstrating how this platform could be more explicitly deployed to change 
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communities, by focusing the efforts of local networks on a single domain of work and coordi-
nating projects so as to improve outcomes in this domain. As described throughout this report, 
NCP defined comprehensiveness as a “sectoral” strategy, meaning that it was important for the 
initiative to catalyze action in multiple domains, including housing, health, and the arts. TTM, 
in contrast, promotes comprehensiveness of strategy to achieve focused, neighborhood-wide 
objectives related to educational improvement, safety, or housing. 
The shift in emphasis from NCP to TTM addresses, in some ways, a long-standing ten-
sion between LISC Chicago and the MacArthur Foundation about the goals of the initiative. 
MacArthur was interested in assessing community-level outcomes as a result of its substantial 
investment in NCP. LISC Chicago, in contrast — at least in the short term — saw the outcome 
of its work associated with strong interorganizational relationships. Community change out-
comes would result, LISC Chicago held, from strong, sustainable community networks. For its 
part, MacArthur recognized relationship-building as an important outcome for NCP, but it was 
equally concerned about accountability and demonstrating progress on community-level 
outcomes. According to MacArthur Foundation staff: 
We have built something; we have evidence of the platform. Testing the Model 
is testing the platform and being rigorous about the theory. I still think about it as 
a capacity building initiative in the next phase. . . . Now we are being more spe-
cific about what you think [the network] can lead to. 
Between October and December 2010, each NCP lead agency was asked by LISC Chi-
cago to conduct the local planning process that would result in a blueprint for ongoing imple-
mentation of the quality-of-life plan. This transition plan required lead agencies to narrow the 
focus of their NCP agenda to between three and five priority domains that could be advanced 
over a three-year period, to identify likely projects in each issue area, and to develop a set of 
metrics by which to measure progress. Knowing that the next phase of NCP would be funded at 
a lower level than the first phase, and understanding MacArthur’s interest in community-level 
change outcomes, there was concern and a great deal of uncertainty among lead agencies about 
their ability to sustain the NCP work. Few lead agencies that were interviewed in early 2010 
had a plan for sustaining NCP staff and programmatic efforts past MacArthur’s initial 10-year 
commitment, despite the inevitability of reduced future funding. The notion that NCP was to 
continue into a second phase was a validation for lead agencies of their work, and — though 
under stress to understand and communicate changes in the model to their partners within a 
limited time frame — the lead agencies and their community partners rallied to refocus and 
hone their efforts.  
For some lead agencies, the stakes of transition planning were higher than others. Quad 
Communities Development Corporation, Teamwork Englewood, and Washington Park Consor-
tium, for example, were formed by NCP and, at the time, were almost wholly reliant on NCP 
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funding to sustain their organizations, beyond specific projects that might have leveraged 
outside funding. In other instances, lead agencies expected NCP to end at the 10-year mark, and 
they felt that the relationships and practices that were built could sustain the most critical 
aspects of their work. In lead agencies where NCP remained a separate program, there was less 
at stake in terms of organizational sustainability after MacArthur Foundation funding for NCP 
ended. However, after the transition plans were reviewed by the foundation, it determined that 
the refined plans were still too broad and were not focused enough to test whether or not the 
platform created through NCP was positioned to make progress toward improving community-
level outcomes in the areas of priority identified by the lead agencies.  
Accordingly, MacArthur and LISC Chicago worked to design a new program architec-
ture, which they jointly presented to lead agencies in June 2011: Up to seven current NCP sites 
would be supported in the next round of MacArthur funding to “test proof of concept” of the 
initiative — or, in other words, to identify a single area where observable progress toward 
measureable community change outcomes is likely to be achieved within a time frame of three 
to five years, with future MacArthur funding for NCP to be concentrated on TTM.  
MacArthur’s next phase of NCP funding would be directed solely to TTM. In many 
ways, TTM is designed to address some of the challenges and shortfalls of the NCP model as it 
was practiced, described in preceding chapters, particularly regarding the coordination of 
investments. The design of NCP — developing a shared vision for improving the quality of life 
in historically disinvested communities through the coordination and capacity-building of often-
contentious and underresourced local partners — did not include any explicit mechanisms for 
concentrating resources or for identifying and measuring community-level change. But, for the 
foundation and for LISC Chicago, NCP was important not just because it allowed for the 
redevelopment of 14 neighborhood areas in Chicago but because it was, according to an early 
LISC memo, “an opportunity [for] LISC and the community development field in general to 
create a new methodology for measurement rooted in a contemporary theory of development.”9  
TTM, then, builds on the platform and capacity-building function of NCP and attempts 
to leverage to introduce a framework that aligns capacity-building and community change 
efforts in a through and more explicit program design. TTM provides the stage on which to test 
the “proof of concept” of NCP and to produce a conceptual and methodological framework that 
will not only be useful for evaluating TTM but that can also inform the community develop-
ment field generally. 
                                                     
9Mooney (2004). This is a memo from Andy Mooney, Executive Director of LISC Chicago, to Jonathan 
Fanton, President of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, May 18. 
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Nine sites were invited to submit proposals to participate in TTM, with the understand-
ing that only seven would be funded. For sites not selected to participate in TTM, LISC Chica-
go would maintain the NCP network and continue to identify and leverage additional multisite 
opportunities, technical assistance, and other resources.10 To support the seven sites that were 
selected to participate in TTM planning, MacArthur contracted with the Metro Chicago Infor-
mation Center (MCIC), a nonprofit research group, to assess the current data capacity of the 
lead agencies and then to work with lead agencies participating in TTM to think through their 
potential impact in measurable ways.  
In March 2012, the MacArthur Foundation awarded a three-year, $8 million grant in 
support of TTM. The seven TTM sites are now honing plans, with the help of issue experts and 
community partners. Areas of intervention selected by local groups include: 
• Education. Auburn Gresham directs activities to students from prekindergar-
ten (pre-K) through 12th grade. The Pilsen Bridge plan attempts to achieve 
better transitions in two areas: entry to kindergarten and entry to high school. 
Logan Square’s plan seeks to improve educational outcomes through parent 
organizing and engagement strategies and through additional educational 
supports.  
• Safety. East Garfield Park’s plan attempts to improve safety conditions as a 
way of sparking economic development along the Kedzie corridor. Little Vil-
lage’s plan focuses on youth development in a longer-term effort to reduce 
violence.  
• Housing. Chicago Southwest’s plan attempts to stabilize the housing market 
by creating opportunities for foreclosed properties to be reoccupied more 
quickly by residents.  
• Public health. Humboldt Park’s plan focuses on wellness and health educa-
tion goals, with initial emphasis on obesity prevention. 
Although plans are in refinement — in part because of the relatively rapid pace of TTM 
planning — they share the following objectives:  
1. Achieving high-quality interventions. TTM interventions consist of sets of 
programs whose intensity, scale, and reach are designed to lead to measura-
ble community-level change over time. Whereas the quality-of-life plans 
                                                     
10Two additional community areas — Albany Park and Back of the Yards — were added to the NCP net-
work during transition planning. These two communities had previously participated in LISC Chicago’s Great 
Neighborhoods Program. 
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were useful as inclusive documents connecting different areas of community 
interventions, TTM plans require a tight implementation logic that links 
change goals, intervention strategies, and measurable outputs.  
2. The integration of data. The TTM approach presupposes the use of both 
community-level and programmatic data to target and improve program im-
plementation. This is an area in which the TTM approach is at the leading 
edge of strategic innovation in the field of community change.11 TTM has 
provided technical assistance resources to help lead agencies build their data 
collection and analysis capacity.  
3. The coordination and use of networks. As an extension of NCP’s approach 
to community development through the strengthening of interorganizational 
networks, TTM presupposes the mobilization of multiple partners and coor-
dination of complementary efforts to address target issues comprehensively. 
4. Policy or systems change efforts. In order to achieve measurable communi-
ty-level effects in the target issue areas, the TTM approach involves efforts to 
attract greater resources from the public and private sectors that help scale up 
interventions or change policies in a way that reinforces and amplifies their 
effects.  
Changes, Tensions, and Opportunities 
Like NCP, TTM still attempts to build local capacity, but it is a capacity of a different 
sort. Instead of encouraging local groups to conduct a new, more relational model for communi-
ty development, there is greater emphasis on using these relationships to change neighborhoods. 
With this shift come substantial changes in the roles and relations of key actors and entities, 
involving new accountability and oversight responsibilities on the part of the MacArthur 
Foundation, LISC Chicago, and neighborhood lead agencies. Especially as expectations for 
community change and the dynamics of accountability and assessment have historically been a 
source of some tension in CCIs, the specification of expected outcomes, the introduction of data 
systems and performance management mechanisms, and the allocation of responsibility for 
monitoring and assessing progress have often been contentious. Community actors sometimes 
perceive efforts to introduce these elements as an imposition of funder priorities, a sign of 
                                                     
11Auspos (2012); Auspos and Kubisch (2012). 
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funder dissatisfaction or desire to exert stricter control over their work, and a contradiction of 
such guiding principles as community-driven agenda setting or resident empowerment.12  
To date, TTM has, in fact, sparked some tensions of this sort, especially related to po-
tential reduced funding in the initiative as a whole. As described above, during early transition 
planning, which initiated TTM efforts, not only were NCP neighborhoods in the process of 
adjusting to the effects of the Great Recession on critical programs and services, but the MacAr-
thur Foundation also indicated that its own funding could not be sustained at the same level in 
the next round of the initiative. In some instances, there was confusion about the expectations 
for transition planning and the move into TTM work. For some groups, a high degree of 
uncertainty about future funding to implement the plans was a major factor, as lead agencies felt 
that they were put in an awkward position in relationship to community partners who were not 
guaranteed funding to implement the plans that they identified. For other lead agencies, TTM 
represented a return to “top-down” planning. 
In contrast, other groups were more sympathetic to the planning process and to the pos-
sibilities of TTM. As one lead agency staff said, “This can . . . drill down on a domain so that 
we are able to learn how to do this in a better way, with qualitative and quantitative data on 
program outcomes.” Another remarked, “It’s very thrilling and terrifying because it gives you 
the opportunity to take a single issue, define strategies, be more methodical and really measure 
whether or not there’s been an impact.” TTM’s changes in orientation, management, and 
expectations are likely to generate challenges over the course of TTM implementation, and how 
the initiative navigates these challenges will be an important area of focus for future evaluation 
research. 
 
                                                     
12The most fully documented examples are Ford Foundation’s Neighborhood and Family Initiative 
(Chaskin, Chipenda-Dansokho, and Toler, 2000); the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s Neighborhood 
Improvement Initiative (Brown and Fiester, 2007); and the Northwest Area Foundation’s multisite community 
initiatives (FSG Social Impact Advisors, 2011). See also Fiester (2011) on the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s 
Making Connections initiative. 
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Appendix Table A.1 
 
Property Crime Reports per 10,000 Persons: Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
Neighborhood 
2000 to 2002 2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 528 -5.5 474 -5.1 439 -1.6 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 600 -2.2 579 -4.1 562 -2.1 
    Auburn Gresham 784 -2.1 823 -6.0 710 -0.0 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 323 -4.2 288 -2.9 268 1.6 
    Logan Square 591 -5.3 505 -12.2 437 0.1 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 446 -4.0 396 -8.1 349 -2.8 
    Chicago Lawn 503 -1.2 461 -3.7 431 -0.5 
    Humboldt Park 546 -2.3 488 -11.9 445 3.5 
    Little Village 288 -5.6 248 -4.6 207 -6.8 
    Pilsen 373 -11.3 342 -9.3 276 -10.5 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 689 -5.5 634 -3.0 577 -5.1 
    Englewood 691 -5.9 660 -1.7 701 -0.9 
    Garfield Park 689 1.6 712 0.6 715 -8.2 
    North Lawndale 530 -1.9 643 4.2 571 -4.4 
    Quad Communities 578 -8.9 544 -0.4 479 -0.8 
    South Chicago 539 -5.2 599 0.1 600 -14.2 
    Washington Park 767 -15.9 642 -3.9 664 -13.1 
    West Haven 845 7.9 915 -18.7 802 0.0 
    Woodlawn 687 -9.4 626 -1.1 648 -2.9 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 1,264 -8.3 1,053 -7.4 969 -1.7 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9. 
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Appendix Table A.2 
 
Violent Crime Reports per 10,000 Persons: Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 161 -2.7 139 -3.6 128 -4.5 
Neighborhood Group I 
(mean) 239 1.1 228 -0.6 230 -4.7 
    Auburn Gresham 329 3.0 331 -2.2 327 -2.4 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 60 -3.1 52 -4.0 47 -2.7 
    Logan Square 149 -8.3 99 -11.7 79 -3.0 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 118 0.4 99 -4.3 92 -4.2 
    Chicago Lawn 131 5.2 139 7.4 148 -2.1 
    Humboldt Park 246 -3.6 196 -6.1 170 0.6 
    Little Village 118 2.2 83 -4.8 72 -1.4 
    Pilsen 127 -12.3 93 -7.8 75 -5.3 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 356 -4.4 296 -1.8 257 -8.6 
    Englewood 418 -1.6 366 -4.2 347 -6.1 
    Garfield Park 467 -0.1 410 -1.7 390 -2.8 
    North Lawndale 336 -9.6 288 0.7 299 -11.4 
    Quad Communities 294 -12.2 227 3.3 181 -17.0 
    South Chicago 270 4.4 259 -1.4 257 -11.0 
    Washington Park 540 -11.2 409 -2.0 325 -4.8 
    West Haven 454 -0.1 372 -11.3 258 -15.9 
    Woodlawn 350 -5.1 319 4.0 317 -3.6 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 156 -3.0 123 -6.0 106 -8.2 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9.  
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Appendix Table A.3 
 
Home Purchase Loan Originations per 10,000 Owner-Occupied, Single-Family Housing Units: 
Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 1,345 3.2 1,860 22.3 1,163 -35.2 
Neighborhood Group I 
(mean) 476 1.9 741 34.0 443 -46.7 
    Auburn Gresham 580 19.8 1,033 37.6 576 -49.1 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 1,930 3.2 2,612 19.4 1,663 -32.2 
    Logan Square 3,188 6.3 4,316 25.4 3,059 -33.6 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 1,134 2.1 1,675 24.7 888 -40.9 
    Chicago Lawn 883 5.8 1,354 25.6 531 -41.0 
    Humboldt Park 1,865 3.2 3,667 40.8 2,190 -47.1 
    Little Village 1,462 5.5 2,029 31.0 817 -51.8 
    Pilsen 1,391 23.2 1,822 24.1 1,443 -37.3 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 2,074 17.1 4,119 42.8 3,409 -50.9 
    Englewood 633 14.7 1,437 60.3 836 -56.5 
    Garfield Park 2,295 24.0 5,159 52.0 3,009 -56.0 
    North Lawndale 1,711 31.0 2,802 22.0 2,070 -61.9 
    Quad Communities 2,719 4.1 4,998 33.8 3,943 -42.2 
    South Chicago 1,243 -0.1 1,761 45.0 1,055 -60.0 
    Washington Park 3,895 14.6 10,824 124.2 9,298 -57.4 
    West Haven 2,472 39.1 7,101 7.5 10,676 -51.2 
    Woodlawn 2,536 26.3 5,854 31.4 4,391 -47.3 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 10,529 4.4 13,632 14.1 9,976 -26.6 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9. 
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Appendix Table A.4 
 
Average Total Home Purchase Loan Amounts (Dollars in Thousands) per Owner-Occupied, Single-Family 
Housing Unit: Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 25 11.2 39 18.3 27 -29.1 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 5 6.0 8 31.7 6 -43.2 
    Auburn Gresham 6 33.6 13 36.8 9 -46.2 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 34 13.0 52 16.8 34 -29.0 
    Logan Square 71 19.4 110 24.2 82 -29.1 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 17 13.4 29 21.8 17 -41.7 
    Chicago Lawn 11 18.6 20 20.3 8 -42.8 
    Humboldt Park 32 13.3 73 35.1 46 -43.3 
    Little Village 18 16.0 31 24.8 13 -56.5 
    Pilsen 23 38.8 35 23.1 30 -34.4 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 31 29.8 67 42.0 64 -47.8 
    Englewood 5 27.1 15 64.2 13 -47.5 
    Garfield Park 31 33.3 84 50.3 56 -54.5 
    North Lawndale 21 45.6 42 23.2 37 -59.0 
    Quad Communities 52 9.1 104 32.9 91 -39.9 
    South Chicago 10 6.5 19 47.7 14 -61.3 
    Washington Park 54 27.6 150 120.7 162 -56.8 
    West Haven 46 44.8 150 6.8 216 -49.0 
    Woodlawn 34 41.5 91 19.6 78 -43.4 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 245 11.9 370 15.7 291 -20.5 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9.  
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Appendix Table A.5 
 
Filed Foreclosures per 10,000 Owner-Occupied, Single-Family Housing Units:  
Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 239 34.3 237 -22.0 329 17.9 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 387 41.9 404 -17.8 461 1.7 
    Auburn Gresham 461 58.2 470 -23.2 508 -2.9 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 108 38.1 96 -18.8 175 41.2 
    Logan Square 241 36.9 197 -42.9 287 65.9 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 246 34.8 226 -21.8 379 46.7 
    Chicago Lawn 196 43.1 237 -21.3 483 36.3 
    Humboldt Park 726 40.5 640 -42.4 710 19.2 
    Little Village 302 32.5 291 -30.8 439 50.7 
    Pilsen 351 20.2 257 -35.0 302 41.4 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 1,061 32.4 822 -32.8 707 15.6 
    Englewood 931 26.7 825 -16.8 867 -2.0 
    Garfield Park 1,964 29.2 1,338 -43.2 966 1.9 
    North Lawndale 1,553 17.7 1,428 -45.2 714 -4.8 
    Quad Communities 624 45.4 581 -22.5 694 2.9 
    South Chicago 935 54.4 754 -39.0 710 14.2 
    Washington Park 2,921 10.3 2,247 -30.5 2,051 5.7 
    West Haven 757 79.2 741 -0.4 662 46.5 
    Woodlawn 1,177 30.2 995 -33.2 956 21.0 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 208 20.5 145 -29.7 92 17.2 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9.  
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Appendix Table A.6 
 
Completed Foreclosures per 10,000 Owner-Occupied, Single-Family Housing Units:  
Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9.  
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 175 31.0 182 -28.4 119 24.5 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 293 32.9 344 -26.9 186 5.2 
    Auburn Gresham 324 30.1 417 -36.2 204 8.5 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 70 37.3 55 -27.3 51 80.1 
    Logan Square 123 34.5 101 -47.1 90 109.1 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 158 23.6 156 -27.1 127 88.6 
    Chicago Lawn 133 40.5 159 -26.1 157 41.1 
    Humboldt Park 519 39.0 552 -40.4 277 41.7 
    Little Village 168 56.3 172 -42.8 134 51.5 
    Pilsen 134 12.8 188 -38.0 84 98.4 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 834 33.8 774 -28.6 286 30.9 
    Englewood 827 30.3 778 -26.3 441 -1.1 
    Garfield Park 1,589 21.2 1,285 -47.4 421 23.3 
    North Lawndale 1,341 69.3 1,045 -36.9 370 -5.1 
    Quad Communities 475 58.5 484 -43.2 249 15.6 
    South Chicago 772 37.2 715 -27.1 273 0.7 
    Washington Park 2,921 26.9 1,985 -32.3 730 50.8 
    West Haven 353 6.7 283 -52.6 358 69.5 
    Woodlawn 1,083 45.8 931 -14.6 391 32.1 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 77 60.7 63 -28.4 24 52.4 
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Appendix Table A.7 
 
Average Small Business Loan Amounts (Dollars in Thousands) per Square Mile of Commercial Land Area:  
Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, by Time Period  
 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9. 
 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 30,719 8.4 37,120 -5.7 32,344 -15.4 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 11,311 6.6 13,387 -4.1 11,476 -21.7 
    Auburn Gresham 6,288 4.3 7,518 -10.3 7,761 -27.2 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 38,952 13.1 51,043 -8.3 43,322 -16.7 
    Logan Square 59,392 17.5 59,777 -0.2 53,746 -22.7 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 15,035 16.3 22,590 -0.9 15,415 -13.4 
    Chicago Lawn 11,174 -6.4 15,941 -5.2 11,882 -29.1 
    Humboldt Park 20,953 7.5 27,434 -7.2 24,814 -17.9 
    Little Village 9,352 34.6 14,410 -6.6 9,363 -18.9 
    Pilsen 15,694 10.4 19,218 -15.5 13,993 -10.6 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 14,184 13.2 22,171 6.9 19,706 -24.9 
    Englewood 6,564 49.6 10,340 -15.9 8,523 -13.9 
    Garfield Park 20,275 2.2 31,278 15.2 22,988 -13.9 
    North Lawndale 12,276 -40.3 18,723 4.9 11,646 -50.8 
    Quad Communities 6,745 4.7 13,464 51.7 10,305 -36.5 
    South Chicago 12,202 11.1 15,998 -5.0 11,902 -26.5 
    Washington Park 11,949 -11.3 9,037 45.0 9,498 -51.9 
    West Haven 34,137 45.7 58,550 4.4 61,759 -6.0 
    Woodlawn 7,092 14.7 12,749 -10.9 10,629 -31.1 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 148,494 8.9 156,997 -4.1 142,224 -13.7 
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Appendix Table A.8 
 
Area Jobs per 10,000 Working-Age Persons: Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, 
by Time Period 
 
 
SOURCE and NOTES follow Appendix Table A.9. 
 
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 5,129 NA 4,873 0.1 5,074 1.9 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 1,686 NA 1,690 -0.2 1,550 0.2 
    Auburn Gresham 1,183 NA 1,140 0.5 1,118 -2.1 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 4,447 NA 4,288 1.2 4,311 -1.7 
    Logan Square 2,198 NA 2,145 0.7 2,258 0.4 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 3,068 NA 3,007 1.0 2,925 -2.6 
    Chicago Lawn 1,755 NA 1,712 -1.0 1,629 -3.0 
    Humboldt Park 2,562 NA 2,458 -2.5 2,287 0.1 
    Little Village 1,670 NA 1,668 -1.9 1,681 0.2 
    Pilsen 4,201 NA 4,177 1.8 4,329 1.4 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 3,623 NA 3,605 1.8 3,052 1.4 
    Englewood 745 NA 658 -6.4 598 -1.5 
    Garfield Park 2,584 NA 2,883 8.1 3,213 -19.4 
    North Lawndale 1,062 NA 1,244 6.4 1,397 -7.2 
    Quad Communities 960 NA 863 -0.0 1,126 8.5 
    South Chicago 1,341 NA 1,248 2.9 1,412 6.4 
    Washington Park 434 NA 470 -6.3 431 -0.9 
    West Haven 16,033 NA 18,464 1.8 10,162 1.3 
    Woodlawn 1,227 NA 1,145 -3.1 1,161 1.3 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 37,417 NA 34,150 0.7 37,642 2.0 
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Appendix Table A.9 
 
Resident Workers per 10,000 Working-Age Persons: Average Rate and Annual Percentage Change, 
by Time Period 
 
SOURCE and NOTES are on the following page.  
Neighborhood 
 2000 to 2002  2003 to 2005  2006 to 2009 
 Rate % Change  Rate % Change  Rate % Change 
Chicago 4,663 NA 4,357 -0.7 4,035 -1.6 
Neighborhood Group I (mean) 4,221 NA 3,718 -2.2 3,535 -0.9 
    Auburn Gresham 3,999 NA 3,690 -2.2 3,556 -0.6 
Neighborhood Group II 
(mean) 5,101 NA 4,804 -0.1 4,504 0.4 
    Logan Square 4,940 NA 4,708 -0.6 4,032 -6.5 
Neighborhood Group III 
(mean) 4,335 NA 4,065 -2.8 3,693 -1.1 
    Chicago Lawn 4,837 NA 4,573 -1.1 4,079 -2.3 
    Humboldt Park 4,464 NA 4,119 -1.8 3,652 -3.2 
    Little Village 2,992 NA 2,741 -4.4 2,356 -3.1 
    Pilsen 3,684 NA 3,460 -0.6 3,267 -1.5 
Neighborhood Group IV 
(mean) 3,999 NA 3,672 -0.4 3,616 -0.1 
    Englewood 3,896 NA 3,416 -4.1 3,195 -0.5 
    Garfield Park 4,195 NA 3,980 -0.1 3,850 -0.6 
    North Lawndale 4,406 NA 4,090 0.4 3,934 -0.4 
    Quad Communities 4,071 NA 3,691 -1.1 3,915 2.3 
    South Chicago 3,859 NA 3,442 -5.6 3,293 0.9 
    Washington Park 3,500 NA 3,225 -2.5 3,406 1.7 
    West Haven 4,448 NA 4,489 3.4 5,001 2.7 
    Woodlawn 3,984 NA 3,518 -0.6 3,742 5.8 
Neighborhood Group V 
(mean) 5,351 NA 5,446 3.6 5,623 -0.9 
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Source and Notes for Appendix Tables A.1 to A.9 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of data assembled by Metro Chicago Information Center (MCIC). 
 
NOTES 
 
Appendix Table A.1: The property crime indicator is calculated as the number of reported property crimes divided by the 2000 population count 
(U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each time period was calculated using a regression procedure in 
order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.2: The violent crime indicator is calculated as the number of reported violent crimes divided by the 2000 population count 
(U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each time period was calculated using a regression procedure in 
order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.3: The home mortgage loan originations indicator is calculated as the number of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act home 
purchase loan originations for owner-occupied, single-family homes divided by the 2000 count of owner-occupied, single-family housing units 
(U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each time period was calculated using a regression procedure in 
order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.4: The home mortgage total loan amount indicator is calculated as the sum of the amounts of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
home purchase loan originations for owner-occupied, single-family homes (in thousands of 2005 dollars) divided by the 2000 count of owner-
occupied, single-family housing units (U.S. Decennial Census). Average percentage change for each time period was calculated using a regression 
procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.5: The foreclosures filed indicator is calculated as the total number of single-family home foreclosures filed divided by the 
2000 count of owner-occupied, single-family housing units (U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each 
time period was calculated using a regression procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.6: The foreclosures completed indicator is calculated as the total number of single-family home foreclosures completed 
divided by the 2000 count of owner-occupied, single-family housing units (U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage 
change for each time period was calculated using a regression procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.7: The small business loan amount indicator is calculated as the sum of the Community Reinvestment Act small business loan 
amounts (in thousands of 2005 dollars) divided by the square miles of commercial land area. Average percentage change for each time period was 
calculated using a regression procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
 
(continued) 
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Source and Notes for Appendix Tables A.1 to A.9 (continued) 
 
Appendix Table A.8: The area jobs indicator is calculated as the total number of jobs in the area divided by the 2000 count of population over 15 
years of age (U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each time period was calculated using a regression 
procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
 
Appendix Table A.9: The resident workers indicator is calculated as the total number of workers residing in the area divided by the 2000 count of 
population over 15 years of age (U.S. Decennial Census) multiplied by 10,000. Average percentage change for each time period was calculated 
using a regression procedure in order to lessen the influence of extreme values and outliers.  
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Appendix B 
Supplementary Figures for Chapter 5 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Appendix Figure B.1   
 
Spatial Distribution of NCP Projects and Funding, by Neighborhood and Domain 
 
a. Chicago Lawn: Economic and Workforce Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
  
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
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Appendix Figure B.1 (continued) 
   
b. Chicago Lawn: Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
  10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.1 (continued) 
 
c. Chicago Lawn: Real Estate Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding
 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.1 (continued) 
 
d. Chicago Lawn: Social Services 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of project location data provided by LISC Chicago and verified by lead agencies.  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Appendix Figure B.2   
 
Spatial Distribution of NCP Projects and Funding, by Neighborhood and Domain 
 
a. Humboldt Park: Economic and Workforce Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.2 (continued) 
 
b. Humboldt Park: Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.2 (continued) 
 
c. Humboldt Park: Real Estate Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.2 (continued) 
 
d. Humboldt Park: Social Services 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of project location data provided by LISC Chicago and verified by lead agencies. 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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The New Communities Program 
 
Appendix Figure B.3   
 
Spatial Distribution of NCP Projects and Funding, by Neighborhood and Domain 
 
a. Quad Communities: Economic and Workforce Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.3 (continued) 
 
b. Quad Communities: Public Spaces, Community Image, and the Arts 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
  
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.3 (continued) 
 
c. Quad Communities: Real Estate Development 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
  10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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Appendix Figure B.3 (continued) 
 
d. Quad Communities: Social Services 
 
NCP Projects 
 
 
 
 
NCP Funding 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: MDRC analysis of project location data provided by LISC Chicago and verified by lead agencies. 
 
10 or more percent 5 to 9 percent Less than 5 percent 
10 or more projects 5 to 9 projects Fewer than 5 projects 
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